Does "Punishing Smarter" Work? An Assessment of the New Generation of Alternative Sanctions in Probation
We have witnessed a major revolution in criminal justice practices since Martinson's
(2)
famous proclamation of "nothing works" in the mid-1970s. That statement praised the death of
rehabilitation and rejoiced in the dawning of the new epoch of punishment In this paper, we summarize
the latest results of this new era. We ask ourselves whether intensive probation or parole -the new
alternative sanctions - reduce recidivism, improve sentencing options, lessen prison overcrowding and
lower the costs of corrections as they are purported to do. And we find our answers in the research
evidence. The Past First, let's reminisce about the age of rehabilitation. From our vantage point,
and we think our reading of past events has some validity, the primary goal of probation officers, and
to a lesser extent prison staff, was to work within a rehabilitative framework to reduce clients'
involvement with the law. Admittedly, in retrospect, it seems that much of what occurred in the name of
rehabilitation in the 1960s and early 1970s was perhaps naive.
On the other hand, there were some bold and exciting initiatives during that time that were thoroughly
evaluated and shown to reduce recidivism by up to 80%. These programs were grounded in behaviourial
principles of treatment, took individual differences into account and had program designers and
supervisors who were trained in using clinical techniques to change offenders' behaviour.
The following examples, taken from probation settings,
(3) are illustrative of behaviourial
programs that reduced recidivism. Walter and Mill's Behaviourial Employment Intervention Program for
juveniles emphasized a token economy, contingency contracting and life-skills training. Programmers
worked very closely and efficiently with employers and the courts to ensure the integrity of the
program.
Andrews' and Kiessling's Canadian Volunteers in Corrections Program used professionals and volunteers
from the public in an adult probation supervision program. The major features of the counselling and
supervision practices were: the use of authority, anticriminal modelling and reinforcement, problem
solving, use of community resources and quality of interpersonal relationships.
Finally, Robert E. Lee's Project CREST in Florida targeted "hard core" juvenile probationers. Paid
doctoral students in counselling psychology or education programs were the primary therapists who worked
on a one-on-one basis with clients. Therapy drew on a number of approaches, including reality,
rational-emotive and client-centred therapies and some behaviour modification techniques. The threat or
use of sanctions was left to the supervising probation officer. The Present Moving now to the present,
we see that Marrinson correctly predicted the future. With isolated exceptions, the new generation of
programs for offenders are rooted in punishment. Excluding the dramatic increase in the use of
incarceration, which can hardly be called programmatic or new, we are referring to what policy makers in
the 1980s called "punishing smarter" alternative sanctions. By and large, these alternative sanctions
can be found in probationary settings and are called intensive supervision probation programs, or
ISPs.
As Billie J. Erwin so forcefully put it when referring to the Georgia ISP, which was considered by many
to be a model for the United States: ...we are in the business of increasing the heat on
probationers...satisfying the public's demand for just punishment.... Criminals must be punished for
their misdeeds.
(4) Or, as Joan Petersilia remarked, probation was becoming more dreaded than
prison.
(5)
The new generation of ISPs turned up the heat by:
-
greatly increasing contact between supervisors and offenders;
-
confining offenders to their homes;
-
enforcing curfews;
-
submitting offenders to random drug testing;
-
requiring offenders to perform community service;
-
requiring offenders to pay restitution to victims;
-
electronically monitoring offenders; and
-
requiring offenders to pay for the privilege of being supervised.
Various ISPs have employed these alternative sanctions to varying degrees.
(6) As well, shock
incarceration and boot camps were often adjuncts to ISPs.
Given the new reality of punishment as the preferable option, it comes as no surprise that
rehabilitative program components, specifically those that attempt to reinforce prosocial behaviour,
have been greatly deemphasized. For example, in some recently studied ISPs that claimed to offer a
meaningful amount of treatment services, evaluators
(7) found that services on average
consisted of only three hours of personal contact per month between the offender and the supervising
probation or parole officer.
Second, individual differences have been almost totally ignored. There have been no ISPs that
deliberately matched clients with services or type of supervising officer.
All of this, then, is in stark contrast to the probation programs of the early 1970s described earlier
in this article.
In summary, a profound shift in policy and practice has occurred in the field of parole and probation.
The obvious question is: how effective are these new alternative sanction ISPs? The consensus in the
literature is that these programs should improve sentencing options, reduce prison overcrowding, lower
the costs of corrections and reduce offender recidivism. Do the programs achieve any of these
objectives? Impact on Sentencing Policy and Options for Corrections According to supporters of the
justice model,
(8) alternative sanctions provide more correctional and sentencing options to
the criminal justice system and may restore or improve fairness in sentencing.
With ISPs, prosecutors, defence attorneys and judges have an additional intermediate option when
considering release on bail and admission to pretrial intervention programs.
Judges also have additional choices for sentencing; they may choose an ISP rather than traditional
probation or prison. It should be noted, however, that ISPs have had some negative consequences on
sentencing policy. According to von Hirsch and others,
(9) judges appear to have used ISPs as
a net-widening technique in some states.
Finally, as an option for corrections, ISPs provide correctional departments and parole boards with an
additional program option. Impact on Costs of Corrections Several comparisons of ISPs and regular
probation have been made. Researchers from the RAND Corporation reported that in the several locales
they studied, ISPs were about 50% more costly than routine probation supervision. A recent American
Probation and Parole Association survey, involving the second author, studied American jurisdictions
using ISPs and reported the following daily cost estimates: regular probation - $2 to $5; ISP - $7 to
$15; and prisons -$35 to $65.
Moreover, specific aspects of ISPs are very expensive. The costs of drug testing for about 200
offenders in an Arizona ISP
(10) added about half a million dollars to the annual budget.
While it was estimated that ISPs in New Jersey and Georgia saved about $7,000 per participant compared
with regular probation, Michael Tonry's
(11) critique of these figures cast doubt on the
extent of the savings.
In fact, ISPs may be more costly because they either inadvertently send offenders to prison who would
otherwise be eligible for probation or they cater to low-risk offenders who may not need this level of
supervision. As to the last point, Clear and Hardyman
(12) made a cogent observation about the
"costs" of ISPs. They claimed that more resources have been poured into ISPs even though they tend to
have lower-risk populations than regular probation does. Thus, many regular probation services, deprived
of resources that have been diverted to ISPs, monitor higher-risk offenders less stringently, thereby
jeopardizing public safety. Impact on Prison Overcrowding Recent research on ISPs has consistently found
that they do not reduce prison overcrowding. In fact, they may contribute to the problem in both obvious
and subtle ways.
The RAND studies in California estimated that at least 10% of offenders entering prison had their
probation or parole revoked. Indeed, the figures may be higher elsewhere. ISP offenders are watched more
closely, and as a result, technical violations are more likely to be detected and processed.
Furthermore, ISP offenders typically have more release conditions and, because of this, may be at
greater risk of rule violations.
It has been speculated that offenders who had probation revoked on technical violations may have been
"going bad" and would have been incarcerated later for more serious crimes anyway. However, the
evaluations of three California ISPs
(13) found no relationship between the number of
technical violations an offender received and the number of subsequent rearrests.
Michael Tonry's analysis revealed other ways the courts may increase prison loads via ISPs. In New
Jersey, some judges have sent potentially eligible probationers to jail on the assumption that they
would then get into an ISP when, in fact, this sometimes did not happen. Impact on Recidivism As one
would expect, the recidivism rates for ISP offenders are lower than for inmates who are released from
prison into the community without participating in an ISP. For example, participants in the Georgia ISP
had 18% fewer rearrests. Tonry and Will
(14) have criticized the prison-based comparison
groups used in the Georgia evaluation since, if anything, these offenders were at greater risk for
reoffending from the outset. The crucial question, however, is do ISPs produce lower recidivism rates
than regular probation or parole?
The answer: alternative sanctions either as stand-alone programs or incorporated into ISPs inevitably
result in about the same or slightly higher recidivism rates than comparable regular probation programs
which monitor inmates much less intensively. This conclusion is based on a comprehensive meta-analysis
of the intermediate sanction literature conducted by the first and third authors of this
article.
(15)
A subset of these data merits attention. Researchers studied probationers who were randomly assigned to
ISPs and control groups (for example, those on regular probation). These studies were replicated across
several sites.
(16) It was found that 39% of ISP offenders had been jailed compared with 28%
of offenders in the control groups. The comparable results for incarceration rates were 13% and 10%
respectively.
Among all the negative results reported so far, four ISP studies deserve more discussion. The Pearson
Evaluation of a New Jersey ISP
(17) This evaluation of the New Jersey Intensive Supervision
program reported that ISPs reduced recidivism. Pearson reported two sets of results: one for a closely
matched smaller sample and one for a less closely matched, larger sample.
In the smaller sample, the ISP group (N=208) had recidivism rates 10% lower than those of a closely
matched regular probation group (N=95) for a two-year follow-up.
The second set of results was on a larger, more representative sample (ISP group, N=352; regular
probation group, N=287), but the control group was not as closely matched. The latter results were
analyzed using the offenders risk level. By far, the greatest reductions in recidivism were found among
the high-risk offenders - high-risk offenders in the ISP had recidivism rates 30% lower than those on
regular probation.
This finding supports Don Andrews' well-documented risk principle
(18) which predicts that
higher-risk offenders should benefit most from interventions that positively reinforce behaviour. There
is no data, however, to indicate that higher-risk offenders benefit more from punishment.
Unfortunately, Pearson did not provide outcome data by risk level for his more closely matched sample.
At this point, we can tentatively conclude that the New Jersey program worked to some degree, but how
well it worked is debatable given that the ISP and control groups were matched only approximately.
Why did this program appear to work? Based on published program descriptions and personal contacts, the
New Jersey program offered more treatment than regular probation. Most program participants attended
peer-support sessions led by an ISP officer and received specialized counselling (for example, drug and
alcohol counselling).
(19) However, it was not statistically documented whether the ISP group
received significantly more treatment services than the group assigned to regular probation.
This study is also important because it paid close attention to the program implementation process. The
New Jersey ISP offered an attractive salary and recruited staff from statewide probation departments and
social work agencies. Program designers had the luxury of selecting staff from a large pool of qualified
applications, and the hiring process was not constrained by civil service or union seniority
regulations. Quality of staff is rarely addressed in ISP studies, yet having appropriate staff is
clearly an important factor. The Byrne and Kelly Evaluation of Massachusetts ISPs
(20) The
second study of note was conducted in Massachusetts. It found no differences in recidivism between the
ISP participants and the comparison groups at several sites. One reason for this was the poor
implementation of the ISP model. Only 27% of the ISP offenders were supervised by their probation
officers in the way that the program originally intended. This rather alarming result may be, in fact,
fairly typical of ISPs.
The Massachusetts study did, however, provide some valuable information. The investigators found a
relationship between the quality of an officer's supervision of probationers and recidivism. In both the
ISP program and the regular supervision group, recidivism rates were 12% to 33% lower among offenders
whose probation officer offered high-quality as opposed to lower-quality supervision. The authors
concluded that their findings offered strong support for treatment and advocated that funding be
provided for employment/education and substance abuse treatment rather than for new surveillance
equipment. The Petersilia and Turner Study
(21) This important study had typical results:
there were no differences in recidivism rates between ISP offenders and controls at three sites. At two
of the sites, however, probationers who took part in programs (employment, counselling and restitution)
had significantly lower recidivism rates. The Paparozzi and Gendreau Study of a New Jersey
ISP
(22) This study, carried out by New Jersey's Bureau of Parole, was unusual for an ISP. It
deliberately targeted high-risk offenders, and it documented the fact that the ISP group received
significantly more treatment services than the control group on regular probation. The study, using
three measures of recidivism, reported reductions in recidivism of 21% to 29% for ISP offenders compared
with a carefully matched sample of probationers in a regular probation program.
Paparozzi and Gendreau also reported that parole offices that were most supportive of the program had
lower recidivism rates among their probationers - an important finding regarding implementation
issues.
Second, they found that parole officers who had a balanced approach to their supervisory work had lower
recidivism rates among their probationers (20% on average for three measures of recidivism) than
officers who were "law enforcement" or "social work" in their approach.
One other finding deserves mention. Probationers under "law enforcement" officers had a 43% technical
violation rate. Is it any wonder that ISPs have been found to have higher rates of technical violations
(which lead to higher incarceration rates) when it is common knowledge that many ISPs have recruited
officers with just this sort of supervisory approach?
In summary, none of these four ISPs assessed the quality of the treatment services delivered to
probationers. The New Jersey Bureau of Parole study, as well as a recent review of probation services by
the American Probation and Parole Association, has recommended that the highest priority be given to
assessing the quality of treatment services using measures such as the Correctional Program Assessment
Inventory.
(23) Conclusion Using various alternative sanctions, correctional systems have been
"turning up the heat" on probationers. But our study of these new sanctions found:
-
no discernable improvement in the delivery of "better justice";
-
a doubling of the cost compared with regular probation;
-
a reduction in public safety;
-
an increase in the prison overcrowding problem; and
-
no effect on offender recidivism and a belated rediscovery that only the inclusion of treatment
services will have any positive effect on reducing recidivism.
As to the so-called rediscovery of treatment services, it has been shown once again that ideology has
little respect for evidence. From the late 1970s to 1990, about a dozen reviews have appeared in the
literature indicating that treatment services can reduce offender recidivism and that punishment and
sanctions cannot.
We need to revisit some of the classic studies of the 1970s (noted in the introduction) that showed
reductions in recidivism. If policy makers choose not to be better informed, then it should be made
crystal clear by supporters of alternative sanctions that retribution and control are the goals of the
criminal justice system. It is time to stop hiding behind the smoke screen of "doing justice," reducing
costs and reducing recidivism.
(1)Address all correspondence to: Paul Gendreau, Ph.D., Professor of
Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of New Brunswick, P.O. Box 5050, Saint John, New
Brunswick E2L 4L5.
(2)R. Martinson, "California Research at the Crossroads." Crime and Delinquency, 22
(1976): 180-191.
(3)R.R. Ross and P. Gendreau, Effective Correctional Treatment (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1980).
(4)B.J. Erwin, "Turning Up the Heat on Probationers in Georgia," Federal Probation,
50(1986): 17-24, p.17.
(5)J. Petersilia, "When Probation Becomes More Dreaded than Prison," Federal
Probation. 54, 1 (1990): 23-27.
(6)J Byrne, Assessing What Works in the Adult Community Corrections System (Lowell,
Mass.: University of Lowell, 1990).
(7)S. Turner and J. Petersilia, "Focusing on High Risk Parolees: An Experiment to Reduce
Commitments to the Texas Department of Corrections," Journal of Research in Crime and
Delinquency, 29, 1(1992): 34-61. See also footnote 17.
(8)N.M. Morris and M. Tonry, Between Prison and Probation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990).
(9)A. von Hirsch, M. Wasik and J. Greene, "Punishments in the Community and the Principles
of Just Desert," Rutgers Law Journal, 29, 3 (1989): 595-618.
(10)C.L. Britt III, MR. Gotffredson and J.S. Goldkamp, "Drug Testing and Pretrial
Misconduct: An Experiment on the Specific Deterrent Effects of Drug Monitoring Defendants on Pretrial
Release," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 29, 1(1992): 62-78.
(11)M. Tonry, "Stated and Latent Functions of ISP," Crime and Delinquency, 36, 1
(1990): 174-190.
(12)T. Clear and P.L. Hardyman, "The New Intensive Supervision Movement," Crime and
Delinquency, 36, 1 (1990): 42-60.
(13)J Petersilia and S. Turner, "An Evaluation of Intensive Supervision in California,"
Journal of Law & Criminology, 82 (1991): 610-658.
(14)M. Tonry and R. Will, Intermediate Sanctions, Report to the National Institute of
Justice (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1988).
(15)The meta-analysis of the intermediate sanction literature was conducted by Paul Gendreau
and Tracy Little. Results of the meta-analysis are available from Paul Gendreau (see footnote 1).
(16)J. Petersilia, S. Turner and E.P. Deschenes, "The Costs and Effects of Intensive
Supervision for Drug Offenders," Federal Probation, 61 (1992): 12-17.
(17)F.S. Pearson, "Evaluation of New Jersey's Intensive Supervision Program," Crime and
Delinquency, 34, 4 (1987): 437-448.
(18)D. Andrews, L Zinger, R.D. Hoge, J. Bonta, P. Gendreau and F. T. Cullen, "Does
Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis,"
Criminology, 28, 3 (1990): 369-404.
(19)F. Pearson and A. G. Harper, "Contingent Intermediate Sentences: New Jersey's Intensive
Supervision Program," Crime and Delinquency, 36, 1 (1990): 75-86.
(20)J.M. Byrne and L. Kelly, Restructuring Probation as an Intermediate Sanction: An
Evaluation of the Massachusetts Intensive Probation Supervision Program, Final Report to the National
Institute of Justice, Research Program on the Punishment and Control of Offenders (Washington, D.C.:
National Institute of Justice, 1989).
(21)See footnote 14.
(22)M. Paparozzi and P. Gendreau, "An ISP that Works! Treatment, Organizational
Supportiveness and Officer Roles." Unpublished manuscript, Bureau of Parole, Trenton, N.J., 1993.
(23)P. Gendreau and D. Andrews, Correctional Program Assessment Inventory (Saint
John, NB.: University of New Brunswick and Carleton University, 1992). Available from Paul Gendreau (see
footnote 1).