C. Intensive Intervention: Dynamic Security and Staff-Inmate Interaction
    Quality Care Environment
    Staff-Inmate Interaction
    Setting Boundaries and Establishing Limits
    What is Motivation?
    The Inmate Code
    Incompatibles
    Gang-Related Activities

D. Team Meetings, Correctional Plans and Security Reclassification
    Team Meetings
    Correctional Plan
    Security Reclassification

Part 4
Operations

A. Setting an Operational Routine
Unit Profile

B. Physical Environment of the Secure Unit
    Perimeter Security
    Secure Unit
    Control Post and Rotunda Operation
    Pods and Cells
    Multi-purpose rooms and their operation
    Kitchen and its operation
    Staff Space
    Segregation Unit
    Yard

C. Rounds and Counts

D. Searches

E. Movement
    On the Unit
    Off the Unit
    Out of the Institution

F. Managing Shared Spaces
    Introduction
    Visiting
    Private Family Visiting
    Health Services
    Segregation
    Gymnasium
    Library/Resource Centres
    Hobby Craft Areas
    School (other programs and program areas)

G. Relation of the Secure Unit to the Main Institution

H. Crisis Management
    Emergency Response Team Interventions
    Self-injurious behaviour protocols
    Management Protocol

I. Secure Unit Handbook for Inmates

J. Secure Unit Expectations and Rules

Part 5
Programs

A. Introduction

B. Goal of programming in the Secure Unit

C. Background and Context
    The Women's Perspectives
    • Non-Aboriginal Women
    • Aboriginal Women
    • Ceremonies
    Aggression and violence by women
    • Young girls and adolescent girls
    • Adult women
    • Conclusion

D. Intervention Approaches: Dialectical Behaviour Therapy and Psycho-Social Rehabilitation
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT)
Psychosocial Rehabilitation

E. Program Model
    Introduction
    Program Readiness
    Program Delivery
    Program Model-Overview
    • Quality care environment
    • DBT/PSR Skills
    • Education
    • Correctional Programs
    • Aboriginal Programs
    • Mental Health Services
    • Elder services, spiritual and religious services
    • Employment and vocational programs
    • Recreation
    • Other programs and services

F. Inmate Committee/Peer Support Teams

Part 6
Evaluation

A. Secure Unit
    Pre-opening audits
    Pre- and post- opening evaluation
    Ongoing evaluations

B. Programs

Part 7
Transition

Part 8
Management Protocol

Appendices

Appendix 1: Profile of women classified as maximum security

Appendix 2: Guidelines for Formulating a Behavioural Contract

Appendix 3: Part 5C (continued)

Appendix 4: Treatment Contract/Informed Consent

Appendix 5: Education

Appendix 6: Fetal Alcohol Syndrome/Fetal Alcohol Effects

Appendix 7: Stillness Inside: Meditation At Millhaven Institution

Bibliography

PART 1 - PRINCIPLES

This Operational Plan for the Secure Units for high risk/high needs women classified at the maximum security level is divided into eight (8) parts: Part 1 - Principles; Part 2 - Who are the women classified as maximum security?; Part 3 - Setting the Environment; Part 4 - Operations; Part 5 - Programs; Part 6 - Evaluation; Part 7 - Transition; Part 8 - Management Protocol. It provides the framework for Intensive Intervention in a Secure Environment.

A. Background

Development of the Intensive Intervention Strategy

Accepted by the federal government in September 1990, Creating Choices , the report of the Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women¹ made recommendations for a new correctional approach to manage women offenders that is responsive to their unique needs. For the most part, the report focused on the 80-90% of women who clearly did not require the level of security provided by the Prison for Women, at that time the only federal institution for women in Canada . It was timely that the report had such a focus, as the majority of women had been incarcerated in a more secure environment than was required to meet their risk and needs.

With the opening of the regional institutions recommended by the Task Force and since the incident at Prison for Women in April 1994 which led to the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Events at Prison for Women in Kingston (Arbour Commission), it became clear that the community-living approach would not meet the needs nor address the risk of a small minority of women, namely those classified as maximum security. Creating Choices , for the most part, had been silent on this issue: it was assumed that following a short adjustment stay in the Enhanced Units, the women would integrate into the general population of the regional institutions. Unfortunately, this assumption was found to be erroneous.

Following the incidents at Prison for Women in April 1994, CSC began to consider the issue of how women who use instrumental violence towards others could be accommodated in the new regional institutions. CSC contracted for two literature reviews, completed in early 1995 ² which were the basis for a meeting with both CSC and non-governmental organisations and experts held in July 1995³. A series of incidents in Edmonton Institution for Women in 1996 resulted in the decision to open maximum security units in each region while the Service developed a long term strategy to meet the needs of this small group of women. These units were co-located in men's institutions⁴, except in Ontario where Prison for Women remained open⁵. Parallel to the opening of the maximum security units, two intensive healing programs were implemented for women with severe mental health problems, one at the Regional Psychiatric Centre (Prairies) and one at Prison for Women.

Another series of studies were initiated beginning in 1995 which focused on the mental health needs of women (the Whitehall Report (1995), the Rivera Report (1996) and the Warner Report (1997)).⁶In the meantime, CSC's Research Branch was conducting comparative risk-needs studies of maximum security women and minimum and medium security women⁷ and of maximum security men.⁸ In late 1997 and into early 1998, a second series of studies took place. Maximum security women (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) were interviewed and the women themselves were asked why they believed they were classified as maximum security and what they believed was required to help them be re-classified to lower security. These two reports⁹ provided the Service with additional insight into both the needs and the views of maximum security women.

The Correctional Service of Canada achieved a major objective in establishing a more equitable and appropriate correctional regime for women in Canada with the opening of regional women's institutions between 1995 and 1997. However, while the new model is safe and beneficial for most women offenders, it became clear that it did not meet the needs of the small group of high risk/high need women or those with severe mental health problems. As such, the Intensive Intervention Strategy, based on research and operational experience, was presented to Treasury Board and received approval in May 1999.

Intensive Intervention in a Secure Environment - Overview

The Service believes there is a need for a separate model for women who are classified maximum security. Based on both past and ongoing research and operational experience, this Operational Plan is the basis for the part of the strategy that addresses the risk and needs of women classified as maximum security. These women require intensive intervention but their risk assessment requires that the intervention be provided in a secure environment, hence, - Intensive Intervention in a Secure Environment . The companion Operational Plan for the Structured Living Environment (SLE) addresses the needs of minimum and medium security women requiring more intensive mental health treatment. These two components make up the Intensive Intervention Strategy.

Intensive Intervention in a Secure Environment is made up of two elements - static security (increased compared to the level of security for the minimum and medium security women) and increased staff-offender interaction:

The existing Enhanced Units at each of the four regional women institutions¹⁰ have been renovated to create Secure Units (additional cell accommodation as well as program and staff space and a secure yard).
Each Secure Unit has sufficient numbers of well-trained staff to allow for intensive intervention and dynamic security using an inter-disciplinary team approach that combines elements of good correctional intervention, dynamic security, appropriate programming and mental health intervention.

The Strategy provides safe and secure accommodation for women while emphasizing individually based intensive staff intervention, programming and treatment. Accommodating this population in their home region allows for more effective preparation and planning for safe release into their home communities as the majority of this population are serving sentences under six years. The Secure Units operate separately from the remainder of the institution with their own programming areas. Inmate movement out of the unit will be under staff supervision/"escort." When required, access to other areas of the institutions by the maximum-security women will occur on a different schedule from the main population. In this way, the maximum-security women will be separated, as required, from the minimum- and medium-security women. Support and administrative services will be shared.

This Strategy responds to CSC's commitment to develop a national strategy for high risk/high need women. It has resulted in the closure of the small units in men's institutions and to the Government's pledge to close the Prison for Women, as recommended by the Task Force in 1990.

B. Principles

The foundation for the Secure Unit is in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA), the Mission of the Correctional Service, Creating Choices, and the Mental Health Strategy for Women Offenders.

Section 77 of the CCRA reads:

77. Without limiting the generality of section 76¹¹, the Service shall

(a)	provide programs designed particularly to address the needs of female offenders; and
(b)	consult regularly about programs for female offenders with (i) appropriate women's groups, and (ii) other appropriate persons and groups with expertise on, and experience in working with, female offenders.

Section 80 reads:

80. Without limiting the generality of section 76, the Service shall provide programs designed particularly to address the needs of aboriginal offenders.

And section 4, in particular the following sub-paragraphs:

4. The principles that shall guide the Service in achieving the purpose referred to in section 3 are:

(a)	that the protection of society be the paramount consideration in the corrections process;
(d)	that the Service use the least restrictive measures consistent with the protection of the public, staff members and offenders;
(e)	that offenders retain the rights and privileges of all members of society, except those rights and privileges that are necessarily removed or restricted as a consequence of the sentence;
(h)	that correctional policies, programs and practices respect gender, ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences and be responsive to the special needs of women and aboriginal peoples, as well as to the needs of other groups of offenders with special requirements;
(i)	that offenders are expected to obey penitentiary rules and conditions governing temporary absence, work release, parole and statutory release, and to actively participate in programs designed to promote their rehabilitation and reintegration.

And section 30:

30. (1) The Service shall assign a security classification of maximum, medium or minimum to each inmate in accordance with the regulations made under paragraph 96(z.6).

(2) The Service shall give each inmate reasons, in writing, for assigning a particular security classification or for changing that classification.

Sections 17-18 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations read:

17. The Service shall take the following factors into consideration in determining the security classification to be assigned to an inmate pursuant to section 30 of the Act:

(a) the seriousness of the offence committed by the inmate;
(b) any outstanding charges against the inmate;
(c) the inmate's performance and behaviour while under sentence
(d) the inmate's social, criminal and, where available, young-offender history;
(e) any physical or mental illness or disorder suffered by the inmate;
(f) the inmate's potential for violent behaviour; and
(g) the inmate's continued involvement in criminal activities.

18. For the purposes of section 30 of the Act, an inmate shall be classified as

(a)	maximum security where the inmate is assessed by the Service as (i) presenting a high probability of escape and a high risk to the safety of the public in the event of escape, or (ii) requiring a high degree of supervision and control within the penitentiary;
(b)	medium security where the inmate is assessed by the Service as (i) presenting a low to moderate probability of escape and a moderate risk to the safety of the public in the event of escape, or (ii) requiring a moderate degree of supervision and control within the penitentiary; and
(c)	minimum security where the inmate is assessed by the Service as (i) presenting a low probability of escape and a low risk to the safety of the public in the event of escape, and (ii) requiring a low degree of supervision and control within the penitentiary.

The Mission of the Correctional Service mandates the following:

The Correctional Service of Canada, as part of the criminal justice system and respecting the rule of law, contributes to the protection of society by actively encouraging and assisting offenders to become law-abiding citizens, while exercising reasonable, safe, secure and humane control.

And in particular, Core Value 1:

We respect the dignity of individuals, the rights of all members of society, and the potential for human growth and development.

And Core Value 3:

We believe that our strength and our major resource in achieving our objectives is our staff and that human relationships are the cornerstone of our endeavour.

The Principles for Change outlined in Creating Choices are:

Empowerment: Empowerment is the process through which women gain insight into their situation, identify their strengths, and are supported and challenged to take positive action to gain control of their lives.
Meaningful and Responsible Choices: Women need options that allow them to make responsible choices. Dependence on alcohol and/or drugs, men, and government financial assistance has denied women the opportunity and ability to make choices.
Respect and Dignity: CSC had often been criticised for its tendency to encourage, and therefore perpetuate, dependent and child-like behaviour among women offenders. Mutual respect is needed among offenders, among staff and between the two.
Supportive Environment: The quality of the environment (both physical and emotional) can promote physical and psychological health and personal development.
Shared Responsibility: There is a role to play for all levels of government, corrections, volunteer organisations, businesses, private sector services, and the community in developing support systems and continuity of service for women offenders.

The principles outlined in the Mental Health Strategy for Women Offenders¹²are the following:

Wellness

This principle refers to promoting wellness rather than "treating pathology" and includes:

holistic program delivery, that is, program delivery that recognizes body, mind, spirit, and emotions and their interconnections in a family and community-oriented context;
the avoidance of labels (including psychiatric diagnoses) insofar as these may reduce women to only their mental health issues;
reinforcement of the skills necessary for personal development and independent living in the community;
the necessity of involving mental health professionals as well as others, including Aboriginal service providers, community resources, families, etc. in treatment plans.

Access

This principle, consistent with section 86 of the CCRA , focuses on reasonable access to appropriate essential and non-essential professional mental health services including:

early identification of mental health problems and treatment needs;
timely interventions that minimise symptom escalation and prevent acute crisis situations;
interventions tailored to acknowledge the complexities of the cases of women who have several mental health and other diagnoses/ issues that require simultaneous intervention;
services provided in keeping with community standards.

Women-Centered

The continuum of mental health services must be offered in a gender-specific and gender-appropriate manner such that:

only personnel sensitive to women and women's issues are involved;
treatment programs and services are designed to meet the specific needs of women offenders while acknowledging personal autonomy, connection to others, and positive mutually respectful relationships.

Client Participation (a principle of fundamental justice)

Women offenders must be involved in their assessment and mental health treatment such that they play as active a role as possible in their treatment planning and in decision-making.

Least Restrictive Measures

Consistent with section 4d of the CCRA (principles):

treatment is based on the least restrictive/intensive form of intervention possible;
women are housed in the least restrictive environment possible, with the lowest level of security required to ensure public safety.

C. Role of the Secure Unit

Through consistent management, clear structures, role modelling, positive reinforcement and timely, consistent interventions, the role of Secure Unit will be to:

Ensure the safe and humane custody of women, respecting their rights and entitlements under the law;

Promote change in the women's behaviours and coping skills that will allow them to safely integrate to lower level security; and,

Integrate where possible, separate when necessary (i.e., integrate with the main institution, for example, facilitate attendance at programs in the main institution when the woman's individual risk assessment determines the risk of such integration is assumable).

D. Shared Spaces

The maximum security women are few in number and creating stand-alone units would have been too similar to long term segregation status. They need opportunities to leave the Secure Units (on occasion). Therefore, the Correctional Service made the decision that the Secure Unit will have some program space but will not have dedicated spaces for visiting, gym, health services, specialised program rooms, vocational areas, etc.. These spaces, already available in each institution, will be shared. However, shared spaces will be managed through separate schedules for the maximum security population and movement of the women will be under direct staff supervision at all times.

Opportunities to move out of the Secure Unit under varying levels of staff supervision based on individual risk assessments, will help to maximise and facilitate the eventual integration of maximum security women offenders. This can be done by accessing resources not available in the Unit if the risk can be assumed (which at some point is likely to occur). It is recognized that the degree of movement out of the Secure Unit will not be identical for all maximum security women. /p>

Operation of shared spaces is discussed in detail in Part 4 - Operations.

E. Separation Issues

One element of the intensive intervention approach is the use of shared spaces and how separation of the maximum security women from the minimum and medium security women will be accomplished, without (or to the least extent possible) limiting or jeopardising the operations of the main part of the institution.

The strict physical, visual and auditory separation from the men inmates in the co-located units was related to gender and previous victimisation issues, not the risk presented by the women. Therefore, the level of separation required in the co-located units is not generally envisaged for the regional institutions. What is clear is that a certain level of separation will and must occur in order to protect the lower security population from possible intimidation¹³ and to ensure that all women are managed in the least restrictive and most favourable environment for reintegration. The goal is to maintain as much free movement for the minimum and medium population; however, there is an expectation that the lower security women will behave appropriately. Separation between the populations will occur in the following ways:

• dedicated space, i.e., the Secure Unit itself;

• "out of bounds" areas around the Secure Unit must be defined (for the main population) and monitored;

• movement off the Secure Unit under direct staff supervision;

• activities off the Secure Unit (e.g., gymnasium) on a separate schedule from activities of the main population;

• minimum and medium security women will not be involved in activities in the Secure Unit. (for Peer Support Team members and Inmate Committee representatives, see the Section 4, Programs).

Movement issues are addressed in Part 4 - Operations.

1 This term was used because at the time, many women serving federal sentences were housed under Exchange of Services Agreements (ESA) in provincial institutions in order to be closer to their home environment.
2 Shaw, Margaret and Dubois, Sheryl, Understanding Violence by Women (February 1995); and, Crump, Judy, Women's Anger and Other Emotions (February 1995).
3 See Brainstorming Session: Understanding Violence by Women and Dealing with Women's Anger, July 5-7, 1995 (CSC, October 1995)
4 The women's units were in Springhill Institution in Springhill, Nova Scotia (closed May 2003); the Regional Reception Centre in Ste-Annes-des-Plaines, Quebec (open at the time of writing); and, Saskatchewan Penitentiary in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan (closed March 2003).
5 The last inmate was transferred out of Prison for Women on May 8, 2000 . The institution closed July 6, 2000.
6 See Structured Living Environment - Operational Plan, CSC 2002 for full details.
7Research Report 1997 N o R-58, Risk and Need Among Federally-Sentenced Female Offenders: A Comparison of minimum-, medium-, and maximum-security inmates, Kelley Blanchette, Research Division, Correctional Service of Canada, June 1997
8 Research Report 1997, N o R-53, Maximum-Security Female and Male Federal Offenders: A Comparison, Kelley Blanchette and Laurence L. Motiuk, Research Branch, Correctional Service of Canada , March 1997.
9Federally Sentenced Women, Maximum Security Interview Project: Not Letting the Time Do You , Donna McDonagh, Ph.D, Correctional Service of Canada, 1998 and Federally Sentenced Aboriginal Women in Maximum Security: What Happened to the Promises of "Creating Choices"?, SkyBlue Morin, January 1999.
10 Nova Institution for Women Truro, Nova Scotia; Joliette Institution, Joliette, Quebec; Grand Valley Institution for Women, Kitchener, Ontario; and, Edmonton Institution for Women, Edmonton, Alberta. Although, the Strategy does not have a direct effect on the Okimaw Ohci Healing Lodge in Maple Creek , Saskatchewan , CSC will continue its efforts to integrate Aboriginal women into that facility. By late 2004, a Secure Unit will be constructed as part of Fraser Valley Institution, the new federal institution for women in Abbottsford , British Columbia.
11s.76. The Service shall provide a range of programs designed to address the needs of offenders and contribute to their successful reintegration into the community.<
12 Jane Laishes (CSC), 1997/2002.

PART 2 - Who are the women classified as maximum security?

Section 18 of Regulations states:

18. For the purposes of section 30 of the Act, an inmate shall be classified as

(a)

maximum security where the inmate is assessed by the Service as
(i) presenting a high probability of escape and a high risk to the safety of the public in the event of escape, or
(ii) requiring a high degree of supervision and control within the penitentiary.

A. Introduction

Between 1998 and 2000, the number of women classified as maximum security remained stable, averaging between 25 to 30 (7%-8% of the incarcerated population); however, during 2001 and 2002, there was an increase and the numbers fluctuated between 40-50 offenders (up to about 14% of the incarcerated population).

Research and operational experience have demonstrated that many maximum security women have severe substance abuse problems, creating security concerns related to contraband control, protection of inmates from intimidation and drug smuggling pressures. Research further suggests the physical and sexual abuse experienced by many women offenders is linked to their substance abuse and past victimisation may also lead to behaviour difficulties.

Research has also shown statistically relevant differences between maximum, medium and minimum security women in several areas.¹ In particular, those classified as maximum security demonstrate higher needs and higher risk than the medium and minimum security women. For some, the primary factor is escape risk, but more often the primary factor is their institutional behaviour. It is often characterised by impulsivity and volatility making it difficult for them to function in the community living environment of the regional institutions.

In general, behaviours can be both serious and harmful and are most often expressed by action (planned or not):

against themselves (self-injurious behaviour or suicide attempts),
within a close relational context (assaults against other inmates or staff including hostage-taking), or
against inanimate objects (destroying property or setting fire to their cells).

These behaviours are often impulsive responses to frustration, boredom, objections to requests or orders given by staff, relationship issues or they have a secondary benefit of allowing the inmate to gain some sense of power and control over others or the environment. In a unit where there is inconsistency on the part of staff and a lack of understood structure and rules, the possibility of individual and group actions increase.

B. Risk and Need²

Blanchette's review of the minimum-, medium- and maximum-security female offender need level ratings showed consistent, reliable between-group differences in six of seven need domains assessed at Intake: employment, marital/family, associates, substance abuse, community functioning, and attitude. Only for the personal/emotional domain were no significant differences found, though data showed trends in the same direction. Maximum-security women were found to have more difficulties than medium-security women, who, in turn, exhibited more needs than minimum-security women.

On a global risk/need rating assessed at admission to federal custody,none of the maximum-security women offenders were designated "low" on overall need. The vast majority (86%) were assessed as "high" need and a minority (14%) were assessed as "medium" need.

Risk levels were also elevated for the maximum-security group: the majority (77%) were "high" risk, and the remainder (23%) were "medium" risk.³ Statistical analyses confirmed that between-group differences in risk/need levels were reliable.

		Maximum	Medium	Minimum
Need	High	86%	43%	10%
	Medium	14%	39%	26%
	Low	---	18%	64%
Risk	High	77%	27%	7%
	Medium	23%	56%	18%
	Low	---	17%	75%

Multiple risk and need variables discriminate between groups, in each case demonstrating more needs and higher risk as security level increases. These findings suggest a heterogeneity of female offender populations by security designation and imply that the assignment of security levels is commensurate with risk and need.

Comparisons across all indicators of suicide potential suggest that maximum-security women are at higher risk for suicide than their medium-and minimum-security counterparts. Although only between 11% and 13% of the minimum/medium security group were identified at admission as "may be suicidal", about 25% of those designated as maximum-security had expressed suicidal intent. This was true for only one offender in medium-security, few (8.5%) of those in minimum-security.

A large proportion (71%) of those in maximum-security had previous attempts at suicide, compared with 42% of those in medium-security, and less than 20% of minimum-security women.

About 35% of the maximum-security group were exhibiting signs of depression at admission, compared to less than 10% of the medium-security group, and under 24% of the minimum-security group. Accordingly, 57% of those designated maximum-security had recent psychiatric/ psychological intervention, compared with 29% and 19% of those in medium- and minimum-security, respectively. Again, all of these differences were statistically reliable.

C. Populations and priorities

From experience in both the co-located and intensive mental health treatment units, CSC has concluded the following:

The number of women requiring enhanced levels of intervention is a small, heterogeneous population, characterised by intense and multiple needs and incompatibilities with other women. They pose an elevated risk to behave violently in the institutional setting compared to the minimum and medium security population and they tend to minimise their institutional violence.

Aboriginal women are over-represented in this population, particularly in the Prairie Region. This presents a special challenge to provide culturally-specific programming and other interventions.

The priority is tomotivate the women to learn to manage and control their aggressive or impulsive behaviours to the point where their risk is lessened and their needs can be addressed (which could eventually lead to a reduction in their security classification). This is particularly important for those not ready to engage in their Correctional Plan.

A significant number of these women have serious and long-standing mental health problems and require intensive, often one-to-one, programming and treatment interventions in order to manage their behaviour and respond to their needs.

Despite its heterogeneous nature, research and experience have also shown that the maximum security populationgenerally fall into three groups⁴ (though there is a small number of women who fall into more than one group):

General population

This group exhibits anti-social behaviour/criminal attitudes or both anti-social behaviour/criminal attitudes and emotional/mental health issues. There are segments of this population that can remain in the general (maximum security) population for lengthy periods, but on occasion require more intensive intervention to deal with crises.

The focus of the intensive intervention is to assist these women to work through their anti-social attitudes (which may result in non-participation in programs, manipulation and intimidation), by establishing a relationship of professional trust and focusing on behaviour management and skills that will allow them to decrease their security classification. This group generally has severe substance abuse addictions, extensive histories of abuse and they tend to disregard boundaries.

Further breakdown of this population could include: those who refuse to participate and for whom behavioural contingencies are required; those nearing release (who may or may not be refusing to participate); and, those with a potential for medium security (who are willing to participate).

Special needs population

This definition is used to describe those women who experience great difficulty functioning in the general maximum security population. This group is characterised as having significant deficits in their level of cognitive functioning or they experience significant emotional and mental health difficulties (more so than those who can function in the SLE) and/or they suffer from serious mental illness. They generally have histories of institutionalisation in mental health hospitals and provincial correctional systems. Their difficulties may prohibit participation in regular programming and/or their benefitting from programming. They can exhibit volatile and sometimes assaultive behaviours.

Intensive, ongoing support in daily living activities and programming adapted to their abilities is required to assist them to learn more appropriate self-care/hygiene and coping mechanisms. For this group, the intensive mental health treatment units' approaches⁵, have proven more effective to change their behaviour than traditional correctional approaches.

Lifers

A third group of women classified as maximum security are serving the first two years of a life sentence. Some of these women may demonstrate high risk and high needs, while others may have more moderate risk and need. In either case, starting a life sentence has inherent difficulties that these women must face.

D. Needs Analysis

A Needs Analysis was conducted in the early planning stages of the Intensive Intervention Strategy to assist in developing the implementation plan. A questionnaire was distributed that looked at the following issues: mental health; daily living skills and difficulties; institutional adjustment; and, staff training needs. It was completed by multi-disciplinary teams in each women's institution.

The women whose cases were identified and reviewed were: women classified as maximum security; those with a maximum security classification within the previous year; women housed in a mental health unit or psychiatric centre; and, women not in a mental health unit, but who had significant mental health problems and/or living skills deficits who needed considerable additional support or intervention. A wide net was cast to ensure that no women were missed.

The data fell into five categories: maximum security; maximum security/special needs; special needs in a treatment centre; special needs but not in a treatment centre; and, formerly maximum security. For the purposes of this Operational Plan, only maximum security and maximum security/special needs will be reviewed (as outlined in the previous section).

The results reflect the research and experience: while special needs women have various mental health problems, the maximum security women tend to have difficulties related to personality disorder characteristics. Substance abuse is a problem in varying degrees for both the maximum security women and the special needs women. While a proportion of the maximum security women exhibit volatile and aggressive behaviours, such behaviour seems more prevalent among the special needs group.

See charts below.

Mental health problems	Maximum	Maximum/SN
Serious mental illness (SMI)	0	2
Personality disorders (PD)	7	2
Cognitive difficulties (CG)	2	2
SMI + PD	0	1
SMI + CD	0	0
PD + CD	2	1
All three	0	1
None of the above	9	0

Substance Abuse	Maximum	Maximum/SN
Substance abuse problems	50%	90%
Alcohol	55%	62%
Poly/general	72%	48%
Prescription drugs	10%	25%

Other Behaviours	Maximum		Maximum /SN
Suicidal behaviours	30%		89%
Self-injurious behaviours	58%	58%
Assault against staff	50%		65%
Assault against inmates	55%		55%

1Research Report 1997 N o R-58,Risk and Need Among Federally-Sentenced Female Offenders: A Comparison of minimum-, medium-, and maximum-security inmates, Kelley Blanchette, Research Division, Correctional Service of Canada, June 1997.
2 Ibid (Executive summary).
3Of the medium security women, 17% were assessed as "low" risk, 56% were assessed as "medium" risk, and the remainder, 27% were assessed as "high" risk). As with the medium- and maximum-security female offenders, global need levels for those in minimum-security were commensurate with security designation, where the majority (75%) were assessed as "low" risk. A further 18% were assessed as "medium" risk, and only 7% were assessed as "high" risk.
4 See Federally Sentenced Women Maximum Security Interview Project: "Not Letting the Time do You", Donna McDonagh, Ph.D., pages 11-13.
5 At the Regional Psychiatric Centre (Prairies) and the Prison for Women, prior to its closure.

Other information from the Needs Analysis showed:

For the eight (8) Aboriginal women with a maximum security classification, seven (7) were identified as maximum security and one (1) as maximum/special needs.
Daily activities: Maximum security women showed particular strengths in self-care (hygiene, dressing and eating) and household activities.
Programming issues: Less than 15% of the maximum security women required programsadapted to their cognitive abilities; whereas, about 25% of the special needs women required adaptations.
Two thirds of the women were identified as able to participate in group programs while only about one-third of the special needs women could function in these settings.
Segregation: Over the previous year, just less than ¾ of the maximum security women/special needs women were placed in involuntary segregation. Voluntary segregation was used for about ½ of the special needs women.
The major behaviour and needs identified above fall in to four general categories: emotional dysregulation; substance abuse; inter-personal skills; and difficulty with daily living skills. For many women, these issues are likely to overlap and relate to both the reasons they are classified as maximum security and their criminogenic needs.

E. Current Profile¹

The maximum security population differs from the general population (minimum and medium security levels). They tend to be: younger, serving a greater proportion of their sentences for crimes against persons, serving longer sentences and they have more prior federal convictions than the general population. Note: The data below does not include 39 women (10.6% of the incarcerated population) who were not yet classified:

Comparison Factor	Maximum Security	Minimum/Medium Security
Incarcerated population	12% (44)	77.4% (284)
Age	68.2% (30) are 20-34 years	48.9% (139) are 20-34 years
1^st degree murder	4.5%	4.9%
2^nd degree murder	20.5%	13.4%
Schedule I	61.4%	53.2%
Schedule II	2.3%	18.7%
Non-schedule	11.4%	9.9%
Serving less than 6 years	45.5%	64.4%
No prior federal conviction	63.6%	79.6%

PART 3 - SETTING THE ENVIRONMENT

This section sets the environment for the operations of the Secure Unit and addresses inter-disciplinary team approaches, staff-inmate interactions, consistency, etc.

Introduction

First and foremost, the Secure Units must be asafe, secure and humane environment for both the staff and inmates.Security is everyone's responsibility, not only the Primary Workers'.

The Secure Unit has additional static security compared to the main institution. While security procedures will be more stringent, there is also increased staff presence and increased dynamic security. However, it is essential that the stricter security measures required in the Secure Unit do not flow into the main institution. Their impact should be minimal.

A. Staffing

The number of staff for which each Unit is resourced depends on its size, however, the positions noted below are specifically resourced and dedicated to the Secure Unit. The breakdown below was used for planning purposes, but may be shifted as per operational requirements as additional staff on the evening shift may help to maintain stability. Overlapping schedules of some staff may help to ensure information is shared. All these individuals make up theInter-Disciplinary Team (see below, Section C).

Days

Evenings

Mornings (overnight)

Team Leader

Psychologist

Assistant Team Leader²

Primary Workers

Behavioural Counsellor(s)

Clinical Nurse

Program Officer(s)

Food Service Officer

Primary Workers

Behavioural Counsellor

Program Officer³

Primary Workers

Support staff and maintenance staff will be services shared with the main institution.

The institutions may use some shared rosters from either the main institution or the SLE, or during meal breaks to allow staff a bit of respite from the Unit. Any staff from the main institution working in the Secure Unit should have participated, as a minimum, in the 2-day Mental Health and Awareness training, though any significant staff rotations should be done gradually if possible. Institutions should make every effort to ensure that at least one staff member on duty at any time is an individual assigned to the Unit on a full time basis.

The maximum security population is not an easy group to work with. It is important for staff to maintain professional boundaries, identify issues which can lead to burn-out and practice good self-care. Though working as a cohesive inter-disciplinary team will assist to reduce the impact of working in the Unit, an occasional staff day (out of the institution if possible) to reinforce the vision of the Intensive Intervention Strategy, address common issues and do some team building could help the team maintain their effectiveness.

For details, please refer to the work descriptions for each position and to theHuman Resource Plan, Part A: Staffing⁴.

B. Management Model: The Inter-Disciplinary Team Approach

An inter-disciplinary team (IDT) is made up of all the staff and individuals working on the Unit; this encourages flexibility and creativity. They plan and coordinate interventions, program implementation, services and evaluation. The team works together and focuses on the inmate's goals and objectives of the Correctional Plan, rather than on the specific specialities of the team members. All team members have a voice and bring information to the table.⁵ It is imperative the IDT work together and not be trapped in hierarchical roles of professionals and paraprofessionals. It is also important that one discipline not compartmentalise the inmate; each team member must contribute in order for the team to reach its highest potential. Each team member needs to know the responsibilities and roles of the other members of the team.

Communication within the team must be clear and understood; all members must be aware of all information. The maximum security population, particularly women who exhibit characteristics of borderline personality disorder, may be adept at "splitting" the staff, so staff must avoid working in isolation. Open communication between staff, in-depth staff discussions on intervention approaches and establishing boundaries in staff interventions, will minimise splitting.

Splitting is a defence mechanism that results from a woman's need to preserve her mental and often physical well-being. Many of those who have experienced incest or violence have learned to separate their very intense feelings. Splitting becomes a learned survival method for coping with repeated trauma experiences. Some individuals may split their internal world into "all good" or "all bad." Some staff members are idealised ("all good") whereas others are regarded with contempt and seen as useless ("all bad"). These two groups of staff members are treated differently so that polarisation and splitting then occurs among the staff. This can lead those staff who are idealised to feel that the "bad" staff simply do not understand the woman, and those staff who are regarded as "bad" view the "good staff" as having been conned by the "manipulative" behaviour of the woman. If women are able to engage in splitting behaviours, the entire unit may be disrupted as a result. Staff burnout can occur rapidly under these circumstances.⁶

However,only staff can split staff. Staff can control how they react to these behaviours. They need to always remember to treat each other as professionals, work through issues in inter-disciplinary team meetings and that polarised thinking can damage the team.

It is necessary that the IDTcommunicate, work together and avoid isolation, set limits, establish boundaries and follow through with consequences. This level of communication helps staff intervene appropriately and support each other when dealing with difficult and often damaged women.

Information sharing within the IDT is essential. This leads to clear communication between staff and ensures that all members of the IDT intervene with and respond to each woman in a consistent manner (which may differ between individual inmates). Everyone IDT member has the same expectations of behaviour from the inmate and understanding about the activities in which the inmate is to be involved. In this way, each team member also understands their role in the inmate's progress and duplication of services can be eliminated. On a practical level, information sharing is also done through minutes of meetings, the Unit's daily log book, individual case records, etc.

Conflicts are likely to occur when more complex decisions are on the IDT table. In order to ensure that the team works together, conflicts need to be recognised and addressed. The Team Leader should work to resolve disagreements and foster collaboration among the team members, all with the goal of providing care and services to the inmate.

Regular meetings must occur and should be scheduled for a specific time each week (minimum of once per week). Every effort must be made by all staff to attend the entire meeting (though it is understood that shift workers on days off will not be available and some staff will need to remain on the floor. In these instances, they should try to provide an update/share information with another staff to present at the meeting). For more difficult cases, or women in crisis, it may be necessary to meet more frequently and share information at the daily shift briefing

Smaller groups of staff may work on specific cases or correctional plans and then bring their recommendations to the full team for decision-making. This weekly meeting may also be used to discuss other issues on the Unit (such as security or program issues).

Through the Team Leader, a link will also be established between the Secure Unit inter-disciplinary team and the Coordinated Care Committee, which oversees mental health services for all the institution, as well as admission to the SLE.

This inter-disciplinary team approach and the increased staff presence on the Unit will facilitate the development of individualised interventions and support for each woman to address her risk factors and her needs.

Plans and Contracts

The inter-disciplinary team will implement and where necessary, update the individual correctional plans for the women. However, at certain times, more specific, short term management and intervention techniques may be required based on the needs and risks of the individual women. For example, for a certain inmate, the focus may be more on behaviour management for a certain period of time with the major concern being on safety and static security measures (everything from cell time to type of restraint equipment and where she stands when staff open the cell door). For other inmates, the focus may be more on behavioural expectations and program participation and how staff intervene when the woman starts to exhibit behaviours inappropriate to the situation. Where a woman agrees, and where appropriate, more formal behavioural contracts can be developed. As with all correctional planning, these specific types of plans will be documented and shared with the woman.

Behavioural Contracts

A behavioural contract is anegotiated, explicitandwritten agreement between two or more individuals (e.g., an inmate and the staff of the Unit) and is signed by the inmate and the Behavioural Counselor.⁷ Behavioural contracts are usually time-limited interventions to address identified behaviours (behaviours can include thoughts and attitudes as well as actions). They help to clarify mutually determined goals, minimise confusion and foster a type of partnership between staff and the inmate. The woman must be consulted and be actively involved in the development of the contract and the decision-making process. This provides a way to nuture her mutual participation and accountability. Both the staff and the inmate must consent to the contingencies that will be used to reach the target behaviour. Positive contingencies are used to recognize progress towards the target behaviour; consequences for not progressing must also detailed.

Allstaff must be aware of the contract and the contingencies that have been set.Staff communication is key. If this is not done, staff are vulnerable to "splitting" if the woman attempts to gain reinforcement or evade consequences from different staff members. It is also important to remember that women are not necessarily participating in the Secure Unit on a voluntary basis: there can be a fine line between an informal behavioural contract and imposed conditions leading to a perceived "abuse of power."

The contract must specify the following:

The expectations, plans, responsibilities and contingencies for behaviour to be changed;
The kind of positive behaviour being sought (e.g., talking politely to staff) and the positive reinforcements when the behaviour is demonstrated;
What constitutes the absence of the behaviour (e.g., not talking politely to staff) and how staff will intervene to encourage positive behaviour (and reinforce it once it occurs);
What constitutes negative behaviour (e.g., swearing at staff) and what the clear consequences are for such behaviour; and,
Consent of both parties.

For additional details see Appendix 2,Guidelines for Formulating a Behavioural Contract.

It is best to breakdown the desired behaviour into small, reasonable and accessible gains. Both the schedule of the reinforcement and the significance of the reinforcer are also important to determine. Reinforcers are not necessarily the same for everyone and it is important that the reinforcer offered is of value to the woman. The best way to decide upon significant reinforcers is in consultation with the woman. Staff need to reinforce as often as possible, but must balance their reinforcement so it is not excessive. In the end, the objective is to have the woman "self-reinforce" and develop her own internal motivation.

Process

Generally, it is the Behavioural Counselor who is responsible for consulting the inmate the psychologist, Primary Worker and the Team Leader and for drafting the contract.
Before finalising the contract, the Behavioural Counselor must present the draft to the inter-disciplinary team for input.
Once the team has agreed to the contract, it is encouraged that the Team Leader forward the draft to the mental health liaison at National Headquarters who will review the draft and consult with Legal Services to ensure policy compliance.
Once the draft is reviewd at the national level, the Team Leader or Psychologist must inform the Warden (or designate) of the contract.
Following notification to the Warden, the contract is finalised and staff on the Secure Unit are advised.
The original contract is placed on the file and a copy is given to the inmate.

C. Intensive Intervention: Dynamic Security and Staff Inmate Interaction

The foundation of the Intensive Intervention Strategy is dynamic security and the presence of sufficient numbers of well-trained staff on the Unit to ensure intensive intervention .

A dynamic security model means fewer electronic or static barriers and more person-to-person interaction. From the Task Force on Security⁸ the following is cited:

No other factor plays such a significant role in providing a safe and secure environment in our institutions. Dynamic security speaks specifically to the relationships that exist between all staff members and the offenders with whom they work. Every interaction that occurs between these two groups of people has a cumulative effect on the overall culture of the Service. Every interaction has the potential to enhance a positive institutional culture or to undo the collective efforts of many others to improve it. The review of security incidents has reflected repeatedly that problems in institutions occur when there is little positive interaction between staff and inmates.

It is the culture of an institution that largely determines the frequency and nature of staff / offender interaction. All of the laws, policies and directives will not create an environment that fosters staff and offender interaction.

The Task Force recommended that dynamic security be defined and understood as "those actions that contribute to the development of professional, positive relationships between staff members and offenders." (pgs. 18-19).

We have seen how increased restrictions (though at times necessary) and/or staff disengagement can lead to increased acting-out as offenders seek to balance the "power" shifts. The need for balance between static and dynamic security reflects both the research and operational experience with this population to date. Finding and maintaining that balance is the ongoing challenge. Dynamic security will consist of a 24-hour staff presence and supervision, with intensive and consistent intervention by an inter-disciplinary team.

In general, correctional approaches tend to leave maximum security inmates alone (little staff-inmate interaction, lots of cell time). The intensive intervention approach, based partially on the British experience, is the exact opposite. The inter-disciplinary team will be consistently present in the Secure Unit: there will be regular staff presence on the floor and in the yard of the Unit; staff will directly supervise women when they are in other areas of the institution.

It is essential that this approach is set in place before the Units open and is maintained once they are operational.

Quality Care Environment

The Secure Unit itself, the level and manner of interaction between staff and inmates, dynamic supervision and security and the inter-disciplinary team approach work in tandem to create a quality care environment that serves as a foundation for all programming and interventions. Despite their increased static security measures, the Secure Units will offer an environment that is safe and supportive (to both inmates and staff) in its attempts to offset the negative aspects of an institutional setting. The environment itself will be the supportive shell for programs and interventions and as such, can either support or impede positive progress.

The environment needs to: be structured; be well planned so it is safe for all; allow for testing and practising of new skills; support change and express attitudes of acceptance and optimism; and, evaluate the women's progress⁹.

Open communication, consistency of rules and interventions, firmness but with some flexibility, all work to increase stability and safety. Safety and security as well as clinical judgement and effective correctional practices should be the foundation of every decision. Staff need to be aware that in some instances progress may slow and that setbacks will occur. Boundaries are especially important to maintain.

Such an environment also includes a support system for staff. It is important to ensure both feedback on best practices, as well as an expectation of constructive criticism so the entire inter-disciplinary team can learn. A culture of openness must be created so it is safe enough for staff to ask, "could I have done this better?, was there another way to intervene?".

Staff-Inmate Interaction

Staff have a major role to play in creating and maintaining an environment that can reinforce positive behaviours and efforts to change. Establishing effective interventions and maintaining appropriate boundaries are key.Every interaction provides the opportunity for teachable moments and staff need to be strategic with the use of control meausres.

From both the Morin and the McDonagh interview project reports, three important themes emerged with respect to staff-inmate interaction:

	Staff need to be clear andconsistent in their application of rules, policies and interventions. The consequences of breaking the rules must be clear, consistent and imposed. For example,
•	The rules must be clear and posted for all to see and refer to (for women who are unable to read, the rules must be clearly explained to them);
•	The environment must be supportive andconsistent so some trust can be developed;
•	Staff should make every effort to respect commitments to maintain credibility;
•	Staff must work together to ensure splitting does not occur as it creates an "us" vs "them" mentality within the Unit and within the staff complement.

	*Communication between management, line staff and inmates must be clear, consistent and constant. For example,*
•	Correctional Plans must focus on what needs to be done to reduce the woman's security classification. Despite multiple needs, they should not be overwhelming;
•	Plans need to be clearly explained to the women (and she needs to participate in their development). Staff need to clearly articulate what the women needs to do to decrease her security level and why certain programs are required;
•	As much as possible, management need to support staff decisions.

	Staff must recognise, reinforce and encouragepositive behaviour rather than only reacting to negative behaviour. For example,
•	Open, positive staff communication and interaction with each other and with the inmates;
•	Focus on the positive behaviours and coping mechanisms and the benefits to the women of these more positive skills (e.g., appropriate coping of internal emotional distress). De-escalate negative (sometimes attention-seeking) behaviours;
•	Staff must role model what they expect of inmates (e.g., gossiping about other staff in front of inmates or swearing while talking to another staff member and then reprimanding an inmate who swears is inconsistent);
•	Staff must recognise that even tiny steps are positive and need to acknowledge those steps (those in the Correctional Plan and others related to day-to-day behaviours);
•	Staff must recognise when a woman needs a legitimate break from programs/interventions or some time alone;
•	Where possible, minimise the iteraction between motivated women and those who are not, to reduce the opportunity for individual progress to be sabotaged (and where interaction cannot be minimised, support women to deal appropriately and constructively with the interference of others);
•	Use behavioural contracts where appropriate;
•	Try to assist women to see how their life would be better in a less secure environment; help them look to the future, not just the here and now.

As indicated, in both the McDonagh and Morin reports, maximum security women continually citedpositive and consistent staff communication, interaction and reinforcement as factors to help them to focus on reducing their security level, as well asa Correctional Plan that was appropriate and realistic (p 51, p 20-23). In general, the personal factors that helped women reduce security levels were self-respect, self discipline and greater self-awareness. (McDonagh , p 49).

One prominent author on behaviour change states the following about facilitating behaviour change (though he focuses on cigarette addiction, it is, nevertheless, relevant to effective correctional practices):

"Even though I recognize the efficacy of fear in facilitating behaviour change, I feel that seeking positive reinforcement (a reward you can enjoy) is better than pursuing negative reinforcement (avoidance of something you do not want to experience), because research shows that positive reinforcement is better at maintaining new behaviour. If fear is your motivator, when fear subsides, so does motivation. Fear can also paralyze you, preventing you from moving at all."¹⁰

It is important for all members of the inter-disciplinary team to recognise that when a woman is not motivated to change her behaviour or security classification she may,

act out in order to maintain their maximum security status (women tended to minimise their institutional violence (McDonagh, p 22)); or,
sabotage others who are trying to focus on themselves. In these instances, staff may need to pay a different kind of attention to this woman in order not to escalate her interfering behaviours (e.g., if she is verbally abusive, staff may need to ignore her until she composes herself (as long as safety is assured), though it can be a fine line to draw).

Such behaviour is likely attributed to a number of factors: benefits (vs consequences) of their behaviour and their remaining in maximum security; fear of the responsibility required in the main institution; fear of change; a lack of understanding of what they need to do or how the interventions/programs will assist them; wanting to remain with friends; being comfortable with what they know; incompatibles; difficulty maintaining new behaviours because of learning difficulties (e.g., cognitive problems, fetal alcohol syndrome/effects).

Setting Boundaries and Establishing Limits

While working in the Secure Unit can be challenging and fulfilling, given both the level of risk and need generally found in this population, it can also be a draining experience for staff. It is essential staff be aware of: their own limits and maintain their emotional boundaries; signs of burn-out; and, the need to communicate, support each other and work together as a team.

Specialised training¹¹ will provide staff with the necessary tools to recognise certain behaviours, the emotions driving them and the interventions required to mitigate these behaviours. Some of the maximum security women have severe mental health problems, others may take medications, or have significant behaviour problems. The more cognisant staff are of these situations and what to expect, the better prepared they are to intervene effectively.

What is Motivation?

All staff have a role in motivating women to develop constructive behaviours and coping skills. Dr. Weil, cited earlier, notes the following, which supports the women's perspectives from the McDonagh and Morin reports:

"Research [into cigarette addiction] indicates that making an attempt to quit is the best predictor of eventual success, even if the attempt itself is not successful…Attempting to quit is commitment to changing behaviour, a measure of motivation, and whether you succeed or fail is less important than making the attempt. Even if you resume smoking in a week, you lose no credit for the effort. In fact, the effort adds to a reservoir of motivation that one day will be full enough to initiate the sudden change that enables people to drop habits without struggling. Such is the power of motivation, but it must come from within. Whether you are a therapist, counsellor friend or relative … all you can do is give good reasons for changing behaviour along with encouragement and support."¹²

"By definition, habits are repetitive behaviour; as such they are easy and familiar, the ruts we fall into while moving through life. Changing habits is hard, especially at first, requiring determined effort and time to make the changes stick…there are two requirements for success: motivation and determination to initiate the change, along with the time to practice the new patterns and have them become fixed."¹³

Motivation¹⁴ is:

Recognising a problem;
Readiness to consider change;
Seeking a way to change;
Initiating and maintaining a change strategy;
Is influenced by interpersonal processes and the environment.

Motivational interviewing:

Is an (brief) intervention to help an individual woman change her behaviour by facilitating her progress through the stages of change;
Combines a counselling style with a set of techniques that are used to build motivation and commitment to change.

As with effective program facilitators, a person conducting a motivational interview is:

An excellent listener who avoids arguments;
Able to express empathy and develop discrepancy;
Accepting and can support self-efficacy;
Non-judgemental and can roll with resistance.

Techniques include:

Asking open-ended questions;
Using decisional balance (the advantages vs the disadvantages of a decision);
Eliciting self-motivational statements (getting the client to argue for change).

This type of interaction, whether as a basis for dialectical behaviour or psychosocial rehabilitation interventions, will take staff a long way to ensuring effective interventions.

The Inmate Code

The McDonagh report indicated the inmate code was of particular importance to a high percentage of the women interviewed, especially during times when they were not interested in reducing their security classification. A strong adherence to the code implies the women believe that what they do while incarcerated in inconsequential; this is problematic with respect to those women genuinely invested in rehabilitative efforts… Becomingpositively involved in how one "does their time" is considered central in changing the behaviour and attitudes necessary to reduce security level. Therefore, finding a way to pragmatically challenge and break down the inmate code is of fundamental importance in managing these offenders. (McDonagh, p ii-iii).

Increased staff presence and role modelling on the Unit is the first step to ensuring that each woman does her own time.

Incompatibles

Incompatibility issues seem prevalent in the women's maximum security population and many are related to relationship problems. If the situation is not addressed quickly, these issues can result in acting out behaviour or management difficulties (e.g., having to always move the women at different times).

Creating opportunities where the inmates benefit from putting aside their differences and working together may be the first step to addressing incompatibility issues. Conflict resolution and encouraging the inmates to focus on their own issues and not those of others may also help to decrease incompatibles. The Elder and Chaplain and the psychologist may provide assistance and leadership in this area. Restorative justice initiatives or mediation training may also be useful (or access to staff skilled in mediation). An increased understanding of emotions and improved skills at handling stress and emotions may be the next step.

Though a formal process may not be necessary, a consistent approach in each institution to address incompatibility issues could be beneficial.

Gang-Related Activities

Gang issues are starting to become an issue in women's prisons¹⁵. Women from or affiliated with different gangs may become incompatible. It is likely that women wishing to distance themselves from gangs with whom they were previously affiliated, could require additional assistance. Some women may be traumatised by violence they have witnessed in gang situations; others may be linked to gangs through their family and disassociating themselves is difficult. [See Commissioner's Directive 576, Management of Gangs and Organized Crime.]

1 Source: OMS - data as of June 1, 2003. See Appendix 1 for additional details.
2 Some of the institutions decided to include an Assistant Team Leader in the roster.
3 In the larger units (EIFW and GVIW). The resourcing was calculated with a Program Officer on in the evenings, however, the WP contract does not allow for WPs to work after 18:00.
4 SeeHuman Resources Plan for the Intensvive Intervention Strategy, Part A: Staffing. This document provides information on the staffing plan for the Strategy. (CSC, December 2000).
5 The IDT does not replace the Case Management Team, but rather describes how the unit staff can work together as a coordinated and cohesive team.
6Laishes 1998, adapted from Linehan.
7 It can be a quick informal contract that is written in the daily log or on a casework record (e.g., complete the behaviour chain analysis and your TV will be returned), but it must be shown that the inmate has consented to the contract and that it is not merely an imposed condition
8 Report of the Task Force on Security, CSC (1999).
9 Adapted from Shiver, 1990 (Therapeutic Environment discussion paper).
10 Weil, Andrew M.D., 8 Weeks to Optimum Health, page 10
11 SeeHuman Resources Plan for the Intensive Intervention Strategy, Part B: Staff Training (CSC, 2000).
12 Weil, Andrew, M.D., 8 Weeks to Optimum Health, page 8.
13 Ibid, page 39.
14 From Motivational Interviewing Training, Research Results and Operational Applications, overhead presentation by Joel Ginsburg, Lynn Stewart and John Weekes (see bibliography).
15 In other areas of the country, similar problems may be more racially motivated.

D. Team Meetings, Correctional Plans and Security Reclassification

Team Meetings

Inter-disciplinary team meetings/case conferences must be held once a week. A time must be built into the weekly schedule and every staff member that can attend must attend. If necessary, movement in the Unit can be restricted to facilitate the meeting. This will also model consistency and the women will know that their cases will be discussed at this scheduled time.

Each case should be reviewed to determine modifications to interventions, lessening or tightening of security restrictions, movement on and off the Unit. Individualised risk assessments for each woman should be ongoing and part of the weekly meetings. As mentioned previously, some of this work may be done by a smaller team who brings their recommendations to the entire inter-disciplinary team for discussion and decision.

Daily interventions should normally be documented in the daily log and in the individual woman's Case Work Record (or structured Case Work Record), as appropriate. A checklist -Behaviour Management and Targets-Daily Record¹ will be filled out once a day and will help staff to monitor progress over time. Major changes will be outlined in the inter-disciplinary team minutes and should be incorporated into the Correctional Plan Progress Report (or other documents as appropriate). Each institution must establish a communication mechanism so significant changes in intervention approaches or other pertinent information can be immediately made available to all staff on the unit.

Correctional Plans

Correctional Plans are developed at the beginning of a woman's sentence and do not generally change. When a woman is classified as maximum security, interventions (detailed in the Correctional Plan Progress Report) should focus on the issues she must address in order to reduce her security classification. Many maximum security women have multiple needs, so in order to both increase motivation to address the problems that led to the reclassification and to imbue a sense of accomplishment, the plan must not be overwhelming. Issues or programs not related to the reclassification could be addressed once she is in the medium/minimum security population.

It is also recognised that a few women will never be able to function in the community based living environment of the main institution, some because of the risk they pose. These needs, their risks and reintegration planning will continue to be managed and addressed in the maximum security setting. In these instances, correctional interventions will continue over long periods and may eventually deal with many more needs and risks than solely the difficulties that led to her maximum security classification

Security Reclassification

A security reclassification review will be done every 6 months in order to facilitate safe reintegration to the main institution as quickly as possible.² At this review, the level, manner and reasons for movement on the Unit, if required, and off the Unit (for example for increased program access) should also be determined. For women sentenced to life as a minimum, the security review need only be conducted at her 2 year review (as per CSC policy).

PART 4 - OPERATIONS

This section addresses the operations of the Secure Unit including operational routines, security procedures, (counts, searches, movement), management of inmates, consequences of inappropriate behaviours, etc..

A. Setting an Operational Routine

Each unit must set daily, weekend and weekly operational routines. It is imperative that staff be thoroughly familiar with routines and procedures identified for all inmates as well as those more focused procedures developed for some individual inmates. A sample daily operational routine could be:

Activity	Description
Shift briefing (approx. 15 minutes)	Include all observation reports, overnight situations, institutional offence reports, program progress or updates, daily appointments, etc.
Count	As per institutional policy; women in cells
Breakfast	Open cells; meals on the pod
Clean-up	Cleaning of pod and cells
Health services	Medical parade
Morning programs /work /individualised interventions	Block(s) of programs or work; individualised interventions and meetings on case management issues, with the Elder/Chaplain, etc.; linked to inmate pay. Women whorefuse to participate remain in their pod on the basic allowance of $1.³
Count	As per institutional policy; women in cells for count.
Lunch	Meal taken in the pod.
Afternoon programs /work /individualised interventions	Block(s) of programs and work; individualised interventions and meetings on case management issues, with the Elder/Chaplain, etc.; linked to inmate pay. Women whorefuse to participate remain in their pod on the basic allowance of $1.
Free time	In pod, in yard or scheduled gym time, showers, laundry.
Shift briefing	As above - women in pods.
Count	As per institutional policy; women in cells for count.
Supper	Meal taken in pod
Evening programs /individualised interventions	Schedule blocks of time, as appropriate. Hobby craft, scheduled gym time, yard time, in program rooms, etc..
Health services	Medical parade
Curfew and lock up	In the pods at 10:00 pm ; lock up in cells at 10:30 pm
Count	As per institutional policy; women in cells for count.
Final shift briefing	As above.

A sample weekly routine includes scheduling: the weekly Secure Unit inter-disciplinary team meeting; the weekly Coordinated Care Committee meeting; scheduled gym time; scheduled visit time; scheduled use of resource centre or library;schedule use of hobby craft areas; scheduled medical appointments, etc. Other events to schedule are religious services; spiritual guidance and sweatlodges/feasts, etc.

The weekend routine could be less structured than the daily routine, (for example, brunch rather than breakfast and lunch), include additional free time, but should still include a certain number of structured activities.

Unit Profile

On a periodic basis, a profile of the Unit needs to be formally articulated because of the shifting population, their needs, behaviours and risks, as well as staff movement. In this way, staff and management will be better prepared to intervene as they will know exactly who is on the Unit.

The ongoing work of the inter-disciplinary team to establish and maintain intervention plans will feed the development of the Unit's profile. Other areas to include in the assessment are: recent incidents; unusual inmate activity or behaviour; upcoming special occasions or holidays; cancellation of visits or any activities; detention referrals; various NPB hearings; contraband seizures; canteen purchases or food hoarding; requests for protection; any intelligence information; etc..

Institutional management, Emergency Response Team (ERT) members and other staff who fill in from time to time but are not on the Secure Unit roster must be kept regularly apprised of the Unit profile.

B. Physical Environment of the Secure Unit

Perimeter Security

Though women classified as maximum security require a higher level of static security than women classified as medium and minimum security, the perimeter security of a men's maximum security institution is not required.⁴ A full security review of the regional institutions was done in 1996 and a number of security enhancements were made.⁵ As a result, no changes have been made to the institutional perimeter which currently consists of the following:

The perimeter fence is eight feet and has an “outrigger” with Berka (razor) wire (at Nova Institution for Women the main administration building forms the front perimeter with the perimeter fence on the other three sides);
A fence detection system signals alarms in the event of intrusions or escape attempts;
A network of closed-circuit television camera and an infrared light-illumination allows for assessment and visual verification of alarms;
The main security control system monitors the perimeter security fence, the closed-circuit television monitors as well as all alarms.

Secure Unit

The design/construction and intensive level of staff intervention in the Secure Unit will supplement the outer perimeter security system. The physical structure of the Secure Unit is designed to:

prevent uncontrolled and unsupervised movement within the Secure Unit and within the institution;
provide another level of barrier to escape, in addition to the existing perimeter security;
support and facilitate 24 hour staff supervision and intervention;
provide accommodation and program capacity separate from the minimum/medium security women; and,
provide a safe environment for staff and inmates.

Static security measures built into the design and construction of the Secure Unit include:

Exterior

the building is of non-combustible construction and exterior walls provide for containment of the population.

Interior

The designs vary depending on the layout of the original Enhanced Unit in each institution; however, each Secure Unit has three levels of containment, the cell itself, the pod (4-6 cells) and the Unit itself (the institutional perimeter fence constitutes the fourth level of containment).

Control Post and Rotunda Operation

The closed Control Post will have sight lines into most areas of the unit. There is a certain amount of space in the central area of the Secure Unit - the rotunda - though this varies in size and design in each of the Units.

The rotunda could be used, as an example, for unit meetings with all inmates (as long as incompatibles can be managed without incident). However, on a daily basis access to the rotunda will be controlled; women will not be permitted to just "hang out" there (see E. Movement).

Pods and Cells

Based on operational experience, research and consultation, groupings of four to six in a housing pod is considered a manageable group size, which does not result in isolation and allows staff to manage groups separately if required. As such, the Secure Units are divided into pods of 4 to 6 cells each (this also helps to minimise noise). The pods can be managed separately depending on, for example, risk and incompatibility.

Each pod has a secure door, a common living/dining area, washer/dryer and a large bathroom with a bath and/or shower, a lunch counter (with a sink, small fridge, microwave, kettle, toaster, etc.) for small meal and snack preparation and reheating food. Knives and other sharps will be on cables or managed in other secure ways. Appliances and furniture will be secured to the floor. Smoking will be permitted in individual cells but generally, not on the pods.⁶

The cells have locking capability. The windows are of a size and location to prohibit free egress. Each cell will has its own toilet and sink. One cell on each pod is handicap accessible.

Institution	Regular cells	Number of pods	Number of cells per pod	Segregation cells on the unit (for the entire population)⁷
Nova	10	2	5	3
Joliette	10	2	1 pod of 4 cells; 1 pod of 6 cells⁸	4
Grand Valley	15	3	5	4
Edmonton	15	3	5	4

Multi-purpose rooms and their operation

When women cannot be safely managed in existing program spaces in the institution proper (even when separate schedules are used), they can use the two⁹ multi-purpose rooms on the unit for programming, spiritual activities, employment, hobbycraft, exercise, etc.. The multi-purpose rooms have some storage space. Considerations for furniture and equipment include chairs, tables (not secured to the floor), black/white board, exercise mats and portable exercise equipment, hobby craft equipment and computer(s).

Consideration should be given to using one room, on a part-time basis, as an inter-faith/shared spirituality room (with appropriate décor). However, because of the space limitations, the latter will also need to be used for many other activities. While the Team Leader should discuss the room's other uses with the Chaplain or Elder, limiting the room's use to specific activities, may be difficult.

At EIFW, due to the significant Aboriginal population and the integrated nature of Aboriginal spirituality in programming as well as the enhanced Elder role, there is an additional Spiritual Room.

Each institution will determine the specific schedule for their program rooms.

Kitchen and its operation

The Secure Units have a central kitchen where the meals for the Unit are prepared. The kitchen will be designed for the cooking and storage of a week's supply of food for the unit as well as for a flexible approach to meal preparation (by either staff alone or staff with inmate assistance) and multi-tasking (cooking programs for example). Because of both the non-egress construction of the Secure Unit and the presence of stoves/ovens, policy dictates that staff must be present whenever an inmate is in the kitchen. The kitchen can be locked when it is not in use.

Meals will be prepared in the Secure Unit kitchen and brought to the pods to be served.

Each kitchen has food carts to take meals to the pods (either the made-up trays for the segregation unit or the casserole dish to the pods). Inmates will eat their meals in the dining area on their pod. Hard plastic cutlery will be provided to the women (that they will keep in their cells). Dishes will be on the pod and will be cleaned and maintained in the storage space in the pod. Pots and pans will be cleaned and stored in the central kitchen. Once the meals are completed and the dishes washed, the serving cutlery will be counted and secured.

The Food Service Officer prepares meals and/or supervises meal preparation (Primary Workers or Behavioural Counsellors can provide additional supervision and assistance as needed). There will be 2-3 inmate employment positions in the kitchen (one per pod if possible). The inmate employment positions should include participating in weekly menu planning with the Food Service Officer and in meal preparation (as a kitchen worker) for the Unit. Kitchen work will be a daily activity (and could require more than one woman per pod). Every effort should be made to have the kitchen workers involved in meal preparation to increase efficiency and to enhance basic living skills.

1 CSC/SCC 0003-T (2003-03) (Word version) and the companion formBehaviour Management and Targets-Daily Record, Offender Targets Worksheet CSC/SCC 0003-01T (2003-05) (Word Version) are being piloted and therefore, may be modified at a later date.
2 The security reclassification scale for women offeders developed/being validated at the time of writing is normally not valid for a period of less than 6 months.
3 Commissioner's Directive 730, Inmate Pay and Program Assignment. This level would be due to a refusal to work, not because of a lack of programs/work.
4 The Executive Committee made the decision that the perimeter security of the regional institutions would not be changed. Static security measures for women and men offenders have never been identical. The regional women's institutions house both minimum and medium security women; the perimeter security is more than men's minimum security and less than men's medium security; however, internally, the operation is closer to minimum security in that the women live without staff presence in houses. Prison for Women was a multi-level institution, housing all three security classifications; yet even its perimeter, while more imposing than that of the regional institutions, was not equivalent to that of maximum security men's institutions
5 At the time of this report, a second review of static security in women's institutions is ongoing. This review will result in clearly articluated technical criteria for women's institutions.
6 Subject to institutional decision.
7 As a working principle, the number of segregation cells is based on 5% of rated capacity.
8 Due to initial structural layout.
9 Nova has one large room that can be divided into two spaces. At their request, EIFW has 4 small program rooms.

Staff Space

The Secure Unit has shared office spaces for the front-line staff because they are expected to spend most of their time on the Unit working with and/or supervising the women. This includes the Primary Workers, Behavioural Counsellors and contract staff.

The Team Leader, psychologist and clinical nurse will have separate offices as they may require more privacy for management duties and counselling. There is an interview room and a staff washroom on the unit.

Segregation Unit

Each Secure Unit will also have a Segregation Unit. It is inside the Secure Unit structure, but is a separate wing of the Unit. It will be a shared space in the sense that when an inmate from the main population is segregated, it will be here. It will be managed by either the main institution staff or the Secure Unit staff, depending on rostering at each institution.

The Segregation Unit includes with three (3 - Nova) or four (4) wet cells, as well as laundry facilities, a full bathroom (shower/tub) and a small yard. At least one cell will be a camera cell.

Yard

The exercise yard has a 12 foot high perimeter (usually a combination of fence and wall) armed with a detection system. Generally, the yard has been placed to minimise contact with the minimum and medium security population. Staff will conduct regular rounds in the yard when the women offenders are using it.

C . Rounds and Counts

See Commissioner's Directive 566-4. Formal stand-to counts will be conducted with the women in their cells.

Key deister checks and rounds must be done as per institutional requirements. Rounds must be done regularly (generally every hour to 90 minutes). If a woman is segregated in her own cell in the Secure Unit pod, it will be up to the institution to determine the frequency, depending on risk or specific concerns.¹

D. Searches

A combination of static and dynamic security measures increase both effectiveness and efficiency in reducing the introduction of contraband to the Unit. Techniques available include:

drug detection dogs;
ion scanner (usually at principal entrance);
regular unit and cell searches (as per Search Plan);
regular searches of the common areas (staff must develop and maintain the habit of regularly searching these areas);
search of shared areas prior to the arrival of the maximum security women and after they leave;
search of the Secure Unit exercise yard before and after women are in the yard as well as supervision during exercise.

The Secure Unit Search Plan must be incorporated into the Institutional Search Plan. Thorough searches of the cells, pods, yard and other areas of the Secure Unit must conducted on a regular basis, likely more often than in the main institution. Searches of shared areas of the institutions should occur before the women arrive and after they leave (e.g. gymnasium, yard, program rooms). Staff supervising in these rooms must be vigilant with respect to contraband exchange.

Women entering or leaving the Secure Unit will be subject to routine non-intrusive and/or frisk searches. Written authorisation must be included in the institutional Search Plan as well as a Standing Order or Post Order in accordance with section 47 (g) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations². Section 47 reads:

A staff member [of either sex] may conduct a routine non-intrusive search or a routine frisk³ search of an inmate where

(g) the institutional head determines that there is an opportunity for the introduction of contraband into the penitentiary and the institutional head specifically authorizes such searches in writing.

Where a staff member of the Service suspects on reasonable grounds that an inmate is carrying contraband or evidence relating to a disciplinary or criminal offence, a non-intrusive or frisk search or strip search may be performed on the inmate as per the CCRA, CCRR and CD 566-7, Searches of Inmates (the National Operational Protocol - Front-Line Staffing, i.e., thecross-gender protocol still applies).

E. Movement

On the Unit

Though the unit routine will be built on the premise that women's cells will be unlocked during the day and evening (least restrictive measures, so the inmates are locked in their cells only when required) movement will be structured, scheduled and based upon risk assessments. For example, women may move from their cells into the pods and then into the program rooms or to an interview in various ways: individually (this may be necessary for a few women) or by pod. For the medical parade, women will likely move one at a time. As the population is heterogeneous, there will at any given time be women who:

have progressed to the point where they are willing to engage in programming and behaviour change;
refuse or sabotage efforts to motivate participation;
require one-to-one intensive mental health approach;
are incompatible with other women on the Unit.

Women must have the opportunity to be in a place where they can safely refuse to get involved in negative group behaviours, learn to work with other women and relate constructively to staff. A balance is required between separation and integration, even within this population: too few individuals results in virtual isolation and reduced capacity to learn constructive interaction with peers, while too large a group increases the potential for copycat behaviours and group action.

Schedules within the Unit should be arranged to limit contact between incompatibles.

Off the Unit⁵

The Secure Units are small, so efforts must be made to get the women off the Unit from time to time. Movement off the Secure Unit to other areas of the institution, provides the staff with some flexibility to assess the woman's progress and her risk. Movement off the Secure Unit will occur; how and when it will occur (the level, type and reasons for the movement) will be based on institutional policy, discussions of the interdisciplinary team and the woman's individual risk assessments. Maximum security women must be escorted and/or supervised when they are off the Unit.

The Checklist-Movement Off the Secure Unit⁵ is an assessment tool, to help staff to evaluate the risk for each woman. It should be reviewed at the weekly inter-disciplinary team meeting and a decision will be recorded in the meeting minutes at least once per month. This is to ensure any restrictive measures are lessened as soon as the risk is assumable.

The degree of movement out of the Secure Unit will not be identical for all the women. As chair of the interdisciplinary team, the Team Leader will be⁶ the decision maker with respect to movement off the unit. Decisions on restraint equipment can be delegated to the Team Leader from the Warden if the latter so chooses.⁷ In general:

Maximum security inmates will move at scheduled times and to pre-determined locations in conjunction with the schedule of the main institution and only when the risk is assumable (unless it is health care emergency);
They will always be under direct staff supervision.
The number of staff and the type of staff (e.g., two Primary Workers or a PW and another staff member will be based on theindividual risk assessment);
Restraint equipment will be based on her individualized risk assessment (see below).

Additionally,

Minimum and medium security women could be made aware of movement times of the maximum security women so they can arrange to be elsewhere, if they so choose [NB: it will be up to each institution whether or not they wish to divulge general movement times of the maximum security women as this may be an opportune time to pass contraband];
If a maximum security woman has a history of incompatibility with a lower security woman, movement and exercise schedules should be arranged to reduce potential for interaction;
If a maximum security woman interacts inappropriately (verbal threats for example), she should be returned immediately to the Secure Unit (this is a rule of the Unit and should be added to institutional policy). The disciplinary process, including offence reports, could be considered;
If lower security inmates interact inappropriately with maximum security women, the normal disciplinary process could be used as well as any re-classification review deemed necessary.

These approaches minimise physical contact with the minimum and medium security population; negative visual and auditory interaction is managed through dynamic supervision by staff.

In order to provide consistency, the following movement framework is suggested. It is based on the assessment staff will do using theMovement Off the Secure Unit Checklist:

LEVEL	DESCRIPTION	RESTRAINTS AND STAFF
1	The woman can only leave the Secure Unit with escorts and in restraints and remains with staff at all times (e.g., to health care for services that cannot be provided on the unit).	Handcuffs or body belt and/or leg irons; two Primary Workers.
2	The woman is under direct and constant staff observation and uses other parts of facility without interacting with other inmates.	Handcuffs only while travelling to the designated area. One Primary Worker escorts the inmate.
3	The woman can leave the unit under direct supervision, is taken to a supervised program area (with inmates from the main population) and then is brought back to the Secure Unit when the program is completed.	No restraint equipment. Two staff escorts, but not necessarily PWs.
4	The woman can leave the unit under direct supervision, to attend a supervised program area (with inmates from the main population). She is brought back to the Secure Unit when the program is completed.	No restraint equipment. One escort; may be either a Primary Worker or another staff member.

Out of the Institution

Please refer to the procedures in Commissioner's Directive 566-6, Security Escorts, when maximum security women are to be escorted out of the institution. For ground escorts (paragraph 20), the minimum staff to inmate ratio shall usually be two officers for the first inmate. For inmates classified as maximum security, at least two types of restraint equipment shall be used (paragraph 27).

F. Managing Shared Spaces

Introduction

The women from the Secure Unit will share institutional areas on a different schedule from the main population and based on their individual risk assessment. The schedule should be adjusted so that the main population is only partially impacted by the maximum security women's use of the areas, though it may be difficult to keep the populations apart during movement. When the maximum women are using shared areas of the institution, these areas should become temporaryout of bounds areas for the main population.

Visiting

The women housed in the Secure Unit will use the existing visiting areaby appointment onlyandon a separate, pre-determined schedule from the minimum and medium security population. This will impact the overall visiting schedule of the institution so all inmates should be made aware of the changes. The visiting area will beout of bounds for the main population during the Secure Unit visiting time.

All institutions have (or will have) a non-contact visiting area.⁸ Whether visits are open or closed will be determined by the woman's individual risk assessment. In most institutions, the visiting area is close to the main entrance. Procedures should be put in place to manage movement of both the inmates and visitors around this area to minimise escape risk. An evaluation will also need to be done to determine whether or not the woman can access the small courtyard adjacent to the visiting areas in most of the institutions.

Each Secure Unit has two posts on Monday to Friday day shift who can be used to escort women around the institution (leaving two Primary Workers on the unit itself). At least one of the Secure Unit staff supervising the movement of the women to the visiting area will remain to provide additional support to the post as needed. Based on the layout of each of the visiting areas, the institution may have to determine how many maximum security women can be in the visiting area at one time. The risk and the number of maximum security women in the visiting area will determine the number of Secure Unit staff who remain.

If there is an individual woman whose risk is assessed as unmanageable in the general visiting area (even in the non-contact area) alternative arrangements could be considered by the institution.

If there are children visiting a maximum security woman, the institution will assess the risk to the children presented by other maximum security women who might be in the visiting area at the same time. If there are reasonable grounds to believe there is a risk to the child or children, an alternate time or location should be considered for the inmate who is creating the elevated risk.

Private Family Visiting

The shared use principle also applies to the Private Family Visiting (PFV) unit.⁹The PFV units have alarmed doors and windows. Each has its own patio/yard. Increased verifications, counts and other security procedures will be established (different from those used for the minimum and medium security women). In institutions where the PFV is not in a restricted or out of bounds area, minimum and medium security women will not be permitted to visit the PFV when a maximum security women is in the PFV.¹⁰

If a maximum security woman whose risk of escape during a potential PFV and whose risk to the community for violent re-offending if she escapes is considered as unmanageable even with more frequent checks or other measures, her eligibility for a PFV must be reassessed. Both CD 770, Visiting and the CCRA provide the requisite authority to do so.

Alternatives may also be considered (based on the woman's risk assessment); for example, she may return to the Secure Unit at curfew to sleep, rather than remaining with her family in the PFV.

Health Services

Though there will be a clinical nurse assigned to the Unit (and if necessary, the institutional nurses could visit the Unit), certain interventions will require that the women visit the Health Services Centre. Except in emergency cases, these visits will be scheduled to limit contact with the main population and women will be under staff supervision. Medical information is confidential, and the escorting officers must respect this information. The risk assessment can determine whether the Primary Worker must remain in the room with the inmate, though some practitioners may insist that the security staff remain.

Segregation

There will be one segregation unit for the entire institution. It is part of the overall Secure Unit building but is away from the main areas of the Secure Unit (depending on the site, the control post has at least partial sight lines into the segregation unit). Secure Unit staff should normally cover the segregation unit when it is occupied, though staff from the main institution may be required to assist. Because inmates in segregation tend to be on a very defined schedule, movement and interventions can be arranged to ensure sufficient staff are available. If required or if appropriate, a maximum security woman can be segregated in her own cell.¹¹ Minimum and medium security women will not be segregated in the Secure Unit, unless there are very exceptional circumstances (e.g., a riot) requiring a short term solution. They must be placed in the segregation unit.

If a minimum or medium security woman requests a time-out from her house, alternatives to segregation cells should be considered first, (e.g. health care beds or, if available and appropriate, the PFV, etc.).

Gymnasium

The gyms are normally located at one end of the main administration buildings as they were designed to facilitate community-use access. Due to fire regulations, the gym normally cannot be locked although the exits are alarmed. Some institutions may be able to key lock the doors temporarily.

Maximum security women will use the gym at a pre-scheduled time and under staff supervision. The size of the group will be based on individual and group risk assessments as will the number of staff supervising.

For example: in order to have staff to supervise the women and have non-security staff (e.g. behavioural counsellor) coach or participate with the group, the women remaining in the Secure Unit could be placed on cell/pod time. The program officer responsible for the gym should also be involved in developing and supervising these activities (which also serves as a link to the staff of the main institution).

Library/Resource Centres

Women permitted off the Unit, may also visit the library/resource centre on a separate schedule. The person responsible for the library should also be involved in working with the maximum security women who attend the library. If this person is an inmate, then, for example, the Behavioural Counsellor could arrange for books and other reading materials to be brought to the Secure Unit (i.e., the inmate could choose the books and a member of the Secure Unit staff could bring the books to the unit).

For those women who cannot leave the Unit, arrangements should be made to have a selection of books, magazines and newspapers brought to the Secure Unit once per week. Written requests can be made to the librarian. Another option is to make arrangements with the municipal library to increase the reading choices.

Hobbycraft Areas

If women involved in hobby craft can be managed off the Unit, then access to the hobbycraft areas could be arranged. Otherwise, the multi-purpose rooms can be used as well as the women working in the pod or in their cells. Supervision and monitoring of tools/sharps will be required.

School (other programs and program areas)

While most programs will be delivered on the Unit, school and programs areas can also be shared. Women who are working to decrease their security classification and where the risk is assumable, can attend a program with the main population.

In these instances, staff will accompany them to the program area and then accompany the women back to the Unit. If women are attending a program with the main population, it is expected that they should not require supervision during the program; however, the program officer should ensure that they do not leave the program room without supervision and the Primary Workers (from either the Secure Unit or main institution) should maintain more frequent supervision of the room through the window in the door.

G. Relation of the Secure Unit to the Main Institution

It is essential the staff in the Secure Unit maintain close relationships with their counterparts in both the Structured Living Environment house and in the main institution. This facilitates staff communication, demystifies and increases understanding of the risk and needs of the maximum security women and allows staff to maintain a connection with their colleagues. Because there is no staff lounge in the Secure Unit, staff could visit the staff lounge during breaks which also provides respite from the Unit.

The Coordinated Care Committee (that oversees all mental health issues for the entire institution) and morning operations meetings also provide a vital link for the Secure Unit management and staff with their colleagues.

H. Crisis Management

The Situation Management Model (see Commissioner's Directive 567, Management of Security Incidents) applies to the Secure Unit as it does to all CSC institutions. All staff, including those in the Secure Unit and all staff in key roles must be aware of their roles and responsibilities and the importance of interaction and communication during a crisis. All Commissioner's Directives with respect to managing emergencies, contingency plans, etc. apply unless otherwise noted.

Emergency Response Team Interventions

As per the use of force policy and CSC's response to the Arbour Report, the first pre-planned interventionmust be done by a women-only team.

Verbal interventions and negotiation must be used wherever possible; however, if a situation escalates (e.g., physical or serious emotional violence occurs) the Situation Management Model provides a range of options with which to respond.

Critical incident stress debriefing will be especially important for staff and inmates because of the small units. Behaviour Chain Analysis and Decision Balance Sheets will also be useful tools (see Part 5 - Programs) to assist inmates to recognise inappropriate actions and behaviours.

Self-injurious behaviour

Self-injurious behaviour is a prevalent behaviour for a small number of women. It is important the unit return as quickly as possible to normal after an incident of self-harm. In order to minimise the contagion effect, it may be best to quickly conduct one-to-one debriefing (rather than group sessions) to provide some basic facts to inmates who witnessed or were affected by the situation. For those who have hurt themselves, various interventions are available through the DBT skills development and other mental health interventions.¹²

Management Protocol

This section is no longer in effect. Management Protocol was rescinded May 1, 2011

I. Secure Unit Handbook for Inmates

Each institution has a handbook (or revised the current institutional handbook) to include descriptions of the Secure Unit, rules and expectations, the unit schedule and routine, how movement will work, how to reduce security levels; the Management Protocol, etc.

J. Secure Unit Expectations and Rules

These expectations and rules will be posted on alarge posterin a few places, including at the entrance to the Unit so that all inmates, staff and visitors to the unit are aware of the rules and that they are applied consistently. Other rules will need to be developed for the central kitchen, laundry areas, bath/shower room.

Expectations:

Respect others at all times. Respect their space and please keep the noise down.
If you don't understand something -please ask.
Sometimes staff can't answer your question right away -please be patient.
Programs and work are mandatory -please be on time.
You are responsible for your cell, your personal hygiene and your behaviour.
When staff come on your pod they will announce themselves (except after curfew).Please be dressed appropriately.
If you need time alone -please try and say so.
Do your own time.

Rules:

Abusive language and threats will not be tolerated.Think before you speak.
Acts of violence will not be tolerated.Think before you act.
Visiting between the pods is not allowed.
Visiting in cells is not allowed.
One person in the bath/shower room at a time.
Cell alarms must only be used for emergencies.
All your cell effects must be on your personal effects sheet (#514) and posted in your cell. No sharing and no trading.
A routine non-intrusive or frisk search will be done every time you leave the Secure Unit and every time you return.
If you act inappropriately when you are out of the Unit, you will be brought back to the Unitimmediately.

PART 5 - PROGRAMS

A. Introduction

Programs, as they are in CSC in general, will be an integral part of the intensive intervention approach in the Secure Unit. It is important to recognise not all maximum security women experience continual institutional adjustment difficulties or are aggressive every day, all day and these women will be released/integrated into the community at some point. The operation of the Secure Unit and its focus need to be firmly fixed on reintegration, preferably first into the community living environment of the institution before release into the community.

Given the intensive intervention approach being implemented, correctional and treatment programs, work, social programs and activitiesshould all contribute to the goal of reintegration of maximum security women.

Most of the Secure Units will have blended populations. Staff will need to consider the programming needs of women whose attitudes are more anti-social; those who may have cognitive or living skills deficits; Aboriginal women whose programs need to be more culturally based and include healing and other types of ceremonies; and, women in the first two years of life sentences.

B. Goal of programming in the Secure Unit

The primary goal of programming is to address the issues that resulted in the woman's

maximum security classificationso she can be safely reclassified to medium security. For most of the women, institutional adjustment has proven to be the main reason they are classified as maximum security. Behaviour management and basic skills building is the main intervention focus for many of the women. The Behavioural Management and Targets - Daily Recordwill help staff to monitor progress.

As such, it is not necessary to deliver all programs identified on the Correctional Plan, nor to address every identified need. The women themselves identified overwhelming Correctional Plans as an obstacle to reducing their security classification. Once the woman has been reclassified to medium security, program involvement can then be expanded.

C. Background and Context

The Women's Perspectives

Non-Aboriginal Women

In the McDonagh report, non-Aboriginal maximum security women expressed the following ideas about how programs were helpful to reduce their maximum security status:

General Population	Special Needs Population
Programs, particularly core programs, are all useful.	All programs seen as useful except for education and literacy programs.
Survivors of Abuse and Trauma and Cognitive Skills considered particularly effective.	Cognitive skills considered somewhat difficult (n=1); Survivors considered very useful.
Substance abuse is perhaps overemphasised; program needs to be more structured and ongoing (relapse prevention, p70)¹³	Not a commonly identified area.
More anger management programs would be useful (p70).	Useful but content difficult (n=1).
Need more gym and physical activities.	Need more gym and physical activities.
Employment usually part of Correctional Plan and considered very important; need more varied assignments.	Employment usually more sporadic.

Program participation/motivation had four themes:

General Population	Special Needs Population
Discomfort with the group model and group dynamics (issues of trust, disruptive inmates).¹⁴	Group participation is more related to incompatibles.
Program considered valuable-they "need" the program; facilitators have experience with issues they are talking about.	Being "valuable" was not an issue; but programs that challenged cognitive abilities were considered too hard, or boring. Creative programs (e.g., arts and crafts) preferred.
Indifference towards programs is often related to the inmate code.
Something to do with their time.	Something to do with their time.

Aboriginal Women

In the Morin Report, Aboriginal women described which programs they perceived worked (and didn't work) to help reduce their security levels:

What Works	What Doesn't Work
New and interesting programs based on healing and experiential learning that are culturally sensitive and are delivered by Aboriginal facilitators and Elders.	Intellectually based programs (e.g. Cognitive Skills) are boring and repeating them adds to the boredom. Programs that are not culturally appropriate.
Programs should have a spiritual base as well as emotional support. Ceremonies need to be recognised as part of the Correctional Plan.	Intellectually based programs.
Native liaison services and full-time Elder counselling services and healing ceremonies.
Well-trained and qualified facilitators who are creative and make their programs interesting, flexible and not authoritarian nor judgmental.	Having correctional officers or former correctional officers as facilitators creates animosity with the Aboriginal women who consider the programs to be security based and not treatment based.
The needs of the women should drive the program requirements, not vice-versa. Women should be able to take the programs when they are ready.	Women should not be forced to take programs for which they are not ready. Delays in providing the required programs and withholding programs to "punish" the women to get them to conform and obey CSC staff. Program repetition upon transfer.
Community re-integration programs that are taken prior to release and for extensive periods.
Programs need to be completed in steps so the women have a sense of accomplishment. Positive reinforcement from staff.	When the focus is only on negative behaviours.
Staff and program facilitators that give support and encouragement to the women.	When support and encouragement is not readily available.

Programs identified in the Morin Report that would help Aboriginal women include:

Intensive substance programs, treatment and relapse prevention to address drug addictions (coupled with prevention of drugs coming into the institution).
Suicide and self-injurious behaviour/prevention.
Programs on domestic violence, the cycle of abuse and abusive relationships, the effects of family violence and dysfunctional family systems, couples counselling (where warranted) to address co-dependency and self-esteem building.
Programs to address grief and loss.
Parenting skillsprograms - to learn to parent their children during visits and upon release.
Living skills and anger managementto deal with spontaneous behaviour and to learn about anger and other emotions from a cultural perspective.
Need to access post secondary or university education.
"Breaking Barriers" program with peer support counsellors.

Though it deals solely with men offenders, in his report Aboriginal Gangs¹⁵, Mercredi indicates that "…the majority of Aboriginal offenders who voiced opinions on the core programs expressed some personal benefit to having taken and completed one or more of the core programs…" (page 10) However, he further insists that "…curricula [that] combine education and healing can be adapted to provide the Aboriginal offenders …with the kind of education that will challenge them to change their lives through personal self-determination, individual growth and self-empowerment." (page 10)

1 A CD on Security Rounds and Patrols is, at the time of publication, in draft form. Once promulgated it should provide additional direction.
2In both the McDonagh and Morin reports, women indicated that the availability of drugs on the maximum security units increases the risk.
3 In the women's institutions, the "Cross-Gender Protocol" also applies for frisk searches, in that men cannot frisk search women inmates (which is not addressed in CD 566-7).
4 Each Secure Unit will be resourced for two, 250 day posts (Monday-Friday) for Primary Workers on the day shift, for escorting and supervising women off the unit. If no escorts are scheduled or required, these officers will be available to work their shift on the Secure Unit.
5 CSC/SCC 0005-T (R-03-05)(Word Version) Pilot Project. This form was developed prior to opening and is being piloted. It may be modified as staff work with it.
6 Unless the warden decides to maintain this accountability.
7 See Commissioner's Directive 567-3, Use of Restraint Equipment, paragraph 12. "Follwing an individual risk assessment, restraint equipment may be authorized by the Institutional Head or his/her delegate to protect staff, inmates and the public in the following circumstances: a. to escort inmates within the institution, including: … iii) escorting a high-risk inmate."
8Grand Valley , Joliette and Edmonton Institution for Women have a non-contact visiting room in the general visiting area. As part of the renovations, Nova now has a non-contact visiting room adjacent to their Secure Unit.
9 Given the increase in even the minimum and medium security population, the requirement for additional PFV units will be determined for each site; utilisation figures will be the basis for the assessment. If an additional PFV is required, the best location will be determined taking the location of the Secure Unit in to consideration.
10 At some institutions, women are permitted to visit the PFV when their co-inmates are with their families. Whether a maximum security woman can be in one side of the PFV while a minimum/medium security woman is in the other side of the PFVwill be for the institution to determine.
11 See Task Force on Segregation that defined segregation as a status, not necessarily a location.
12 The Regional Psychiatric Centre has developed self-injurious behaviour protocol, entitledParasuicidal Behaviours Handbook for Forensic Inpatients; however, RPC is a voluntary treatment milieu which is different from the Secure Units.
13 CSC is piloting a state-of-the-art substance abuse program for women in 2003.
14 TheFamily Life Improvement Program, the pre-requisite toSpirit of a Warrior, introduces group dynamics and the program at Saskatchewan Penitentiary experienced success in this area.
15 Mercredi, Ovide,Aboriginal Gangs: A Report to the Correctional Service of Canada on Aboriginal Youth Gang Members in the Federal Corrections System,October 2000.

Ceremonies

Mercredi also writes at length on the role of the Elder and that their work does not constitute a "program" (page 12), but can be best understood through participation in ceremony. He states, "[I]t is ceremony where many of the basic values of traditional life are best explained, understood and applied. Observation and book knowledge of traditional ways are helpful in building awareness, but the essence of the way of living can only be experienced in practice." (page 12).

Mercredi continues, "[T]heir [the offenders'] participation in ceremony will make them evaluate their past life and help them build a better one without the usual exams, tests, or assessments that make up the work of the professional people and others who work for the correctional system. (page 13). The choice for a different lifestyle will become apparent as one engages in the road of traditional knowledge and spirituality. One can try to fake it but no one can fake it forever. You come as you are but if the teachings are followed in one's daily life, you will not remain the same. Your life will improve as you transform into a self-reliant, confident and responsible human being. That message of transformation…is the Creator's promise…It is a belief rooted in the idea that ignorance can be replaced with the enlightened knowledge of one's self in union with the rest of creation." (page 16)

Mercredi's comments reinforce the importance of integrating ceremonies, traditional teachings, and culturally-sensitive approaches to interventions and programs identified by Aboriginal women themselves.

Mercredi outlines some of the lessons or teachings of traditional people¹:

Non-violence is apersonal duty anda way of life;

Kindness is astrengtha way of life;

Honesty istruth anda way of life;

Sharing isempowering anda way of life;

Individual self-responsibility isuplifting anda way of life;

Self-forgiveness is anact of love anda way of life;

Caring for yourself and others isspiritual anda way of life;

Aggression and violence by women

The institutional adjustment behaviours prevalent in many women classified as maximum security that impact both staff and the women themselves are assaultive behaviour, serious self-injurious behaviours and suicidal behaviours.

In the last 10 years, more research has been done on women's anger, aggression and violence and the reader is directed to three reports in particular: Understanding Violence by Women, A Review of the Literature by Shaw and Dubois; Literature Review on Women's Anger and Other Emotions by Crump; and Female Adolescent Aggression: A Review of the Literature and the Correlates of Aggression by Leschied et al (see Bibliography, for details)².

Though the study by Leschied et al focuses on young and adolescent girls, there are many similarities in the characteristics and behaviours staff tend to see in our adult population. It is for this reason, and to give some understanding of how aggression and violence can develop, that this information on youths is included here.

Young girls and adolescent girls³

Though the incidents of violence in Canada , have been stable or decreasing, the rate of girls charged with violent crimes has increased twice as fast as that of boys (though boys still commit more violent crimes than girls overall - Leschied, p7). The definition of what constitutes violence is now broadening and includes verbal threats and intimidation. As such, girls are proportionately more likely to appear in the data (p9).

Studies have indicated that up to age 11, similar incident rates are reported for physical aggression by both girls and boys. Around age 11, things start to shift as relationships become more complex - the majority of girls who were physically aggressive revert to more indirect or "relational aggression" - gossiping and spreading rumours. However, girls who continue to be physically aggressive were characterised as "having poor social cognitive awareness and unable to keep up with the complex exchanges in the social group." Physical aggression is used to attain high status and control (p11).

Several factors have been identified in the literature concerning violence and aggression in girls, many of which are similar to general criminogenic factors and familiar to those who work with maximum security women (p38-39, table):

Systemic influences: as with women, children should be viewed in their social context. Their role models can impact their behaviour (p11). Adolescent girls' aggression is more interpersonal and tends to be focused on disrupting interpersonal relationships, whereas boys are more overtly aggressive (p12/23). This seems to be partly due to the way girls are socialized (p12).
Family:family communication styles (e.g., verbal aggression, weak or inappropriate problem-solving skills),parent management approaches, (e.g., low parental support/attachment, affection, emotional attachment, rejection, consistency in behavioural expectations); and,violence in the home (often leading to depression) are all identified factors (p12/30). Studies have shown the girls' fathers' behaviours as more strongly related to daughter's aggressive behaviour than to their sons' aggressive behaviour (p27)⁴. A longitudinal study suggested that "…low parental support and affection predicted persistent hitting and predatory violence in females…. the relationship between low parental support and violence was stronger for the adolescent girls…disrupted family status is predictive of persistent hitting only for adolescent girls [i.e., not for boys]." (p28)
Peers: though boys seem to experience increased popularity with their aggression, girls tend to be rejected for it (p13). However, girls that continue to associate with delinquent peers have more opportunities for delinquent behaviour. Girls join gangs for many of the same reasons as boys: to escape poverty, improve self-esteem, social cohesion and identification (p31).
School: Studies found significant relationships for violence with school drop-out and low school achievement (p13/31). One study showed that "…social rejection in school as a result of aggression was a predictor of girls' later aggressive tendencies, a pattern that was a somewhat stronger risk predictor for girls than boys." (p13) Poor educational achievement is also associated with other problems, e.g., early pregnancies, problematic behaviour towards their children, problems with their children, depression and anxiety. Education has been shown to be aprotective factor: aggressive girls who stayed in high school had more positive outcomes on all the variables; likely more options were available to them (p32).
Specific Trauma: in response to trauma, children can act in a "delinquent" manner, e.g., running away, yet such behaviour is also recognised as a coping/survival skill. However, running away can put the child back into high risk, re-victimizing situations, continuing the cycle (p13).
Cognitive: as with general criminogenic risk, cognitive factors (attitudes, beliefs, empathy, problem-solving, legitimisation of use of force) are important with respect to prediction of risk. One study showed "….the ability to perceive the effects of victimisation would appear to be related to an ability to suppress violent acts." (p24)
Comorbidity⁵ with other psychiatric factors: various studies suggest that girls show incidence rates of disorders such as depression, anxiety, adjustment disorders and separation anxiety disorders to a greater extentwhen accompanied by offenses of an aggressive type (p14). Another study showed that "as the level of suicidality increased, so did the frequency of violent behaviour. Implications of such findings could assist in the assessment of lethality in suicidal behaviouras being linked to the expression of externalized aggression." (p37)
Gender: One study suggested that "[D]espite the fact of a much lower level of overall aggression demonstrated by girls compared to boys, due to the type of expression of aggressive tendencies and socialization experiences of girls,the extent of potential distress experienced by girls may indeed prove to be even greater than for boys." (p16) There appears to be a paradox in that "…girls have a greater likelihood of developing a multiple disorder, even though they may have much lower prevalence rates of a particular disorder." (p16)
Substance Abuse: studies have shown a significant relationship between risk taking and drug use and other delinquent behaviours (gang membership, drinking, stealing and fighting).

Briefly,

"…the factors that contribute to individual risk, whether it is for general anti-social risk or the threat of violence, are complex, including both systemic and individual variables (p39), "…violent behaviour is a result of the interaction of contextual, individual and situational factors." (p42)
Depression and victimisation appear to be factors specific to female aggression (Bonta, p2).⁶ The tendency for girls to place a greater value on social relationships may be one of the unique themes being played out in linking aggression and depression with girls. (Leschied, p14)
Expressing aggression may increase the tendency for depression and suicide in girls. (p41 "…girls who express aggression seem also to report higher levels of depression and suicidal ideation.") Victimisation may lead to increased violence, perhaps in an effort to avoid revictimisation. "Young depressed women were nearly four times more likely to be aggressive and girls who were physically or sexually victimized were at higher risk for violence." (Bonta, p2) In other words, "[U]nderstanding the contributions of depression to aggression would be a critically important area to consider in treatment…" (Leschied, p43)
Girls tend to use indirect or relational aggression to disrupt interpersonal relationships while boys use overt physical aggression. However, "[E]vidence suggests the possibility that as some girls age, the form of aggression shifts from verbal threats intended to harm relationships to physical aggression." (Bonta, p1). "Aggression reported with girls can be both relational as well as physical…however the nature of escalation of violence would appear to be different. Boys are more likely to express their aggression as an impulsive act…whereas findings…suggest girls escalate first through relational socialized manipulation, that, in only some cases achieves a physical expression." (Leschied, p39) Targeting indirect, non-physical forms of aggressive behaviour may prevent direct physical forms of violence. (Bonta, p2)

Adult Women

In part of their study, Shaw and Dubois looked specifically at violence in institutions and in prisons and some of the information reflects the results from both the McDonagh and Morin reports. The various studies Shaw and Dubois reviewed suggested the following (p35-38):

Violence in institutions is an interactive phenomenon: overcrowding, "provocation" by staff or other inmates, staff inexperience or tolerance of violence are all situational factors which interact with individual and systemic factors. Assaults seemed to result from an interaction between environmental and internal factors and could not be explained by patient pathology.
Assaults in institutions were often associated with staff demands for action, refusal or requests or the imposition of sanctions.
Staff are often unaware of triggering events, while patients often claimed they were "provoked."
In comparison, women may receive disciplinary charges for more trivial offenses than are men.
Higher rates of discipline charges are found in institutions with higher security… and among young, single women.
Women serving shorter sentences tend to be charged more than women serving longer sentences.
Women with a history of juvenile incarceration were more likely to be charged than others.
Women are more likely to act alone than in a group [though CSC has experienced both types of aggression].
Inmates' perceptions of events and interactions: boredom and "provocation" were seen as the main factor leading to fights and arguments; withholding of rights, favouritism, unfairness or victimisation were seen as the main source of confrontation with staff.
Labelling inmates as manipulative, violent or dangerous can set up staff expectations, encourage hostile interpretation of actions and induce resistance. Physical violence was more likely to be a result of harsh institutional practices, which leads to defiant responses from the inmates (more overt inmate behaviours), resulting in more punishment.
Management style, inmate-staff relations, staff training and size of the institution all appear to be crucial factors when studying violence and discipline.

In a study conducted in the United States⁷, the following conclusions were made (p145):

Institutional violence was found to be consistently related to certain demographic characteristics and mental health and victimization factors.
Age, minority status, high scores on the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) Global Severity Index, a positive screen for antisocial or histrionic personality disorder, and sexual victimization before the age of 18 years, all contributed to a significant model for predicting institutional violence.
These results suggest that the behaviour that culminates in the incarceration of women and the perpetration of violence within this highly structured environment is a multidimensional trajectory that is characterised, in most cases, by a lengthy premorbid period of abuse, psychiatric disturbance and general life maladjustment. (see Appendix 3 for additional details).

Conclusion

The information provided in this section doesnot serve to excuse violent behaviour of women inmates, but rather tries to explain it. What does surface, is that violent acting-out is complex, cyclical and likely stems from many elements including ineffective parenting and family dysfunction; gender factors (e.g., the way girls are socialized); learned behaviours, beliefs and attitudes; lack of education; lack of problem-solving abilities; and, victimisation and a fear of re-victimisation, be it physical, sexual or a sense of powerlessness in the face of perceived (or real) arbitrary interventions in a prison setting (staff may be unaware of how their very legitimate actions may be perceived as "provocative").

Many inmates have maintained a level of verbal aggression seen in adolescents; others continue to use physical aggression to resolve conflicts and solve problems. The aggressive behaviour of many woman may also parallel depression and suicidal ideation.

D. Intervention Approaches: Dialectical Behaviour Therapy and Psycho-Social Rehabilitation 8

Below is a brief overview of the two intervention approaches that will address a large majority of the identified needs of the women. All staff working in the Secure Unit will receive comprehensive training in these approaches, so only a brief outline is included here.

Both the Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) and Psychosocial Rehabilitation (PSR) models have certain common principles and delivery methods, for example: an underlying philosophy of support, validation and not pathologising the client; success in forensic settings; program admission and exclusion criteria; individual treatment planning; skills building; decreasing the frequency of problem behaviours; recreation and leisure components; evaluation and research; and, staff training and ongoing supervision. Women for whom DBT interventions will be effective may also have areas where PSR skills will help them; however, women whose main need is PSR may experience difficulty with some of the more abstract concepts of DBT.

Staff working in the Secure Unit received similar training on DBT and PSR as staff working in the SLE; however, the Secure Unit training focuses more on behaviour management and interventions. It was also helpful to include in the training, other staff who work on a regular basis with the women, to increase their knowledge and ensure consistency in interventions.

Dialectical Behavior Therapy⁹ (DBT)

Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) has been used in forensic settings and is one of the most promising approaches to help women struggling with severe emotion and behavioural dysregulation. Many of these women display a combination of difficulties characterised by self-destructive and/or suicidal behaviour, severe interpersonal relationship problems, unstable and low self-image; cognitive disturbances and distortions; and, extreme and problematic impulsive behaviour¹⁰. Generally, they exhibit:

High sensitivity		Immediate reactions; a low threshold for emotional reaction.
High reactivity		Extreme reactions; a high arousal state that impedes their thought processes.
Slow return to baseline		long-lasting reactions that contribute to high sensitivity to next emotional event.

Philosophical Traditions

DBT is based on a biosocial theory of personality functioning. This theory suggests that the nature of the difficulties experienced by a person are rooted and maintained through a combination of biological and environmental factors. In this a model, personal difficulties stem from:

deficits in important skill areas: interpersonal, self-regulation, emotion regulation and distress tolerance; and,
personal and environmental factors that reinforce maladaptive behaviours and hinder both the use of existing behavioural skills and the development of new skills and capacities.

DBT also has roots in two other philosophical and therapeutic traditions: cognitive-behavioural and dialectical theory which focus on the following:

Enhance the ability to deal with emotions and situations;
Improve motivation;
Ensure that new/learned skills can be generalised to other environments;
Enhance the staff's capabilities (and their motivation) to respond to difficult situations; and
Provide structure to the environment.

DBT is framed by an overarching dialectical perspective that is the foundation upon which the entire intervention approach rests. The dialectical perspective emphasises the interrelatedness and wholeness of a person's reality and the synthesis (or balance) of opposites. In DBT, individuals are considered trapped in polarities: things tend to be black or white - there is no gray. This is evidenced in their dichotomous and extreme thinking, behaviour and emotion patterns, and their difficulty or inability to move toward synthesis.

Synthesis, or balance, is sought on several levels: the key dialectic is acceptance and change. On the one hand, DBT requires confrontation, commitment and the woman taking responsibility; on the other hand, it focuses considerable attention on accepting and validating the woman while simultaneously teaching a broad range of behavioural skills. Confrontation (or change), is balanced by support (or acceptance); hence the dialectic. This increases the person's comfort with ambiguity and change which are inevitable parts of life. The real target is to achieve balance: balanced actions, balanced emotions, balanced cognition, to help create a life worth living - on their own terms.

To achieve this, DBT includes specific strategies to promote acceptance and validation of the woman's current capabilities and behavioural functioning (e.g., mindfulness; recognising that aspects of problematic behaviour have an adaptive function). These are balanced by strategies to promote change (e.g., behavioural analysis, problem solving, contingency procedures, skills training) which teach the woman more adaptive ways to deal with difficulties and to assist her to acquire skills to accomplish this. Dialectical strategies inform all aspects of DBT treatment.

DBT has a hierarchy of behavioural targets for change using three stages of treatment. CSC concentrates on Stage 1 which focuses on assisting individuals to attain basic capacities (e.g., increase behavioural skills, mindfulness skills, interpersonal effectiveness, emotion regulation, distress tolerance and self-management) and decrease severe behavioural dyscontrol (e.g., suicidal behaviour, therapy interfering behaviours, quality of life interfering behaviours).¹¹

In the Secure Unit

Similar to any application of DBT, the goal of DBT in the Secure Unit is for the inmates to learn and refine skills to change behavioural, emotional and thinking patterns generally associated with problems in living, but that may be particularly associated with their maximum security classification.

The DBT Treatment Team staff, in consultation with each woman participating in the DBT program identifies individual treatment targets. Consistent with Linehan's model, these treatment targets are priorised: imminently life-threatening and unit destructive behaviours are the priority and are addressed first. When significant treatment gains have been achieved, the treatment focus is then shifted to quality-of-life interfering behaviours.

DBT in the Secure Unit has four (4) essential components:

individual counselling (psychotherapy) - one hour per week;
skills training sessions (individual or in two-person groups) - minimum of one lesson per week;
supplementary support and coaching (particularly to deal with crisis situations); and,
team consultation (staff).

DBT skills training assists women to develop behavioural skills that are not in their current repertoire and to integrate these skills so they can respond in a more effective and skillful way on a broad scale (generalisation). The skills modules focus on:

core mindfulness skills (to address confusion about self and cognitive dysregulation);
interpersonal effectiveness skills (to address interpersonal chaos);
emotion regulation skills (to address problems controlling emotions); and,
distress tolerance skills (to address difficulties associated with managing emotional distress and impulsiveness).

DBT skills training in CSC includes two additional modules: orientation and bridging . These modules incorporate goal formulation, understanding the process of change, self-management skills, crime cycle analysis and integration, and relapse prevention.

Because behaviour change is the focus, behavioural analysis is a key factor in DBT. Behavioural skills within and outside of an individual's repertoire must, therefore, be accurately and continually assessed throughout the process of learning, developing, refining and/or increasing the use of their skills. Behavioural analysis in the Secure Units is supported by the use of the Behaviour Management and Targets - Daily Record (completed by staff) and the use of Decision Balance Sheets¹² (completed by the women). Depending on the woman's level of participation, the more complex Behaviour Chain Analysis (completed by the woman) can also be used.

DBT treatment is a collaborative process involving all members of the inter-disciplinary team and the individual women. Together, they devise the most effective intervention to help her increase adaptive behaviours. This process encourages the women to acquire and generalise skills to more appropriately and effectively address their needs at a pace that is consistent with both their needs and their learning styles.

Psychosocial Rehabilitation (PSR)

Mission: To increase the functioning of people with long term psychiatric disabilities so that they are successful and satisfied in their environments of choice with the least amount of ongoing professional intervention.

Psychosocial Rehabilitation is a comprehensive approach that is the most appropriate and potentially effective program model for individuals with basic skill needs and cognitive challenges (particularly persons with severe and persistent mental illness, e.g., severe and treatment-resistant mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and related disorders). A fundamental assumption of the approach is that all persons with mental illness, no matter how severe, have the potential to learn and grow. The main goal of PSR is to help clients take back control of their lives so they can formulate goals and plans that improve their quality of life. PSR is based on ongoing, empirical evaluation of program procedures and components.

The concept of PSR was a response to the failure of the mental health system to assist people disabled by severe mental or emotional illness, severe behavioural problems and traditional treatment methods (i.e., institutionalisation and medication). Successful reintegration to the community has often been impeded by an individual's: loss of community living opportunities and supports because of their institutionalisation; limited resources, skills and supports; isolation, and a sense of hopelessness brought on by institutionalization; and, inappropriate behaviour patterns learned through institutionalisation¹³. With adequate skill development and/or environmental supports, individuals can return to their communities where they can live satisfying lives. Programs have resulted in increased discharge rates and lower re-hospitalization rates for even the most severely mentally ill individuals.

PSR interventions have proven effective at increasing: adaptive behaviours, including self-care, interpersonal, vocational and living skills and at reducing problem behaviours, including psychotic behaviours and aggression. It uses a social learning approach that incorporates a variety of techniques based on fundamental learning principles, as well as a variety of skills training, cognitive remediation, positive reinforcement, vocational training and psycho-educational components. This is done within a highly structured schedule. As much as possible, skills are taught in the daily context where they would usually be used (e.g., personal hygiene training is done as individuals rise in the morning and prepare for the day).

The PSR approach also includes socialisation, recreation, and leisure activities. These core activities provide clients with the opportunity to practice skills as well as develop new skills within a normal social context.

Change in functioning is a process of gradual incremental acquisitionof new behaviours, rather than sudden and dramatic improvements or cures. Therefore, all staff interactions with clients, regardless of how routine, have the potential of either contributing to skill development or detracting from it. Continuity of care is critical to assist women to maintain and build upon gains made using PSR interventions.

E. Program Model

Introduction

The Needs Analysis, research and experience demonstrate that among the maximum security population, the main identified difficulties are behaviours characteristic of personality disorders, aggression (towards themselves or towards others) and poly-substance abuse¹⁴. For the maximum security women with special needs, daily living skills are also a challenge.

Behaviours

Needs

Assaultive

Self-injurious

Suicidal

Emotion dysregulation/distress; inter-personal skills; difficulty with daily living skills; substance abuse.

The primary goal of programming is to address the issues that resulted in the woman's maximum security classification (usually institutional adjustment). Behaviour management and basic skills building are likely to be the main intervention focus for many of the women.

For each inmate, the inter-disciplinary team in the Secure Unit will need to assess (and re-assess as necessary) the following:

What behaviours led to the maximum security classification that must be addressed?
Can we begin focused skill work now or does she first need to get her behaviour under control?
Which intervention approach will help increase her adaptive behaviours (DBT or PSR)?
What type of program delivery will be most effective? (i.e., on the Unit, one-to-one, small group, regular group, off the Unit)?
What are the goals and what will be considered success in her individual case?
How will her progress be monitored?

In an ideal world, the issues that led to the maximum security classification will mirror her criminogenic factors which would make interventions and programs more effective in the long run. In cases of multiple needs, it will be necessary to clearly identify the primary focus of programming and work at the issues in a somewhat consecutive manner, so as not to overwhelm the woman with numerous programs and goals. Needs will have to be assessed and reassessed to evaluate if the program options are effective.

Program Readiness

For some women, much work will need to first be done on their motivation and program readiness before more focused skill work can begin. Research has shown some women go through phases where they don't want to participate in any programs.

To increase self-awareness, motivational interviewing, behaviour management and behavioural contracts may be needed to get a woman to a place where some form of programming can begin.

Program Delivery

Programs are likely to be delivered in small groups (2-3 women) or on a one-to-one basis. Though program effectiveness has been shown to be greater with a group of 8-12 participants, given the needs and behaviours of maximum security women, alternatives can be used; the lack of a large group is not a reason to not deliver a program.

Depending on the participants, program modules may need to be delivered in smaller chunks and some repetition may need to occur. The needs, risks and abilities of the women, as well as any interfering behaviours will need to be assessed when deciding on the type of program delivery best suited for each woman.

Program Model - Overview

When the information in the previous sections are taken together, a model for programming in the Secure Unit takes shape (see below) and includes the following elements:

Quality care environment (see Part 3C)
Behaviour management and skill building through either DBT or PSR
Education programs
Correctional programs
Specialised programs
Mental health programs and services
Elder services, spiritual and religious services
Employment and vocational programs
Recreation
Other programs and services.

Quality care environment

As discussed previously, the Secure Unit itself, the level and manner of interaction between staff and inmates, dynamic supervision and security and the inter-disciplinary team approach work in tandem to create a quality care environmentthat serves as a foundation for all programming and interventions.

DBT/PSR Skills

These two approaches offer the women the skills required to address the majority of identified needs and decrease the maladaptive behaviours that contributed to their maximum security classification. The focus will be on teaching and reinforcing basic DBT/PSR skills to decrease maladaptive behaviours and increase distress tolerance.¹⁵ When the women agree to participate in these progams, their informed consent is required (see form in Appendix 4).

Staff will both model and teach DBT and PSR skills as every interaction is an opportunity for a teachable moment. Every effort should be made to encourage women to participate in these skill building programs.

Education

Though Literacy and Continuous Learningis a "core" program, the need for education is important enough to highlight on its own. Education programs should be offered and encouraged in the Secure Unit.

Education has been shown to be a protective factor with respect to violent behaviour. The more that disadvantaged women can educate themselves, the better equipped they will be to function in the community. Education programs can be offered in a group or individually and are essential to community reintegration. They also help build self-esteem and encourage the women to concentrate on issues other than themselves. Education and work can be healthy, temporary escapes from emotional pain.

Our current statistics show that about one-third of maximum security women have up to a grade 9 education but almost two-thirds have reading ability of less than grade 9. Forty-four percent (44%) read at a grade 6 level or lower. This lack of literacy can create huge reintegration problems (see Appendix 5 for a more detailed breakdown.).

Learning disabilities may need to be addressed¹⁶ for education as well as other types of programs. For some women, overcoming past negative school experiences will be a challenge. Interaction with teachers and school work provides an opportunity for the inmates to apply their DBT and PSR skills to a different environment.

For some women, obstacles to learning may be related to Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD). This is the most recent term used to describe both Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) - a medical diagnosis that refers to a specific cluster of anomalies when prenatal exposure to alcohol has been confirmed and Fetal Alcohol Effects (FAE) - used to describe the presence of some, but not all, FAS characteristics when prenatal exposure to alcohol has been confirmed

In adolescence and adulthood FASD, leads to short term memory impairments, impulsivity, problems in judgements and abstract reasoning, difficulty processing cause and effect, poor understanding of consequences, difficulty differentiating between right and wrong, poor adaptive functioning, poor sense of social boundaries (e.g., difficulty comprehending physical danger to themselves). It also leads to frustration intolerance, inappropriate sexual behaviour, substance abuse, mental health problems and trouble with the law. However, an individual's verbal skills are often not impared and individuals may be mistaken for being cognitively higher functionning than they actually are¹⁷ (see Appendix 6).

Correctional Programs¹⁸

Correctional programs are interventions which address the multiple factors that contribute directly to criminal behaviour.¹⁹ Though DBT and PSR are the focus, correctional programs should be offered to women who require them. They can compliment basic DBT and PSR skills programs and provide women with an opportunity to apply their new skills.

Living Skills: Reasoning and Rehabilitation or Circles of Change (for Aboriginal women), Anger and Emotion Management, Parenting Skills. If the woman is involved in DBT, it is neither necessary nor helpful to offer either Reasoning and Rehabilitation or Anger and Emotion Management at the same time. These programs must be offered either after DBT is completed or when she is in medium security; however, if required, the program should be made available. For the women focusing on PSR skills, Reasoning and Rehabilitation/Circles of Change might begin as a complement to the other daily living skills she is mastering though may need to be delivered in smaller parts.

Substance Abuse: for women with severe drug-seeking behaviour, theWomen Offender Substance Abuse Program (or elements of it) may complement the DBT skills and provide an opportunity to adapt the DBT skills to a different environment or set of issues.

Survivors of Abuse and Trauma:again, it will likely be more beneficial to first have a woman hone her distress tolerance skills through DBT in order to allow her to better manage her distress. Once these (DBT) coping skills are integrated (and more likely once she is at medium security) the Survivor program could then be initiated. It is important to note the community standard for addressing past victimisation has changed over the last decade. Research is now showing that (coping) skills training is more effective in sustaining a woman's stability rather than long intensive psychotherapy though education and awareness programs are still helpful. As most women have identified the need to address these issues, the Education and Awareness component could be made available while the woman is still in maximum security. If she successfully integrates skills taught in DBT, she may not need to pursue the entire Survivors' program.

Aboriginal Programs

The Spirit of a Warrior Program focuses on violence prevention. The Family Life Improvement Program) is the pre-requisite for Spirit of a Warrior. The programs were piloted in early 2002 at Saskatchewan Penitentiary.²⁰ Circles of Change is a cognitive skills program designed for Aboriginal women.

Spirit of a Warrior

Spirit of a Warrior is a healing program for women to explore their acts of violence and understand how violence has shaped their lives. Finding the roots of violence is the first step to healing and then learning alternative ways and new skills to reduce and eliminate their own violent behaviour.

"Warrior" is a cultural metaphor. The concept implies a capacity to find a follow a Path, that is a responsible (and response-able) life direction to pursue. It includes the development of such qualities as self-possession, spiritual and psychic awareness/alertness/attentiveness, goodness and caring, endurance, patience, resilience, capacity to fight for what must be defended and preserved in order to assure a Way of Life.21

The program has 8 main components with a total of 92 (possible) sessions. The facilitator can choose sessions according to the needs of the participants. The Elder plays an important role in the entire program. Each day begins with a sweetgrass ceremony and each week ends with a sharing circle (which may be substituted with a ceremony as appropriate).

The 8 components are: Anger Awareness; Violence Awareness; Family Origin Awareness; Self-Awareness; Skill Development; Group Skill Development; Cultural Awareness; Cognitive Learning.

This is a very intensive program. Staff training and awareness is essential as is communication between program staff and correctional staff to ensure that all parties are aware of the inmate's state and possible repercussions of the day's sessions.

Family Life Improvement Program (FLIP)

The Family Life Improvement Program (FLIP) precedes theSpirit of a Warrior program. It addresses some of the same issues as Spirit but at a lower intensity. Many of the women need experience in group program/dynamics before tackling some of the issues in Spirit. The FLIP Program helps to acclimatise the women to the issues and to group dynamics.

Mental Health Services

Each Secure Unit will have a full-time Psychologist, Clinical Nurse and Behavioural Counsellors who will work intensively with women on individual and/or small group basis. Resources are also available for psychiatric services. In some regions the psychiatrist liaises with the Chief, Health Services; in other regions they report back to the psychologist. As it is unlikely that psychiatrists will participate in the inter-disciplinary team meetings, it is essential a link between the psychiatrist and the IDT is established to ensure that information is shared.

Elder services, spiritual and religious services

For Aboriginal women, reconnecting with their traditions and culture through Elder teachings and ceremonies allows women to regain dignity and control of their lives and their behaviours. As much as possible, Elders and the ceremonies they perform, should be integrated into programming.

Both the Elders and the Chaplains provide spiritual and religious instruction, services and ceremonies. The Team Leader needs to seek them out as both need to be integrated members of the inter-disciplinary team. Often, spiritual leaders see strengths in an individual that are hidden from correctional staff; strengths that can be built upon to help the woman better address her risk and needs to lower her security classification.

There is a successful program at Millhaven Institution where a Buddhist monk teaches the maximum security men meditation skills. This, too, could be beneficial for women (see Appendix 7).

Employment and vocational programs

Keeping the women both busy and gainfully employed will be a challenge for these small units. There will be 2-3 positions as kitchen workers, assisting with menu development and meal preparation; pod and unit cleaning; maintenance of the unit and outside grounds and other small group work programs.

Other suggestions include having the maximum security women contribute to a larger institutional Corcan program (or to another institution's program); developing data bases and book résumés for the library (to enhance literacy skills); sewing/mending/repairs; computer courses, gardening/horticultural program; toy making; arts and crafts; making medicine bags; quilt-making; paper-making (e.g., cards from recycled paper); cooking skills and nutrition education (coupled with a topics of interest or current events discussion); volunteer work for local charities, non-profit organisations or United Way agencies.

Recreation

Each Secure Unit has its own yard as well as multi-purpose program space that can be used for recreational activities. Women will access the institutional gymnasium if the risk is assumable.

Other programs and services

This includes health services, nutrition information, admission and discharge, art/music therapy, visiting, etc.

1 Aboriginal Gangs, page 13.
2 Shaw et al and Crump are available atwww.csc-scc.gc.ca. Leschied et al is available at www.sgc.gc.ca.
3 This information is taken from/cited from Leschied et al (see bibliography). The internet version was used.
4 InFemale Offender Risk Assessment: The Case Management Strategies Approach,Motiuk and Blanchette (1995) determined that "feelings towards father (neutral or hostile)" was one of several elements predictive of violent recidivism" (Table 1), though the sample size was small (n= 81). See bibliography.
5 Multiple diagnoses or multiple problems.
6 Bonta James, Research Summary-Corrections Research and Development , Solicitor General of Canada, Volume 5, Number 3, May 2000,Adolescent Female Aggression[Source: Leschied et al. internet version used (see footnote #61 and bibliography.]
7 FromPsychiatric symptoms, history of victimization, and violent behavior among incarcerated female felons: An American perspective(2002). See Bibliography for details.
8 From unpublished overview by Dr. Donna McDonagh, December 1999.
9 This section was prepared by Dr. Donna McDonagh.
10DBT was developed by Dr. Marsha Linehan to treat individuals who meet criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD); the types of difficulties noted here are characteristic of the BPD diagnosis. See: Linehan, M.M. (1993a).Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder.New York , NY : Guilford Press. Also see, Linehan, M.M. (1993b). Skills Training Manual.DBT has clinical research utilizing controlled trials to support its effectiveness (Linehan, M.M; Armstrong, H.E; Suarez, A; Allmon, A., and Heard, H.L. (1991). Cognitive-behavioral treatment of chronically parasuicidal borderline patients.Archives of General Psychiatry, 48. 1060-1064. Also see, Linehan, M.M; Tutek, D.A; Heard, H.L., and Armstrong, H.E. (1994) Interpersonal outcome of cognitive-behavioral treatment for chronically suicidal borderline patients.American Journal of Psychiatry, 151, 1771-1776).
11Stage 2 DBT focuses on decreasing post-traumatic stress. The focus of Stage 3 is toincreaserespect for self and achieve individual goals.
12 When a woman is struggling with making a decision, or has engaged in a problematic response to a situation, staff assign aDecision Balance Sheet - a treatment tool designed to quickly assess the 'pros and cons' of choosing, or having chosen, a particular behaviour, alongside the 'pros and cons' of an alternate behavioural choice. In this manner, the links between behaviour and choice are continually reinforced - with the desired outcome being the movement toward more contemplative and adaptive behaviour across time. The message that all behaviour is fundamentally a choice is a crucial one in effecting behavioural change, and a difficult concept to convey. Admittedly, to the participants, the behaviour appears intuitively more akin to choice when the options are considered prior to acting; they may have difficulty conceptualizing their behaviour as a 'choice' when analyzing it retrospectively, particularly when they consider it to have been reactive, impulsive or otherwise necessary or inevitable in nature.
13 SLE Operational Plan, p32, from Warner, Alan,Implementing Choices at Regional Facilities: Program Proposals for Women Offenders with Special Needs (1998).
14 Women beginning life sentences may or may not fall into these behaviour and need categories and programming will need to be offered accordingly.
15 Some women will be able to advance to more complex DBT skills; this will be determined through progress assessment.
16 Using a learning disabilities approach has had some success with individuals diagnosed with fetal alcohol spectrum disorder.
17 Lawryk, Liz, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and Related Conditions - Implications for the Justice System. See Bibliography.
18The revisedCorrectional Program Strategy for Women Offenders (updating the 1994 Program Strategy and out for consultation at the time of publication of this Plan) identifies three types of programs: correctional programs, mental health programs and social programs. Correctional programs target criminal behaviour (e.g. substance abuse), mental health programs and services are aimed at symptom reduction and well being (e.g. personality disorders, schizophrenia). Social programs (e.g. education and employment) assist and reinforce successful reintegration of offenders as productive members of society. Social programs allow women to demonstrate their well being and support the transfer and generalisation of skills learned in correctional programs.
19 For details, see Commissioner's Directive 726, Management of Correctional Programs.
20 TheIntensive Treatment Program, developed and offered at BCCW (and evaluated by CSC) is also a violence prevention program. However, at the time of this writing, both DBT and other strategies being considered may supercede the need for this program.
21 FromSpirit of a Warrior facilitator's manual.

F. Inmate Committee/Peer Support Teams

Inmate Committee

The inmates in the Secure Unit will need representation to management and a mechanism to share information with the main institution. This can be done by either creating a small committee (e.g., one representative per pod and a Chair, subject to the same time frames as the full institutional committee); or, have one inmate sit as the Secure Unit representative on the main institution Inmate Committee (though she could not be the chair as she would have little or no access to the main institution).

The latter option may be more difficult to implement depending on who the representative is, how often the Committee meetings are held and may increase attempts at contraband exchange. However, the advantages are that the Secure Unit will be more fully integrated into the entire institution. An alternative is to have the Chair of the main institution meet with the Secure Unit representative(s) on an established schedule.

Peer Support Teams

Most institutions have had success with Peer Support Teams and they should be able to continue to meet with minimum and medium security women who are in segregation. For three of the four institutions, access to the segregation unit is done without traversing the Secure Unit itself.

However, maximum security and segregation are two different issues. Though lower security women will not be permitted on the Secure Unit, consideration could be given (if appropriate) to training one or more of the Secure Unit inmates to offer peer support. It will be necessary to set parameters around the interventions, including timeframes, searches, how to offer support to an inmate in a different pod, etc.

PART 6 - EVALUATION

A. Secure Units

Pre-opening audits

Each Secure Unit went through a pre-opening audit prior to approval being given to open. The audit addressed both administrative, policy and security issues.

Pre- and post- opening evaluation

A comprehensive evaluation is being conducted to assess the way the unit functions and its impact on the entire institution and population. This evaluation addresses the following main issues:

Do the Secure Units meet the needs of the maximum security women?
- Are the women involved in pro-social activities?
- Are their needs being addressed?
- How is the women's institutional behaviour being affected?
- How do the women perceive their environment?
How are the staff in the Secure Unit affected?
- Do staff feel safe? How can risk be minimised?
- Are they satisfied with their job?
- Do they feel part of a functioning inter-disciplinary team?
- Do their supervisors support them?
- Is dynamic security practised?
Does the addition of the Secure Units affect the operations of the main institution?
- How are the minimum and medium security women affected?
- How are staff in the main institution affected?

Methodology

Staff and inmates completed questionnaires prior to the Secure Units' opening (pre-test) and will do so again 6 months after the opening (post-test). Further post-testing may be conducted at a later date. The questionnaires were completed by:

Pre-tests (prior to Secure Unit opening)	Post-test (6 months after opening)
Maximum security women housed in the co-located units	Maximum security women in the Secure Units (some inmates will be the same as the pre-test, others maybe new-this will be accounted for)
Staff hired and assigned to work in the new Secure Units	Staff working in the Secure Units
Inmates in the main institution.	Inmates in the main institution.

The package for the maximum security inmates includes: basic self-report data; Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR); Self-Control Schedule (SCS); Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-Circumplex; Correctional Environment Status Inventory; and, the Personal Safety and Security questionnaire.

The staff package includes: basic self-report data; Job Satisfaction questionnaire; Supervisory Support questionnaire (with additional questions); Occupational Health and Safety questionnaire; and, the Personal Safety and Security questionnaire. The results will be published by the Research Division once the post-testing is completed and the results have been analysed.

Ongoing evaluations

Every six (6) months, staff will complete theInstitutional Functionning Scale for each inmate. The information will be forwarded to Research Branch at NHQ for analysis.

B. Programs

It is also important to note that a couple of the scales are also used in the either the PSR or DBT pre- and post-testing battery. Any program specific pre- and post-testing will be conducted separately from the evaluations described above.

Part 7 - TRANSITION

A smooth transition will help the new units to set the environment and start off on the best foot. Transition plans were well-developed between the co-located units and the regional institutions to ensure a smooth transition, and need to consider many different aspects. Where there are population management difficulties (e.g., more inmates than beds), clear criteria were developed to ensure that as many transfers as possible are voluntary and that any involuntary transfers are transparent and equitable. Staff, too, must be considered in this change and those working in the co-located units must be recognised for the work they have done since 1996.

A brief change management program was available to staff in the co-located units to help the women get used to the coming change (resistance to such a change is to be expected; e.g., some women never wanted to leave Prison for Women).

Some staff of the Secure Units were able to spend time on the co-located units to work with staff and the women so they had met the women prior to their arrival. It was also important that staff shared information about the Secure Units, explained the operations and routine and demystified the move. The Inmate Handbook was usually available to the women in the co-located units prior to their move. Photographs of the Secure Units and the regional institutions, also helped ease the change.

The moves were and will be gradual, 2-3 women per week. A well-structured orientation program should be delivered as they arrive¹. One or two non-therapeutic programs (e.g., school, cooking, etc.) should be available as soon as the women start transferring in from the co-located units.

PART 8 - MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL2

This section is no longer in effect. Management Protocol was rescinded May 1, 2011

1 For example, theMoving Forward program developed by the Behavioural Counsellors at EIFW.
2 The Management Protocol was promulgated on February 21, 2003.

APPENDIX 1 - PROFILE OF WOMEN CLASSIFIED AS MAXIMUM SECURITY

	SEPTEMBER 1997¹		FEBRUARY 1998²		MARCH 1999³		JUNE 2000⁴
Profile	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Age
20-34	30	81%	22	65%	16	64%	16	59%
Marital Status
Single (separated, divorced, widowed, not stated)	24	65%	23	68%	20	80%	22	81%
Common-law	10	27%	7	21%	4	16%	3	11%
Married	3	8%	4	11%	1	4%	2	8%
Total	37	100%	34	100%	25	100%	27	100%

Race
Caucasian	19	51%	13	38%	18	72%	16	59%
Aboriginal	15	41%	17	50%	7	28%	10	37%
Black	1	3%	2	6%	0	-	0	n/a
Asiatic	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	n/a
Other	1	3%	1	3%	0	-	0	n/a
Not stated	1	3%	1	3%	0	-	1	4%
Total	37	100%	34	100%	25	100%	27	100%

Serving A Sentence For
First-degree murder	1	3%	0	0	0	-	0	-
Second-degree murder	6	16%	2	6%	7	28%	5	18%
Schedule I offence	29	78%	29	85%	13	52%	20	74%
Schedule II offence	1	3%	1	3%	2	8%	1	4%
Non-Schedule offence	0	0	2	6%	3	12%	1	4%
Total	37	100%	34	100%	25	100%	27	100%

Sentence Length
Under 3 years	9	24%	7	21%	10	40%	7	26%
3-6 years	12	32%	14	41%	1	4%	5	18%
6-10 years	5	14%	5	15%	4	16%	5	18%
10 years plus	4	11%	5	15%	3	12%	4	15%
Life / Indeterminate	7	19%	3	9%	7	28%	6	22%
Total	37	100%	34	100%	25	100%	27	100%

Previous Federal Carceral Sentences
None	27	73%	28	82%	22	88%	18	66%
One	7	19%	3	9%	1	4%	5	18%
Two	1	3%	1	3%	1	4%	2	8%
Three or more	2	6%	2	6%	1	4%	2	8%
Total	37	100%	34	100%	25	100%	27	100%

1 Data provided by Performance Assurance - OMS report September 17, 1997 for 37 offenders; 2 additional maximum-security offenders are recent admissions and no information is as yet available through OMS.
2 This data includes all incarcerated women serving a federal sentence who are classified as maximum security; data was provided by Performance Assurance, CSC February 1998 with a total of 34 women classified as maximum security.
3 This data includes all incarcerated women serving a federal sentence who are classified as maximum security; data was provided by Performance Assurance, CSC March 1999 with a total of 25 women classified as maximum security.
4 This data includes all incarcerated women serving a federal sentence who are classified as maximum security; data was provided by Performance Assurance, with a total of 27 maximum security women - figures as of May 28, 2000.

APPENDIX 2

Guidelines for Formulating a Behavioural Contract

Each contract should contain the following information:

1. A clear and detailed description of the required behaviour (target behaviour).

2. Some criterion specifying the how much time it should take (length of the contract) to achieve the desired goal.

3. The method of data collection and the schedule for reviewing progress. The contract should specify the way in which the target behaviour(s) is observed, measured, and recorded; and detail a procedure for informing the woman of her achievements during the length of the contract.

This information should be included in general terms in the contract itself so the women is aware that progress is being measured; however, the specifics/details should be communicated to the IDT separately (so the contract is not too long nor complicated).

4. A clear statement of the reinforcers to be used, their schedule of delivery and who will deliver them when the criterion is met.

The timing for delivery of reinforcement contingencies should be arranged to follow the behaviour as quickly as possible.

5. A clear statement of the provisions for consequences in the event the contract is not fulfilled in the specified time frame or frequency.

However, if the woman chooses to withdraw from the contract, then her situation would return to the status quo that existed prior to the contract being put in place. In other words, additional consequences cannot be added.

6. The identification of potential problems and how they should be resolved.

7. A bonus clause that indicates the additional positive reinforcements obtainable if the woman exceeds the minimal demands of the contract.

8. Signatures of the inmate and the Behavioural Counsellor and the dates of agreement.

Staff should document in writing the date the Team Leader approved the contract and the date theWarden was notified.

APPENDIX 3

Continued from Part 5 - Programs, C. Background and Context, Aggression and violence by women, Adult women. From, Psychiatric symptoms, history of victimization, and violent behavior among incarcerated female felons: An American perspective (2002, see Bibliography).

All of the independent variables except for age and screening for antisocial personality disorder fell out of the model; yet the model was highly significant and predicted both high institutional violence and low institutional violence with a sensitivity of 71% and a specificity of 72%. It is unusual to find single variable that contribute equally to high rates of sensitivity and specificity suggesting that these variables are particularly relevant to the emergence of prison-based violence. The influence of race, which was apparent throughout the preliminary analyses, dropped out of this model, suggesting that the positive screening for personality disturbance found to be high among the minority inmates was the underlying determinative factor. (page 145)
…the current study reaffirms the specific and unique characteristics of female inmates when compared to male inmates, highlights the high degree of psychiatric disturbance experienced by this population and generates interest in the predictive relevance of personality disorders to violent behaviour among women. … these emergent themes and relationships underscore the relevance of personality pathology to evaluating risk for violence among women. They further illuminate the victimization and early behavioural disruptions that precede sustained criminality in adulthood. (page 145)
The rather profound racial differences identified in the types of distress reported by White and African American women point toward the need for mental health services designed to respond to these different styles of experiencing and/or reported distress, conflict and victimisation. (page 146)

APPENDIX 4

Treatment Contract/Informed Consent

Secure Unit Treatment Program

I _____________________________ (print name)
FPS# _______________________ of

_____________________________________ (name of institution) hereby agree to participate in
the Treatment Program (DBT/PSR) which is offered at the Secure Unit.

I understand that there could be benefits to my reintegration potential by taking part in the Treatment Program.
I understand that during the Treatment Program that I must commit to my treatment plan which includes a treatment agreement, and participating in activities such as attending Skills Training Sessions, individual sessions, completing assignments, and taking prescribed medications (if applicable).
I understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time.
I understand that once I have withdrawn or have been suspended form the treatment program there may be a minimum of a one month wait before I can reapply to the program.
I agree that information about my treatment plan and my progress can be shared with the inter-disciplinary team for case management and other consistent uses.
I understand that I must participate in the assessment and evaluation part of treatment through the collection of clinical information.
I have been informed of the risks, possible other methods of treatment and possible consequences of being involved in the Treatment Program. I understand the above points and authorize _________________________________(Psychologist), or whomever s/he may designate, to coordinate my involvement in the Treatment Program.

_____________________________ _____________________________

Signed Witnessed

Dated this __________(day)_________________(month), 20________(year).

I ___________________________________(name of staff member), have explained the above Contract, the nature of the Secure Treatment Program, and have addressed all questions of the person who signed the above consent form. I am of the opinion that the person who signed this consent form has the ability to understand the nature of the treatment proposed.

_____________________________ ___________________________

Signed Witnessed

Dated this __________(day)____________(month), 20_______(year).

Description of the Treatment Programs offered in the Secure Unit

Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) is a comprehensive therapeutic program that involves the application of a broad array of cognitive behaviour therapy strategies targeting serious problem behaviours which interfere with coping and an individual's feeling like they have a life worth living. Two primary components of DBT are: (1) individual psychotherapy and (2) skills training in the areas of mindfulness, emotional regulation, interpersonal effectiveness, and distress tolerance.

Psychosocial Rehabilitation (PSR) is a comprehensive strategy for meeting the needs of persons who experience serious difficulties in most "activities of daily living" and/or have challenges in mental capabilities. Participating in this Treatment Program allows women to learn basic skills to develop their supports and resources for moving into the general population.

As is stated in the Treatment Contract/Informed Consent, each woman will have to agree to the treatment plan that is developed with her by staff and commit to a corresponding Treatment Agreement.

APPENDIX 5 - EDUCATION

Maximum Security Women - Grade Levels

	No grade	Grades 1 to 3	Grades 4 to 6	Grades 7 to 9	Grade 10	Above Grade 10	Post Secondary	Not Stated/Blank	Total
Caucasian	0	1	2	5	7	4	1	6	26
Aboriginal	0	1	0	6	3	4	0	4	18
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Total	0	2	2	11	10	8	1	11	45
% Total		4.4%	4.4%	24.4%	22.2%	17.8%	2.2%	24.4%

Maximum Security Women - Reading Comprehension Levels
	No grade	Grades 1 to 3	Grades 4 to 6	Grades 7 to 9	Grade 10	Above Grade 10	Not Stated/Blank	Total
Caucasian	6	1	5	3	3	8	0	26
Aboriginal	3	0	4	6	2	3	0	18
Other	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total	9	1	10	9	5	11	0	45
% Total	20%	2.2%	22.2%	20%	11.1%	24.4%

This information is from the CSC Offender Management System, all women's admissions to the federal system since 1995. The data for maximum security women has been filtered out to be presented here.

This data shows that about 42% of maximum security women have a grade 10 education or higher. However, when their reading level is assessed, only 36% can read at that level. Almost 65% have less than grade 9 level reading, with 20% at the 0 level (illiterate). This shows some problem may exist with the data, the testing or the input of data from the field. That being said, it is known that individuals can graduate high school and still not be able to read. Therefore, if the reading levels are even somewhat accurate,it is essential that literacy levels be improved among these women.

APPENDIX 6

FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME/FETAL ALCOHOL EFFECTS¹
(from Correctional Service of Canada , Environmental Overview 1999)

National Perspective

Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) is a medical diagnosis that refers to a specific cluster of anomalies when prenatal exposure to alcohol has been confirmed. Fetal Alcohol Effects (FAE) is a term used to describe the presence of some, but not all, FAS characteristics when prenatal exposure to alcohol has been confirmed. (Health Canada , Canadian Perinatal Surveillance System)
In adolescence and adulthood FAS/FAE leads to memory impairments, problems in judgements and abstract reasoning and poor adaptive functioning. It also leads to frustration intolerance, poor understanding of consequences, inappropriate sexual behaviour, substance abuse, mental health problems and trouble with the law. (CSC, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Implications for Correctional Service)
FAS is believed to be one of the leading causes of preventable birth defects and developmental delays among Canadian children. Among women who drink heavily during pregnancy, the incidence of FAS has been estimated to be 43 per 1000 live births. The national rate has been estimated to be 1 to 2 per 1000 live births, suggesting that each year more than 350 children are born with FAS. (Health Canada , Canadian Perinatal Surveillance System)
Studies of epidemiology have concluded that FAE has an incidence of 3 to 4 times higher than FAS; however, because FAE cases are less likely to be consistently diagnosed or to be observed by a health care professional, they continue to be undetected. (CSC, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Implications for Correctional Service)
Among certain Canadian Aboriginal groups, the incidences of FAS/FAE is much higher. (CSC, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Implications for Correctional Service)
The Canadian Center for Substance Abuse has estimated the lifetime extra costs for health care, education and social services associated with the care of an individual with FAS to be about $1.4 million. (Health Canada , Canadian Perinatal Surveillance System)
Because FAS was only identified in the last 25 years there is a huge gap in our knowledge and ability to diagnose adults with FAS/FAE. (Health Canada, Canadian Perinatal Surveillance System - no date)

Regional Perspective

A survey conducted by health Canada discovered that while maternal alcohol consumption varies by province, it was the highest in Quebec and lowest in the Atlantic Provinces . (Health Canada, Canadian Perinatal Surveillance System - no date)
A 1996 study revealed that of the FAS cases reported in Saskatchewan in 1996, 86% of them were Aboriginal. (CSC, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Implications for Correctional Service - no date)

International Perspective

The present estimates of the world incidences of FAS are 1.9 cases per 1000. (CSC, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Implications for Correctional Service - no date)
FAS is estimated to occur in 0 to 4 per 1000 live births in industrialized countries. (Health Canada, Canadian Perinatal Surveillance System - no date)

1 The term Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) is now being used to refer to both FAS and FAE.

APPENDIX 7

Stillness Inside: Meditation At Millhaven Institution
(from Contact, Vol 8, No. 5, May 2001)

The room is still and peaceful. Twelve men sit in silence, their hands folded in their laps, their eyes looking downward or completely shut. A voice softly reminds them to focus on the relaxed flow of their breathing, not urgently but gently - to let any other thoughts go and to return to the breath.

The men are inmates at Millhaven Institution in Ontario and they spend about one hour each week in a meditation class at the institution's chapel. The voice is that of Kelsang Thekchen, a Buddhist monk in the Kadampa tradition of Mahayana Buddhism, making the centuries-old practice of meditation available to the prisoners.

Using Meditation To Help In Everyday Situations

Kadampa Buddhists strive to use Buddhist teachings as practical methods for transforming daily activities into a path to enlightenment and to integrate their meditation practice into everyday life. As the men arrive at the chapel and settle in the chairs for the meditation class, Thekchen greets them and speaks of the goals of the practice of meditation.

"For 15 minutes we need peace, clarity and focus," he says to the men of the time spent practising silent meditation. "Meditation is quite a specific thing - it is training the mind, strengthening an inner mental muscle."

At the age of 32, Thekchen is the same age as some of the men. While they are all dressed in the familiar jeans and t-shirts of an institution, Thekchen wears the maroon and yellow robes of a Tibetan monk.

Born Darren Prout in Toronto, he studied Kadampa Buddhism as taught by the Tibetan meditation master Geshe Kelsang Gyatso. In 1998, after much study, Darren became a monk and was given the monastic name Kelsang Thekchen. Since then, he has been living and teaching in the Kuluta Buddhist Centre in Kingston.

Bringing Meditation To Millhaven Institution

He became interested in teaching at Millhaven Institution through a Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) staff member who attended his classes. "Brandy May, a parole officer at Millhaven Institution," he remembers, "had been coming to classes and workshops at the Kuluta Centre for a couple of years and we would often talk about how beneficial it would be for the guys at Millhaven, especially the assessment group, to have meditation classes."

The stress experienced by newly arrived inmates at the Millhaven Assessment Unit (MAU) can be very great. They arrive at the MAU after sentencing and are assessed there before being transported to their assigned institutions.

"They need meditation, Brandy would often say," Thekchen recalls. So he offered his services. Brandy May approached Assistant Warden Cathy Gainer and Chaplain Gloria Lecomte who were both very interested in helping to alleviate the stress in assessment and very supportive of the idea of meditation classes for MAU inmates. After working out an appropriate schedule and completing the paperwork, the meditation class began.

"It is important to have a meditative cool in every situation."

"There are now about 12 guys who attend regularly and are happy to have an opportunity to find some peace and talk about ideas such as developing love and overcoming anger," says Thekchen.

In the meditation class, Thekchen speaks to the men about some of the difficulties they face and how meditation is about "getting the mind under control so that, no matter what happens, you stay in control." Through this control, he says, it is possible to transform adverse conditions, though he adds "transformation is difficult when guys are right in your face."

"Every situation offers an opportunity for training the mind and developing inner peace," Thekchen says. "Make a strong determination to develop this peace." "It's important," he tells the class, "to have a meditative cool in every situation." In their interactions with others he urges the men to "become aware of your own faults and of the good qualities of others." "Observe your state."

As the class ends, an inmate tells Thekchen of his interaction with a new cellmate, saying how he warned the man not to turn on his TV too loudly in the early morning. "I warned him once and I warned him twice and I wasn't going to warn him a third time," the inmate said, suggesting an image of a smashed TV and a serious altercation. "But then I tried to look at his good qualities and I saw that he had no family, like I do, and I really felt for the guy. So he's okay - I don't mind him anymore."

Bringing Meditation To Maximum Security

Thekchen recently began teaching another meditation class at the Maximum Security Unit of Millhaven Institution, or "J" Unit as it is informally called. "My initial fear," says Parole Officer Brandy May of the offenders incarcerated in "J" Unit, "was that they would shy away from meditation, thinking that it might be perceived as weakness by predatory types." "So I broached the idea privately with a lifer whose opinion and instincts I trust. He 'canvassed the troops' and suggested that we proceed."

Even with this informal go-ahead from a long-time inmate and the complete support of the institution's administration, it was difficult to judge how the maximum security inmates at Millhaven Institution would react to being told to sit silently and concentrate on their breathing by a young Buddhist monk. At first Thekchen found the volatile men of "J" Unit to be a bit more difficult to reach.

"It took them a while to settle and there was a bit a snickering," says Thekchen of the first meditation class with them, "but they soon saw that training the mind was like training a muscle with weights - unless you work at it, you have no control. Then they settled down."

Thekchen continues to offer a weekly meditation class to the men incarcerated in the MAU as well as to those in "J" unit. "We're all equal," he says. "We're all just trying to find ways to stop the suffering."

This article was prepared with the invaluable assistance of Parole Officer Brandy May and Assistant Warden Cathy Gainer of Millhaven Institution, as well as that of Kelsang Thekchen and the inmates of Millhaven Institution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blanchette, Kelley, Research Report 1997 N o R-58,Risk and Need Among Federally-Sentenced Female Offenders: A Comparison of minimum-, medium-, and maximum-security inmates. Research Division, Correctional Service of Canada , June 1997.

Blanchette, Kelley and Motiuk, Laurence L., Research Report 1997, N o R-53,Maximum-Security Female and Male Federal Offenders: A Comparison, , Research Division, Correctional Service of Canada , March 1997.

Blanchette, Kelley and Motiuk, Laurence L.,Female Offender Risk Assessment: The Case Management Strategies Approach(paper presented to the Canadian Psychological Association Annual Convention, Charlottetown , June 1995).

Bonta James, Research Summary-Corrections Research and Development, Solicitor General of Canada, Volume 5, Number 3, May 2000,Adolescent Female Aggression[Source: Leschied et al (see below). [Internet version used.]

Correctional Program Strategy for Women Offenders (draft), revised by Doris Fortin, May 2003 (Correctional Service of Canada).

Correctional Service of Canada ,Contact, Vol. 8, No. 5, May 2001.

Crump, Judy, M.Div.,Literature Review on Women's Anger and Other Emotions, for CSC February 1995.

Ginsburg, Joel I. D., PhD., Stewart, Lynn, PhD., C. Psych., and Weekes, John R., PhD.,Motivational Interviewing-Training Research Results and Operational Applications (overhead presentation, CSC 2000).

Human Resource Plan for the Intensive Intervention Strategy for Women Offenders, Part A: Staffing Plan. Human Resource Sub-Committee, National Implementation Working Group, Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Women, August 2000/October 2001 (Correctional Service of Canada ).

Human Resource Plan for the Intensive Intervention Strategy For Women Offenders, Part B: Staff Training Plan. Human Resource Sub-Committee, National Implementation Working Group, Office of the Deputy Commissioner For Women, December 2000/October 2001 (Correctional Service of Canada ).

Laishes, Jane, Senior Project Manager- Mental Health , Health Services, National Headquarters Understanding Borderline Personality Disorder - CSC, February 1997.

Lawryk, Liz,Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and Related Conditions - Implications for the Justice System- Lawryk Consulting 2001.

Leschied, A., Cummings, A., Van Brunschot, M., Cunningham, A., Saunders, A.,Female Adolescent Aggression: A Review of the Literature and the Correlates of Aggression, April 2000 for the Department of the Solicitor General of Canada . [Internet version used.]

Lepnurm, Marje,Multi- vs. Inter- vs. Transdisciplinary Team Approaches: A Literature Review and Recommendation for RPC, February 5, 1999 .

McDonagh, Donna, Ph.D.Federally Sentenced Women Maximum Security Interview Project: "Not Letting the Time do You" Correctional Service of Canada, 1999.

McDonagh, Donna, Ph.D,Psychosocial Rehabilitation Model and Dialectical Behaviour Therapy Program Model-Overview of the two approaches (unpublished). Correctional Service, December 1999.

Mercredi, Ovide W.,Aboriginal Gangs: A Report to the Correctional Service of Canada on Aboriginal Youth Gang Members in the Federal Corrections System, October 2000.

Morin, SkyBlue,Federally Sentenced Women Maximum Security Interview Project: Whatever Happened to the Promises of Creating Choices?for Correctional Service of Canada , 1999.

Programme de traitement, Unité régionale de santé mentale (Région du Québec, Établissement Archambault), Octobre 1998.

Report of the Task Force on Security, Correctional Service of Canada , 1999

Shaw, Margaret and Dubois, Sheryl,Understanding Violence by Women, A Review of the Literature, for Correctional Service of Canada , February 1995.

Structured Living Environment Operational Plan, CSC 2002

Warren , Janet I., et alPsychiatric symptoms, history of victimization , and violent behavior among incarcerated female felons: An American perspective, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, Volume 25, Number 2, March/April 2002, pages 129-145.

Weil, Andrew,8 Weeks to Optimum Health, Fawcett (trade paperback version), June 1998. Original hardcover, Random House, March 1997.

Women's Policy Group, Her Majesty's Prison Service , UK ,Best Practice Guidelines for the Management of Difficult, Disruptive Women.

Consideration could be given to include information on harassment and muscling and how to deal with "bullies" in the inmate orientation training. Staff training could also include these topics, as well as how to support and empower women who may be so victimised.

Common menu bar links

Institutional links

Subjects

Working at CSC

Resources

Proactive Disclosure

Women Offender Programs and Issues

Secure Unit Operational Plan

Intensive intervention In a secure environment

Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Women

Table of Contents

Part 1 Principles

Part 2 Who are the women classified as maximum security?

Part 3 Setting the Environment

Part 4 Operations

Part 5 Programs

Part 6 Evaluation

Part 7 Transition

Part 8 Management Protocol

Appendices

Bibliography

Development of the Intensive Intervention Strategy

Intensive Intervention in a Secure Environment - Overview

Need

Risk

General population

Special needs population

Lifers

Plans and Contracts

Behavioural Contracts

Quality Care Environment

Staff-Inmate Interaction

Setting Boundaries and Establishing Limits

What is Motivation?

The Inmate Code

Incompatibles

Gang-Related Activities

Team Meetings

Correctional Plans

Security Reclassification

Activity

Description

Unit Profile

Perimeter Security

Secure Unit

Control Post and Rotunda Operation

Pods and Cells

Multi-purpose rooms and their operation

Kitchen and its operation

Staff Space

Segregation Unit

Yard

On the Unit

Off the Unit5

Out of the Institution

Introduction

Visiting

Private Family Visiting

Health Services

Segregation

Gymnasium

Library/Resource Centres

Hobbycraft Areas

School (other programs and program areas)

Emergency Response Team Interventions

Self-injurious behaviour

Management Protocol

Expectations:

Rules:

The Women's Perspectives

Aggression and violence by women

Dialectical Behavior Therapy9 (DBT)

Psychosocial Rehabilitation (PSR)

Introduction

Program Readiness

Program Delivery

Program Model - Overview

Inmate Committee

Peer Support Teams

Pre-opening audits

Intensive intervention
In a secure environment

Part 1
Principles

Part 2
Who are the women classified as maximum security?

Part 3
Setting the Environment

Part 4
Operations

Part 5
Programs

Part 6
Evaluation

Part 7
Transition

Part 8
Management Protocol

Off the Unit⁵

Dialectical Behavior Therapy⁹ (DBT)