Intensive Supervision of Offenders on Prerelease Furlough: An Evaluation of the Vermont Experience
During the 1988 presidential campaign, a furor erupted over inmate furloughs when the Republican candidate, George Bush, accused his Democratic opponent of being "soft on crime." To prove his point, he cited the case of an inmate from the Democrat's home state who had committed a sexual assault and stabbing while on a furlough.
Intensive supervision of inmates on prerelease furlough evolved from a house arrest initiative that
began in 1988 in Chittenden county (in the northwestern part of Vermont). As a measure to relieve
overcrowding, the house arrest program was designed as an alternative for misdemeanant offenders and
non-violent felons with short sentences (maximum sentence of no more than 120 days). Corrections
department officials select who is admitted to the program, and correctional officers monitor home
confinement. Supervision includes several face-to-face contacts per week as well as random daily
telephone checks. Alcohol and drug testing are also standard features of the program.
Before March 1988, supervision of inmates on prerelease furlough was almost non-existent compared
with the house arrest program. The normal procedure for monitoring offenders on prerelease furlough -
offenders who had served long sentences - included, at most, twice weekly face-to-face contacts or
telephone checks.
The superintendent of the Chittenden correctional facility felt that house arrest resources should be
used to monitor furloughed inmates. He noted that people under house arrest consisted of a few
misdemeanants who were being intensively monitored while furloughed inmates, who had much more
serious criminal histories, were being virtually ignored. He received permission from his superiors
to have resources from the house arrest program diverted to supervise furloughed inmates as
intensively as inmates under house arrest.
Thus, the intensive supervision of inmates on prerelease furlough began. The policy of supervising
furloughed inmates spread to the southwestern part of the state in 1989. Now, almost all inmates on
prerelease furlough in Vermont are intensively supervised. Department officials felt comfortable with
such a policy in part because they worried that increased reliance on furloughs to control
overcrowding would lead to the release of more dangerous people to the street.
Our analysis examines two questions. First, are inmates under intensive supervision different from
those monitored under previous furlough supervision practices? Second, are the outcomes
different?
We examined two groups of inmates on prerelease furlough. One group consisted of 36 offenders who
were furloughed from the Chittenden facility between January 1986 and April 1988. The furlough
episodes for this group numbered 40 (an inmate can be furloughed more than once). Members of this
group received minimal supervision. We labelled these offenders Group 1.
The other group, Group 2, was furloughed from the Chittenden facility between March 1988 and November
1991. They numbered 69, with the number of furlough episodes being 105. This group received intensive
supervision.
There were no statistically significant differences in the average minimum sentence and the average
maximum sentence of the two groups.
There was, however, an important difference between the two groups in their current offence type.
Contrary to the prediction of some, those released under intensive supervision were not more
dangerous.
Indeed, a significantly higher proportion of offenders in this group were non-violent offenders. Our
conclusion is that the pressure of crowding encouraged officials to furlough more offenders who were
eligible according to department policy.
Our analysis also showed that the population furloughed under intensive supervision was at no greater
risk to reoffend than past populations, if felony record is an indication. There was no statistically
significant difference in the proportion of offenders with a felony history. Again, we conclude that
more offenders who were eligible were furloughed.
Finally, there was no significant difference in the average length of each furlough episode.
Figure 1 shows a comparison between the outcomes of the two groups' furloughs. While one in five
furlough episodes ended in revocation under previous supervision practices, about one in two were
revoked under intensive supervision. In the case of the former, all revocations were for violations
of furlough conditions. Regarding the latter, 2 revocations were for arrests, and 3 furloughs were
revoked for criminal actions for which there was a subsequent conviction; the other 48 revocations
were for violations of conditions.
Figures 2 and 3 compare the therapeutic or rehabilitative effects of intensive supervision with those
of previous practices. Offenders in each group were tracked for one year after release from prison.
Figure 2 shows that 15% of offenders in Group 1 and 19.1% of those in Group 2 were subsequently
convicted of another crime. This difference was not statistically significant.
Moreover, Figure 3 indicates that, of those who were subsequently reconvicted,
individuals in neither group were more likely to be violent than those
in the other. Of offenders in Group 1, one in six (16.7%) subsequently
committed a violent crime, while 4 in 17 (23.5%) of offenders in Group
2 were convicted of a violent act. Again, the difference was not statistically
significant.



The results of this study cast some doubt on the usefulness of intensive supervision for offenders on
prerelease furlough. Though offender control is improved, it does not seem to affect public
safety.
Whether the benefits gained in offender control are worth the costs in resources and further prison
crowding (due to returning offenders) is a much discussed subject among practitioners and
academics.(4)It costs about US$8,000 per year to supervise intensively each offender on
furlough. Lacking budget estimates for previous practices, we can assume that the costs were minimal.
Hence, a return to such practices could probably save money.
Nevertheless, there are reasons for maintaining intensive supervision. In an era of hardening public
attitudes toward crime, corrections professionals have stressed surveillance and de-emphasized
service brokerage for offenders in the community.(5)With an increasing number of offenders
on furlough, corrections officials may want to maintain a public surveillance presence in the
interest of good public relations.
In addition, Vermont is one of the few jurisdictions in the United States never to have been under
court order to release inmates because of overcrowding. It is quite clear that the present furlough
program has helped in this regard. Moreover, the delicate policy decisions regarding whom to release
are still the jurisdiction of elected and appointed officials rather than the judiciary. This
situation provides for a high degree of public accountability.
It is likely that events will eventually cause changes in practices, however.
The offender population is projected to grow well beyond prison capacity.
Eventually, street supervision resources may be insufficient to continue
intensive surveillance. At that point, supervision practices may necessarily
become less intensive yet, as this research suggests, more appropriate
for monitoring offenders on the street.