

————— **Research Brief** —————

**Prison Gangs: A Review and
Survey of Strategies**

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Prison Gangs: A Review and Survey of Strategies

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Prison Gangs: A Review and Survey of Strategies

Executive Summary of Findings

With the help of two student research assistants, a research consultant, and the Director of Operational Research for the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), we collected 34 completed surveys from a list of 50 states, two correctional corporations, and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, for a response rate of 64 percent (these systems held 954,132 prisoners at midyear 2008). In addition, we conducted an extensive literature review on prison gang literature using North American and international sources. The design was based on a prior study conducted by Ruddell, Decker, and Egley (2006) and assistance in administering the survey was facilitated by the Director of Operational Research for the CSC. We believe that this is one of the most comprehensive surveys on American prison gang interventions.

The objective of the study was to provide insight into the following research questions:

- (1) What different gang management strategies are currently in use in three main areas:
 - a. Prevention (e.g., Thwarting gang recruitment of new members).
 - b. Sanctions (e.g., The use of informal and formal methods of controlling existing gang members).
 - c. Interventions (e.g., Treatment/therapeutic interventions that respond to the offender's criminogenic needs).
- (2) What strategies have been used to identify and map gangs (e.g., gang structure and activities), including applications of new technology (e.g., tracking J-Pay funds from community sources to prisoners, or developing computerized databases to track the inter-relationships of offenders).
- (3) To determine whether any formal evaluations of these strategies have been conducted, and if so, whether these interventions have proven to be effective? (In the absence of formal evaluations, are there any strategies that seem to be effective or promising?)

Some of the major findings, organized by the six main sections of the survey, include:

- ❖ Most prison systems have experienced some increase in Security Threat Group (STG) members over the past five years and this has been associated with an increased range of challenges including violence, disruptive behaviors, and threats to staff authority.
- ❖ While virtually all prison systems surveyed had management strategies to sanction gang members, the most common intervention still remains segregation and isolation

followed by restrictions on privileges, and including gang membership in security rating or classification scores.

- ❖ Relatively few of those who responded acknowledged having formal orientation or reception strategies to inform and discourage gang and/or potential gang members from becoming involved in gangs.
- ❖ Approximately one-half of all prison gang members were thought to be unaffiliated with a gang when they were admitted to prison. According to almost two-thirds of respondents, the primary reason for joining a gang is fear of other inmates.
- ❖ Gang renunciation and treatment programs were present in approximately one-third of the prison systems, but for those jurisdictions that do have such programs their most effective strategy for reducing STG misconduct was the case management activities of counselors.
- ❖ While virtually all respondents collect data and information on STG members virtually no external evaluations were conducted on the relative effectiveness of prison-based gang interventions.
- ❖ The most common problem facing American prisons today, as identified by the 34 respondents, was a lack of dedicated resources to combat STG compounded by an increasing prison population, overworked staff, and changing dynamics of STGs.
- ❖ Overall, while there is clear evidence showing that prison gangs/STG represent significant challenges for American prison systems, there is no one clear strategy for the management, monitoring, or evaluating the relative effectiveness of current gang management interventions. The primary reason for the lack of coordination and/or investigation is attributable to a lack of resources for STG investigations and coordination between the different jurisdictions (e.g., local jails, as well as state and federal prisons).

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Overview

"Now we'll start this band of robbers and call it Tom Sawyer's Gang. Everybody that wants to join has got to take an oath, and write his name in blood." Everybody was willing. Excerpt from Tom Sawyer's *Huckleberry Finn* (1884).

This study reports the findings from a survey on prison gang interventions in U.S. jurisdictions. Part of the rationale for this study is premised on the observation that prison gangs are flourishing across Canada (Correctional Service of Canada, 2008). In order to gain some insight into what is being done to respond to this problem in other jurisdictions we conducted a survey of gang/security threat group (STG) coordinators from all 50 states, two private correctional organizations and the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The survey was called the "Prison Gang Survey" (See Appendix A).

American correctional systems have long dealt with the problem of prison gangs in their facilities, and most jurisdictions have actively confronted the challenges that prison gangs present to the safe operation of institutions. As a result, we conducted this survey of prison systems in an attempt to identify which strategies might be effective in managing prison gangs in relation to three main policy action questions:

- 1) What types of gang management strategies are being used by different jurisdictions?
- 2) How are gangs/STG being monitored? And;
- 3) What, if any, formal research has been done on STG interventions, and what was the outcome of this research?

Although the findings from this study are exploratory and descriptive in nature, they offer a rich combination of qualitative and quantitative results. The report concludes with a number of recommendations for the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) to better address the growing problem of prison gangs and their illegal and disruptive activities. The recommendations also serve as a basis upon which correctional officials can make informed decisions as to how they can respond to prison gangs and avoid/minimize some of the pitfalls of what the American prison systems are, or are not, doing.

Policy Problem(s):

Imprison a large batch of others, and a competitive market, and division will form – Trulson et al., 2006, p. 27).

The proliferation of gangs and gang members in prisons has been steadily increasing since the 1980s (CSC, 2008; Decker, 2003). According to a 1999 survey by the National Gang Crime Research Center, gang membership within adult state correctional facilities increased from 9.4% in 1991 to 24.7% in 1999 (Knox, 1999). Prison gangs, also known as Security Threat Groups (STG), have been defined by Knox (2005) as:

any group of three (3) or more persons with recurring threatening or disruptive behavior (i.e., violations of the disciplinary rules where said violations were openly known or conferred benefit upon the group would suffice for a prison environment), including but not limited to gang crime or gang violence (i.e., crime of any sort would automatically make the group a gang, and as a gang in custody it would logically be an STG). (p. 1)

Most U.S. correctional systems use similar definitions (e.g., three or more members with a common identity) and this standard is also used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2009) to define street gangs, as well as by Canadian authorities in their definitions of organized crime and criminals (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2005). As such, there seems to be general acceptance for definitions of gangs and/or organized criminals based on group size and activity.

A recent report by the CSC (2008) estimated that 16% of the federal male and 12% of the female inmate population was involved in a prison gang (these totals had increased from 12% and 7% respectively since 1997). The problem of gang involved inmates is also evident in the provincial and territorial correctional systems, prompting the Ministers responsible for Justice and Corrections from four Western provinces to contemplate building a regional remand centre to hold these inmates (CBC, 2009). Prison gangs typically require absolute loyalty (Ralph et al., 1996) and secrecy (Fong & Buentello, 1991) which serves to further confound efforts to identify these members. As a result, it is possible that the numbers of gang members reported in a jurisdiction are undercounted (e.g., in the CSC, offenders identified as gang members at intake are higher than those who are validated by the Security Intelligence Officers).

In part fueled by the media attention and an increase in gang related activities there have been a number of recent Canadian studies and reports that have focused on specific aspects of

prison gangs (Alberta Solicitor General and Public Security, 2003; Edmonton Police Service, 2005; Grekul & LaBoucane-Benson, 2007; 2008; Mellor et al., 2005). While helping us understand the scope of the problem, none of these studies have empirically examined different programmatic responses to gang management. As a result, this study responds to this gap in the literature.

As noted in an online site dedicated to prison conditions, gangs were reported as representing a growing challenge to the safety and security of correctional institutions (Insideprison.com, 2006). The threats are expressed in a manner of different forms, ranging from involvement in major incidents, the distribution of contraband (including drugs), contributing to higher rates of violence, increasing racial, ethnic, or inter-group tensions within facilities, undermining the rehabilitative programming by supporting criminogenic values, engaging in criminal enterprises, and contributing to failure in community reintegration if parolees return to gang activities upon release (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009; Fischer, 2002; Ruddell, Decker, & Egley, 2006; Trulson, Marquart, & Kawucha, 2006).

Gang related activities have been associated with higher rates of correctional violence. Ingraham and Wellford (1987) were among the first scholars to officially report a relationship between the presence of prison gangs and violence. A recent report by the Department of Corrections for Washington State reported that gang members represent up to 18% of Washington's 17,000 inmates, but accounted for 43% of all major violent infractions inside their prisons (Dinenny, 2009). Consistent with that finding, Fischer (2002) observed that between 1994 and 2000, prison gang members in Arizona's Department of Corrections were 74% more likely to engage in serious violations than non-gang members. Moreover, a study by Fong, Vogel and Buentello (1992) reported that of the 25 homicides in the Texas prison system in 1984, twenty (80%) were gang related. Gaes et al. (2002) pointed out that although prison gangs are a pervasive problem in many jurisdictions "there has been very little empirical analysis of the impact of prison gang membership on violence" (p. 359).

The problems associated with gangs are not isolated to the United States: In February, 2009, a gang in a Ciusus Juarez (Mexico) prison was responsible for initiating a disturbance that resulted in the death of 20 inmates (CNEWS, 2009). A South African study reported that prison gangs have and continue to terrorize and exploit their fellow inmates (van Zyl Smit, 1998). Finally, a more general reference to prison violence and prison gangs recently appeared in the

Wellington, New Zealand press. Citing a leaked report from the national Correctional Department, it was noted that since 2003 prison assaults had increased from 1.7 per 100 prisoners to 4.3 per 100 in 2006-07 (Hubbard, 2009).

Similar patterns of gang related violence occur within Canadian penitentiaries. Although not all cases of violence are directly associated with gang activities, there has been strong interest from the Office of the Correctional Investigator (OCI) about recent deaths in CSC penitentiaries (OCI, 2009). Therefore, while street gangs in the community and inside prison settings do not represent a significant proportion of the criminal underclass, they do disproportionately contribute to violent activities and also create significant challenges for prison operations, including ensuring the safety of staff and inmates.

Another significant challenge to the safe operations of penitentiaries is the extent to which gang members attempt to compromise staff members through their use of associates in the community. Wilkinson and Delgado (2006), for instance, reported that gang members collectively tried to manipulate and/or intimidate staff members. The 1997 and 2001 murders of correctional officers Diane Lavigne and Pierre Rondeau from the Département du Québec des Corrections by the Hell's Angels illustrate the extent to which gangs can reach into the community to threaten, harm, or kill correctional officials.

In addition to violence, other illegal activities undertaken by gang members include the importation of drugs into correctional facilities and the perpetuation of an underground economy (e.g., unauthorized transactions between inmates – see Reuters, 2009). Presenters at a December 2008 Symposium on Gangs and Drugs in Federal Penitentiaries drew the link between gangs and the proliferation of drugs in prisons (CSC, 2008). One of the challenges that correctional systems have to confront is that both illicit drugs and the underground economy also lead to violence.

Prison gang members may also attempt to undermine the rehabilitative program within a facility. Colon (2004) found, for instance, that gang involved juveniles attempted to weaken educational or therapeutic programs. It is likely that the same behaviours occur in adult corrections. A forthcoming study from the Correctional Service of Canada (2009) reported that gang members placed illegal activities as a priority rather than rehabilitation and reintegration. It is possible that these gang members might discourage other offenders from actively participating in their case management plans.

Last, many gangs form along racial or ethnic lines, and this may contribute to higher levels of inter-group tensions in correctional facilities (Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 2002; Ross & Richards, 2002). One emerging trend in some jurisdictions is the radicalization of inmates: Hamm (2008) reported that in the United States some prison gangs are becoming radicalized (e.g., adopting and promoting radical political or terrorist agendas – see Ford, 2009 for an example from England). Terrorist groups might also see prisons as a fertile recruiting ground: Marchese (2009) provided examples of “Richard Reid (the so-called shoe bomber) and Jose Padilla (the so-called dirty bomber), both former inmates who converted to Islam and later took up the cause of terrorism” (p. 46).

Understanding the scope of the prison gang problem is also important for public safety, as gang membership has a high correlation with recidivism (Adams & Olson, 2002; Olson, Dooley, & Kane, 2004). Continued commitment to a criminal organization does not bide well for a safe transition to the community. As such, the effective management of gangs has become a component of CSC’s transformation agenda (see CSC Review Panel, 2007). Given these challenges, it is important to be proactive and develop strategies that can reduce the influence of such groups, as well as stopping the recruitment of newly admitted offenders into prison gangs. Such strategies should start with a review of different gang management strategies to determine if there are successful interventions – which is the purpose of this study.

There is a very real need to better understand the dynamics of prison gangs to better manage their behaviour and actions within correctional settings. Grekul and LaBoucane-Benson (2008) recently noted that there “is a relative paucity of Canadian research on the topic” (p. 60) and that until recently “most policies and programming for gang prevention and intervention was informed by either media accounts of gang activities or informed from the United States” (p. 60). While this study draws upon an American sample, the intent of this research is to establish a baseline from which to launch a series of more comprehensive Canadian studies of prison gangs and their influence.

Conceptual Overview

“I’m convinced that if you put three people on an island somewhere, two would clique up and become predatory against the other at some point” - Cory Godwin, former president of the Gang-Investigators Association for the Florida Dept. of Corrections (cited in Trulson et al., 2006, p. 26).

According to Trostle (1996), the 1980s and 1990s can be referred to as the "decades of the gang." Today, there is no shortage of interest in the study of gangs, or for that matter their portrayal in the mass media. A perusal of any criminology/criminal justice index will quickly reveal a plethora of published material on youth and street gangs and to a lesser extent prison gangs. Yet, prisons are playing an increasingly important role in the lives of gangs and gang members. As Curry and Decker (2003) observed; gangs are becoming more involved in crime and consequently members risk being arrested and eventually sent to prison. Therefore, prisons represent a natural extension of street gang life. For example, Wilkinson and Delgado (2006) point out that, "the outside world is constantly influencing the environment inside the fence" (p. 36). A second concern about gangs and gang members in prison is that the criminal justice system typically goes after the major players in order to try and break-up gangs. However, research has shown that sometimes gang leaders are able to continue to conduct their business while imprisoned and continue to "call the shots" while in protective custody. Joan Petersilia (2006), a noted correctional researcher, described the following gang activities in California prisons:

The California Department of Justice (DOJ) reports that prison gangs control numerous criminal enterprises from within prison, including extortion, illegal gambling, racketeering, robbery, smuggling of contraband and drug trafficking, assaults on inmates and staff, and murder. For example, in 2004, eight leaders of La Nuestra Familia pled guilty to federal racketeering conspiracy charges for directing drug deals, ordering murders, and orchestrating robberies from their cells at Pelican Bay State Prison, California's supermaximum-security prison. (p. 33)

Despite the consensus that gangs are problematic, the construct of gangs has been fraught with definitional challenges every since Frederick Thrasher's classic study of gangs while a graduate student at the University of Chicago (see Thrasher, 1927; Winterdyk, 2001). Since then, the label gang has run the gambit from denial (from some criminal justice organizations) to a variety of different meanings for researchers, practitioners, and for those who either are, or might be considered gang members (see Ball & Curry, 1995). And while some have suggested that everyone understands the meaning intuitively (National Institute of Justice, 1992), such an approach does not facilitate the understanding of gangs and/or the standardization toward how best to respond to gang related concerns. However, as Thrasher (1927) observed, no two gangs

are entirely alike. They in fact present “an endless variety of forms, and everyone is in some sense unique” (p. 45). Thrasher goes on to suggest that gangs vary “as to membership, types of leaders, mode of organization, interests and activities, and finally as to its status of leaders, mode of organization” (p. 45).

Sanchez-Jankowski (2003) argued that most researchers have failed to differentiate gangs from other types of collective behavior. He argued that gangs should not be seen as “a collection of deviants” but rather as a collection of people who have the same “values and goals of mainstream American society” who are simply responding to the particular “socio-economic conditions its participants confront” (pp. 211-212). To further complicate matters, prisons represent unique social environments that pose additional challenges when it comes to identifying and deciding how best to respond to real and/or perceived gang related concerns. As Wilkinson and Delgado (2006) have commented, within the confines of a prison inmates are: “commonly joined together by factors such as city loyalty, race and even on which side of the prison they reside” (p. 37). The collective behaviour of inmates is generally formed through what inmates have to offer other inmates, such as; protection, status, or drugs and other illegal contraband (e.g., cell phones). And in order to engage in such activity, it requires a degree of organization that involves the cooperation of a number of individuals, both within and outside the penitentiary. Hence, the term that is commonly used by American correctional facilities to identify prison gangs is security threat groups.

Regardless of whether one agrees with these observations; from a research perspective, it is necessary to have a standardized definition. For example, intuitively the label of gang is often associated with a crowd of young persons who engage in anti-social collective behavior. However, as reflected in the literature, gang members, especially those in correctional institutions are adults – and some belong to sophisticated criminal organizations, such as outlaw motorcycle gangs (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). What becomes evident when reviewing the literature is that there are a number of competing definitions and they do little to help focus the attention on a term that has today commonly been used to describe collective behavior that is considered disruptive (see Winterdyk, 2001). For example, scholars have pointed out that some young men upon entering prisons are not necessarily gang members but become gang members as part of the prisonization process and desire to ‘survive’ while serving their sentence.

For the purpose of this project we use the definition of prison gangs from the National Gang Crime Research Center which refers to prison gangs as security threat groups. As highlighted above, STGs were defined by Knox (2005) as: “any group of three (3) or more persons with recurring threatening or disruptive behavior” (p. 1).

While most of the research literature focuses on street level gangs, the first documented prison gang study was conducted in the United States and focused on the Gypsy Jokers, an outlaw motorcycle gang based out of Portland, Oregon that formed in the 1950s and continued their activities while incarcerated in the Washington State Prison at Walla Walla (Stastny & Tyrnauer, 1983). One of the first nationwide gangs involved the Mexican Mafia, which according to Lyman (1989) were able to “operate within the prison system as a self-perpetuating criminally oriented entity” (p. 48). They began operation around 1957 in the California Department of Corrections. According to the Insideprison.com website, the Mexican prison gangs tend to be concentrated in the south western states and have grown over the years. By 1998 there were estimated to be over 1,500 Mexican Mafia gang members in prison and that number was rising (Insideprison.com, 2006).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (2009) has reported that there are a number of national-level prison gangs operating in the United States and that some of these gangs have international connections (Aryan Brotherhood, Barrio Azteca, Black Guerilla Family, Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos, Mexikanemi, Mexican Mafia, and Neta). Moreover, there are a number of regional gangs that typically operate in one or two states. Last, there are local- and state-level gangs whose activities are typically limited to one jurisdiction. While they don’t classify outlaw motorcycle gangs as distinct prison gangs, there is a similar structure of national, state, and local motorcycle gangs and when members are imprisoned, they form prison gangs. Given the international activities of these U.S. gangs, it is likely that their members are incarcerated in Canadian correctional systems.

Even though it has been argued that in both Canada and the United States that prison gangs numbers have increased (see: Camp & Camp, 1985; CSC, 2002; 2008), others point out that the ability to determine the actual number of gang related inmates is one of the most elusive figures in corrections (see Trulson et al., 2006). Using data from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Trulson et al. (2006) pointed out that prison gang members accounted for less than 1.2% of all state and federal prison inmates. And when using the more relaxed definition of STG, “gang-related

inmates constituted less than five percent of all prison inmates across the country” (p. 26). Some caution must be used in interpreting these estimates, however, as validated gang members (those who have been proven by law enforcement to be members of prison gangs) are often much less than the percentages estimated by practitioners such as security staff. Petersilia (2006) notes, for instance, that only about two percent of California’s prison population has been validated as gang members, although there is widespread agreement that the total is many times higher (p. 35).

In addition to the early work of Stastny and Tyrnauer (1983) and Camp and Camp (1985), other key research of gangs in correctional facilities includes the work of Ralph and Marquart (1991) which focused on gang violence in Texas; Gaes, Wallace, Gilman, Klein-Saffran and Suppa (2002) who studied the impact of prison gangs on prison violence and related misconduct. More recently Ruddell et al. (2006) conducted a national-level survey of jail administrators with a focus on the types of gang management strategies that were being used and their relative success.

As prisons are recognized as an extension of the outside world of criminality, prison gangs manipulate their inside environment to ensure their power, influence, and continuance of their outside businesses. Since gangs often rely on violence to assert their power, intimidation, and dominance over contested territory, it is readily comprehensible that similar practices occur inside prison. Camp and Camp (1985) noted that while gangs make-up around three percent of prison populations, they accounted for up to 50% of prison violence. When there are more than two gangs being housed in the same institution, the risk increases proportionately.

Prison/Correctional Responses To Prison Gangs

Drawing largely from the work of Curry and Decker (2003), prison officials have established a number of ways of managing prison gangs or STGs. For the most part, the practices are essentially the same that are used with non-gang members who pose a risk to the orderly operations of a prison. Some of the strategies include:

- Inmate informants (Wilkinson & Delgado, 2006).
- Segregation units (Trulson et al., 1996; Fischer, 2002).

- Isolating gang leaders. A practice that was introduced in the Midwestern states during the early 1970s. It met with nominal success because of limited resources (Rivera et al., 2003).
- Locking down the institution (Ward & Werlich, 2003).
- Monitoring prison gang members' internal and external communication (Fischer, 2002).
- Case-by-case examination of prison gang offences.
- Rotating or transferring gang leaders throughout a prison system.
- Isolating problem inmates and gang members in pods to restrict their interaction with other inmates (Crouch & Marquart, 1989).
- Converting prisons into gang-free facilities (Rivera, Cowles, & Dorman, 2003).

While some prison gang/STG staff are receiving more training on prison gangs (Knox, 2000), the primary response to dealing with gang members in some jurisdictions is essentially no different than that of non-gang members. In many cases these interventions are not evaluated, and without any clear understanding of the relative effectiveness of intervention strategies, these approaches lack credibility.

Perhaps somewhat ironic given the level of challenge that gangs can present to the operation of prisons, Curry and Decker (2003) point out that there is: “no published research evaluations testing the efficacy of these suppression strategies on curbing prison gang violence and other criminal conduct inside correctional institutions” (p. 160). The study by Fischer (2002) provides evidence that within the Arizona Department of Corrections, that identifying and sanctioning STG members did appear to have a positive effect. However Fisher also noted that the impact of the intervention was mitigated by staff shortages and gang members adapting to their environment and knowledge of the STG policy by avoiding doing those things that linked them to gangs (e.g., displaying gang colors or getting gang related tattoos).

More recently, the research by Grekul and LeBoucane-Benson (2008) on Aboriginal gangs in Canadian prisons found that “institutional authorities have taken steps to deal with street and prison gangs without the benefit of academic scholarship to guide intervention.” In fact, they go on to argue that early intervention has led to “unintentional officially induced proliferation of gangs across the nation.”

The current study responds to the gaps in the literature about the efficacy of gang management strategies by examining the actions that U.S. jurisdictions are undertaking to reduce the proliferation and negative influences of prison gangs.

Project Methodology

This study employed a two part methodology which included a literature review and a survey that was sent to 53 U.S. prison systems (federal, state, and corporate). Regarding the literature review, student research assistants compiled a list of publications from the academic literature, national and international news items found on the internet, and reports by various local, state, and national Departments of Corrections. A number of different search engines were used to locate this material (e.g., Google, and the Mount Royal College library search engine which has access to a wide range of online academic and government publications).

Regarding the survey, a list of state Department of Corrections contact persons across the United States was compiled from the National Major Gang Task Force website. In the case of missing data, internet searches were conducted by the two research assistants in order to find the appropriate contact person. Most of these officials who were contacted were Directors of Security for state correctional systems, Directors of investigative bureaus, or Gang/STG investigators. As such, they would have direct knowledge of gang intervention strategies within their jurisdictions.

The semi-structured questionnaire (see Appendix A for a copy of the Prison Gang survey) solicited information across six primary areas relating to prison gangs and prison gang intervention strategies and/or practices. The survey was emailed by the CSC to all of the federal, state, and corporate contacts. Potential participants were contacted the first two weeks of March, 2009 via email, phone and/or fax. Once contacted they were invited to participate in the project and asked to return the survey to the Principal Investigator, John Winterdyk, at the Criminal Justice Research Lab in the Department of Justice Studies at Mount Royal College in Calgary, Alberta by March 16, 2009. In addition to providing an email contact, a fax number was also provided, should the respondent prefer to fax their completed survey. Effective March 31, 2009, we had received 34 responses, or a response rate of 64 percent. In most cases the respondents were the officials identified above (e.g., Directors of Security or gang investigators).

Results: Prison Gang Survey

The results of this exploratory study are presented in six sections that correspond to the main sections of the survey. Collectively, they provide answers to the policy questions identified in the Executive Summary and in the Overview.

The first series of questions, in **Section I**, dealt with *STG – Gang Membership*. The percentage of the total institutional population who were thought to be STG members on January 1, 2009 ranged from 2% to 50% with a mean of 18.04%. The percentage of the total institutional population who were validated as STG members, by contrast, ranged from 0% to 39% with a mean of 10.93%. As such, these totals are fairly consistent with earlier studies that examined the prevalence of gang members in prisons: Minor, Wells, Angel, Carter, and Cox (2002), for instance, found that 13% of U.S. prison inmates were members of STG. Ruddell and colleagues (2006), by contrast, found that 13.2% of jail inmates were gang-affiliated. Moreover, these totals demonstrate the challenges of distinguishing between the estimates of validated and un-validated gang members – a problem confronted by the CSC in their estimates from admissions data compared to those validated by the Security Intelligence Officers.

Understanding gang membership, leadership and structure is important in developing gang management interventions. It is possible that different strategies, for instance, be developed for highly organized gangs with long histories compared to more transient street gangs that have recently formed. Grekel and LaBoucane-Benson (2007) reported that the gang structure and leadership of Aboriginal gangs in Canada tends to be dynamic and that they don't follow a consistent structure. This contrasts against the more organized and entrenched organized crime families or outlaw motorcycle gangs that have a long history and well-defined leadership and membership structures.

In terms of the best estimate of the percentage of members who had a leadership role in the gang, the responses ranged from two respondents reporting that they “don't know” to 33% of all STG members as being leaders, with a mean of 4.72%. The final question of this series asked respondents to estimate the percentage of members who were “hard core” gang members, and the responses ranged from .3% to 93% with a mean of 22.19%. Understanding these characteristics are important in developing gang management strategies: If approximately 30% of gang members are leaders or hard core members, this finding suggests that 70% may have less

allegiance to these gangs, and this group may be less resistant to different interventions. As such, follow up studies should establish whether Canadian prison gangs have a similar structure.

A series of questions asked respondents about changes in STG members/membership over the past five years. Almost 70% of the respondents felt that the percentage of STG members in their correctional system had increased. In addition, around 60% expressed the view that gang members with histories of violence had risen. In terms of an increase in female STG members, 43.8% of the respondents felt that their numbers had increased in the past five years. In addition, 59.4% of the participants expressed the view that STG members belonged to more sophisticated organizations today. Knowing these trends is important, as less sophisticated prison gangs may be consolidating into larger and more sophisticated organizations, which may make it more difficult to manage them.

The next series of questions revealed that negative or illegal gang member behaviors over the past five years had increased, and that these groups had become more disruptive and generally more challenging to prison staff and administration. This observation is consistent with the findings reported in the literature review from the United States and Canada. For instance, 28.1% of respondents said that gang members had increased the use of “prisoner litigation or grievances to counter gang management strategies” while 65.6% reported an increase in the “attempts to compromise staff members.” This total was followed closely by respondents who said that gangs were more likely today to be involved in “disruptive conduct” and “increased acts of violence toward other inmates” (62.5%) compared to five years ago.

One of the interests of the investigators was determining whether membership in radicalized gangs had increased in U.S. jurisdictions. Only 21.9% of the respondents said that they were holding gang members involved with these radical-extremist groups. Hamm (2008) had proposed a number of strategies to reduce the spread and impact of these groups, including increasing the number of prison Chaplains, staff diversity, training, intelligence gathering, monitoring inmate participation in religious groups, and intelligence sharing with law enforcement or other correctional agencies (pp. 18-19). Respondents were asked whether any of these strategies were effective, and they overwhelmingly reported (80%) that “Sharing intelligence with other correctional organizations” and “Sharing intelligence with other law enforcement organizations” (both at 80%) were the most effective interventions to respond to radicalized groups.

Section II of the survey dealt with *STG Management Strategies*. Of primary interest was whether different jurisdictions imposed sanctions on prisoners once they were validated as gang members. Just over one-third (34%) of the respondents noted that their prison systems have sanctions that are imposed on all prisoners who were validated or identified as gang members.

Table 1: Response to whether programs/responses were effective in reducing the influence of gang members

Programs or Responses	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Segregation/isolation	69.2%	23.1%	0	7.7%
Specialized housing units	53.8%	15.4%	0	30.8%
Restrictions on privileges:				
Visits	57.1%	21.4%	3.1%	14.3%
Program participation	35.7%	50%	7.1%	7.1%
Commissary/canteen	30.8%	30.8%	0	38.5%
Participation in employment	38.5%	15.4%	7.7%	38.5%
Access to community	30.8%	15.4%	0	53.8%
Access to communication	45.5%	18.2%	0	36.4%
Loss of good time credits	30.8%	15.4%	0	53.8%
Delay parole eligibility	38.5%	15.4%	0	46.2%
Control release destination	25%	8.3%	0	66.7%
Automatic increase of security rating or	50%	14.3%	0	35.7%
Gang free prisons	8.3%	16.7%	0	75%

Table 1 shows the breakdown on the relative effectiveness of various sanctions. Overall, it can be seen that most programs or responses were thought to be either “very effective” or “somewhat effective.” Of special interest is whether there was an automatic increase in security rating or classification score for those prisoners who were validated as gang members. While the CSC’s custody rating scale or security reclassification scale do not have such a item, many U.S. jurisdictions increase security ratings for gang involved offenders due to their higher levels of involvement in institutional misconduct. Austin (2003), for instance, argues that gang membership is a factor predictive of prisoner behavior and should be incorporated in classification and risk assessments.

Section III included four questions that solicited responses to *Strategies for Reducing STG Recruitment*. One of the interests of the investigators was whether there are strategies that discourage or thwart gang recruitment. Slightly less than one-third of the respondents reported that their prison system offered some form of educational program or intervention to incoming

inmates at orientation or reception to discourage them from joining gangs (such as an orientation video, class, written materials or as part of case management activities). Of the prison systems that had such programs, the most effective strategy was “counseling, casework, or unit management activities” where 27.3% of respondents said it was “very effective” followed by those reporting that their “Orientation classes” were effective at reducing gang recruitment. However, given the small number of systems that actually had these interventions, the results should be viewed with considerable caution.

Eight participants indicated that their prison systems were currently using other strategies to deter and/or discourage inmates from joining gangs and they provided almost a dozen written comments. One respondent stated that they distributed a list of “disruptive groups” (e.g., larger national-level gangs) as well as a list of “watch groups” (e.g., local street gangs) to the facilities. Several respondents noted that once gangs have been deemed to be a STG, offenders affiliated with that group can be placed into a STG management unit (STGMU). All other gangs are monitored to determine if they will pose, or do pose, an elevated threat. A third respondent noted that by the time the adult comes to prison they “already have made the decision to join a STG and have been part of the gang life style for years.” Last, a respondent from one state noted that they have a debriefing unit but no specific intervention program(s).

One interest of the investigators was how many offenders became gang members after being admitted to prison. Respondents were asked to estimate this total, and these ranged from 3% to 98%, with a mean of 48.7%. This finding suggests that almost one-half of U.S. prison gang members become associated with a security threat group after they have been imprisoned. While this finding is based on a relatively small sample of respondents, it has profound implications for gang management strategies: If prison officials can stop gang recruitment, they can effectively reduce the scope of the problem by one-half. The challenge, of course, is how prison systems can thwart gang recruitment or discourage prisoners from joining a gang.

Follow up questions asked respondents why inmates became affiliated with a gang after their admission to prison. As indicated in Table 2, the primary reason was “fear of other inmates or gangs” with secondary reasons being to “increase their social status” and a “sense of not belonging, no other friends or relationships.”

Table 2: Reason for gang affiliation

Reasons for Joining a Gang	Primary Reason(s)	Secondary Reason(s)	Least Important Reason(s)	Not Applicable
Access to contraband	12.5%	34.4%	28.1%	25%
Economic benefits	6.3%	37.5%	31.3%	25%
Increase their status	21.9%	34.4%	15.6%	28.2%
Sense of belonging, no other friends or relationships	37.5%	34.4%	9.3%	18.8%
Fear of other inmates/gangs	62.5%	18.8%	3.1%	15.7%

The fact that most security or gang officials believe that fear is the primary reason for an unaffiliated offender joining a gang has important policy implications. As Ross and Richards (2002) observed, “in some prisons you absolutely need to affiliate with a group that will protect you. The loners, the people without social skills or friends, are vulnerable to being physically attacked or preyed upon” (p. 133). From a similar perspective, Marchese (2009) wrote that, “Newly incarcerated inmates with no gang affiliation may seek the protection and support of established gangs. If inmates believe that facility staff cannot protect them, they are more likely to join a gang to achieve protection” (p. 46). These findings suggest that by creating safer institutions, we reduce the allure of the gang and the ability of gangs to recruit new members.

Section IV of the survey included three main questions pertaining to *Reducing STG Influence*. Historically, many jurisdictions targeted gang leaders (e.g., higher levels of investigative resources were directed into monitoring these leaders and isolating them once they engaged in illegal or disruptive activities). Approximately one-half of all respondents acknowledged that they targeted STG leadership or leaders in an effort to disrupt the group’s activities. As reflected in Table 3, the most common and effective strategy was “isolate leaders” (36.8%), followed by “criminal prosecution of gang leaders” (31.6%). When combined with “somewhat effective” then the initiative to “isolate gang leaders” appears to be the most common and effective strategy (78.9%). What was rated as least effective was directing higher levels of investigator’s time towards gang leaders, as only 16.7% of respondents expressed that was a “very effective” strategy, although 50% did say that it was a “somewhat effective” approach.

Table 3: Rating the effectiveness of approaches in reducing the influence of gang leadership

Targeting Gang Leadership	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Isolate leaders (e.g., segregating them)	36.8%	42.1%	15.8%	3.1%
Target leaders for internal sanctions	21.1%	47.4%	21.1%	10.5%
Direct higher levels of investigator’s time toward gang leaders	16.7%	50%	11.1%	22.2%
Criminal prosecution of gang leaders	31.6%	26.3%	5.3%	36.8%

A follow up set of questions asked respondents whether they had a different set of interventions for organized crime or highly durable gangs (e.g., outlaw motorcycle gangs) compared to less organized gangs, such as neighborhood street gangs. It is interesting to note that only two of the survey participants acknowledged using a different set of interventions for organized crime or highly durable gangs.

The last question in this section asked about ranking the threats that different gangs posed to their correctional system (e.g., threat management or threat assessments). Only six of the respondents indicated that they used any formal method of ranking the threats that different STG present. In other words, there is no widespread use of a threat assessment tool or instrument either among prison systems. And while respondents were invited to fax a copy of their threat assessment instruments to the researchers, none were received.

Section V consisted of two primary questions that pertained to *STG – Gang Renunciation and Treatment*. Gang renunciation programs (also called “deganging”) assist gang affiliated inmates to leave their gang. Forsythe (2006) conducted a literature review on prison gang renunciation and reported that these programs typically have small numbers of participants, and they tended to be older inmates. Yet, his investigation also showed that once the offender renounced their gang affiliation, they were less likely to be involved in violence than prior to their renunciation, and that they seldom returned to the gang. Our survey of U.S. jurisdictions showed that slightly more than one-third of respondents indicated that they had a formal gang renunciation program in place.

A series of follow up questions asked respondents about the effectiveness of renunciation strategies, and with the exception of “interventions based on a formal education or treatment program” none of the listed renunciation strategies were identified as being overly effective. Table 4 provides a breakdown of responses, and shows that most jurisdictions do not have these

types of programs. Given the importance of such initiatives, however, it is an aspect that would appear to warrant further and closer examination.

Table 4: The perceived effectiveness at increasing the number of members that have formally renounced their involvement in a STG

Gang Renunciation Strategies	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Interventions using faith-based strategies	0	15.4%	7.7%	76.9%
Interventions using Chaplains or other religious leaders	0	7.7%	0	92.3%
Interventions by counsellors, casework staff or unit managers	7.7%	38.5%	0	53.8%
Interventions based on racial, cultural or ethnic values	0	23.1%	7.7%	69.2%
Interventions based on a formal educational or treatment program	15.4%	30.8%	0	53.8%

The final question in Section V asked respondents whether their prison system had any formal treatment interventions that specifically targeted STG members. Only six of the respondents indicated that they have a formal treatment intervention for STG members with the most common strategy involving “case management activities of counselors, casework specialists or unit managers.” While there have been few effective U.S. interventions for gang members based on rehabilitative models, it is important to note that Canadian researchers have demonstrated the effectiveness of therapeutic interventions with gang members (Di Placido, Simon, Witte, Gu, & Wong, 2006).

The final section of the survey, **Section VI**, addressed the subject of *STG – Gang Investigations*. This section was comprised of seven questions that solicited responses about different strategies that were thought to be effective at enhancing the quality of investigations. A number of questions were asked about different software and data analysis strategies that are being used by law enforcement agencies (e.g., crime mapping or data mining) to determine whether these approaches were also used in corrections.

Almost all (93.8%) respondents indicated that their prison system collects and examines different forms of individual and facility information to aid in STG investigations. Although the results in Table 5 indicated that the respondents felt that their investigative strategies were generally effective, when asked which techniques were used to interpret the data collected, most

of the responses to the options listed (e.g., data mining, predictive models, mapping, network analysis) were “not applicable” (ranging from 55.6% for data mining to 85.2% for cluster analysis and predictive models). Thus, while some jurisdictions are using sophisticated analytical strategies and tools, investigations based on these techniques are in the minority.

Table 5: Perception as to which strategies have been effective in aiding your investigations of STG

Data	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Analysis of financial records	42.3%	46.2%	3.8%	7.7%
Analysis of phone records	73.3%	20%	0	6.7%
Monitor STG member’s phone conversations	80%	15.6%	0	3.1%
Search STG member’s mail	83.3%	16.7%	0	0
Analysis of prisoner incidents and/or misconduct	70%	30%	0	0
Tracking the relationships of STG/criminal associates	63.3%	30%	0	6.3%
Monitor STG affiliated persons in the community	43.3%	36.7%	0	20%
Program participation	3.4%	31%	13.8%	51.7%

Less than one-fifth of the respondents used any type of computerized programs to identify, analyze, or display gang/STG relationships. Fewer respondents, approximately ten percent, indicated that they used Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to map the location of gang members or their behaviors (e.g., mapping gang related incidents within an institution). Respondents indicated that GIS is used to identify where in the institution gang/STG related incidents occurred. Given the extent to which GIS is used in other areas of the criminal justice system (including mapping the location of parolees living in the community), it would appear prudent to explore why GIS is not used more extensively in prison systems.

One emerging area in correctional investigations is to partner with vendors who supply services for inmates and their families, such as private corporations that facilitate the online deposits of funds in inmate accounts. Corporations such as J-Pay conduct these transactions for a fee to the inmate’s family, but they also provide a report to the prison system that tracks these deposits. As a result, if a single person is depositing funds in numerous inmate accounts in several different institutions, it may be an indicator of unlawful or gang activities. Respondents were asked if they partnered with any of these commercial enterprises, and only two reported that their prison systems used these services. These respondents, however, viewed these services

as only “somewhat effective,” suggesting that these partnerships should be viewed with caution but nevertheless explored further.

Participants were also asked about their perceptions of intelligence sharing – within their correctional system and with other elements of the criminal justice system. Respondents overwhelmingly reported that they found information sharing within their system to be very effective (78.1%), and that they generally found that sharing information with parole authorities, other prison systems, or law enforcement to be very effective. One surprising finding was that almost one-half of state prison systems do not share intelligence with local jails. As approximately 13% to 16% of U.S. jail inmates are gang involved (see Minor et al., 2002; Ruddell et al., 2006), this seems to be a lost opportunity. Follow up studies might investigate whether this pattern is similar in Canada and the degree to which the CSC shares intelligence with their counterparts in provincial and territorial corrections and the effectiveness of this information sharing.

Table 6: With whom are the products of your investigations shared?

Intelligence Sharing	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable – Missing
Within our prison system	78.1%	15.6%	0	6.3%
With parole authorities	46.9%	28.1%	9.4%	15.7%
Prisons from other jurisdictions (state, federal, or corporate)	53.1%	31.3%	0	12.5%
County jails	28.1%	12.5%	6.3%	46.9%
Law enforcement (local, state, and federal)	64.5%	28.1%	0	9.4%
Prosecutors	37.5%	28.1%	0	34.4%

One of the limitations in our understanding of criminal justice interventions is that so few jurisdictions actually conduct evaluations of programs to determine their effectiveness. The final survey question relating to gang investigation asked the participants if they had ever had a formal evaluation of their gang management interventions. Less than one-quarter of respondents (21.9%) indicated that evaluations had been committed. The general outcome of these evaluations were the observations that the prison population was increasing, and these pressures on the system were compounded by a decrease in staffing and funding, which further compromised the quality and effectiveness of the work being done by prison staff to address STGs.

The final question was an open ended item that asked respondents to identify the major problem confronting their prison system today. Almost uniformly the main challenge or problem confronting prison systems in the United States -- as identified by the gang/STG coordinators -- was a lack of resources and staffing problems largely attributable to the increasing number of inmates, and in particular gang/STG members. For example, one respondent noted that: “we are currently closing facilities and suffer from dramatic funding/budget cuts.” Another noted that the quality of applicants for corrections officers was deteriorating and that there was a general level of attrition among existing staff. Additional comments included: the lack of a centralized intelligence unit that would allow prisons to determine the actual size, growth, and depth of the STG situation; lack of dedicated resources; shortage of staff and/or a younger cohort of young STG members; overcrowding and not enough space to effectively deal with gang members; a lack of resources and skills to effectively combat the level of violence among STG and the technology at their disposal; and the growing concern with access of STG members to cellular phones and contraband (including tobacco). In essence, in spite of the dedicated efforts of STG coordinators, there appears to be a serious discord between the institutional objectives of ensuring a safe environment and the capacity (resources and personnel) to meet that goal in many U.S. jurisdictions.

Conclusions

The objective of the of this project was to survey gang/STG coordinators from U.S. prison systems in an effort to gain a richer understanding of how prison gangs were being managed, and whether there were/are strategies which appear to work better than others. These successful interventions might then be used by the CSC and their provincial and territorial counterparts to address prison gang/STG issues that are presented in their facilities. In particular, we attempted to provide answers to the following policy research questions:

- (1) What different gang management strategies are currently in use in three main areas:
 - a. Prevention,
 - b. Sanctions, and
 - c. Interventions.

- (2) What strategies have been used to identify and map gangs, including applications of new technology.
- (3) To determine whether any formal evaluations of these strategies have been conducted, and if so, whether these interventions have proven to be effective?

This report was produced with a limited sample (N=34 of a possible 53 respondents, who held a total of 954,132 inmates – nearly 68% of all state prisoners) and was submitted on March 31, 2009. It is hoped that more jurisdictions will continue to respond, and that an updated report will be produced by the CSC. Nevertheless, a number of observations can be offered at this time as the results tended to be reasonably consistent across the sample.

Results from the Literature Review

First, the literature review confirms what is already recognized by many practitioners; that is, prison gangs/STG not only vary in their presence across institutions, but they are an international phenomenon that pose risks to the safe operations of prisons, and the community if these offenders remain gang involved. There is also some evidence to suggest that membership within prison gangs are generally difficult to correctly classify and define within prison systems. That explains the finding that while 18.04% of U. S. prison populations were thought to be gang members, approximately 10.93% were actually validated as gang members. Furthermore, as has been discussed in the gang literature, there is no clear consensus on what constitutes a gang and perhaps more importantly there needs to be a distinction made between street gangs in prison and prison gangs in prison. Each presents a different set of challenges.

Gang Management Strategies

This study shows that there is a wide gambit of strategies used to control prison gangs in the United States. Most involve the practice of identifying gang members and then taking proactive steps to suppress the threat that they pose, or remove potential trouble makers from the general population through segregation. However, as noted in the literature review, prison environments by their very nature breed and unintentionally support the formation of sub-groups – the process referred to as “prisonization.” It was also evident from a review of the gang/STG literature that there has been little systematic research that has examined the success of other gang control

strategies in prison settings. Of the interventions that were reviewed, the most “successful” has been the isolation of gang members. However, the action appears punitive and without any structured and evidence-based intervention programs to assist gang members from leaving their gang, it is suspect as whether such measures serve little more than to contain a potential problem. It is perhaps analogous to sending a young child to their room without any proper follow-up.

In response to the three proposed policy action research questions of this project, based on the survey results, a number of observations can be offered:

- Compared to five years ago, STG membership has increased, and these groups are engaging in higher levels of disruptive behaviours within the prison systems.
- Comparatively few prison systems in the United States have formalized, let alone standardized, prevention strategies to reduce STG recruitment. There was no one clear prevention strategy being used and/or being used successfully. However, there does appear to be modest support for the use of counseling, case work, or unit management activities. Based on the qualitative responses, resource constraints on a number of levels raise serious doubt as to how well any such initiatives can be supported in the prison systems that responded to this study.
- The most common sanction used for controlling the influence of prison gang members was their isolation (e.g., segregation). About two-thirds of all prison systems acknowledged using one or more sanctions, such as segregation, specialized housing units, restrictions on privileges and the automatic increase of a gang member’s security rating or classification score. While it was deemed effective, there is no indication that segregation does little more than contain the problem as opposed to resolving it.
- Only half of the respondents indicated that they had formal intervention strategies to respond to the offender’s criminogenic needs. The most common approach used was case management activities of counselors, casework specialists or unit managers.
- Approximately one-half of all prison gang members are not affiliated with a gang when they are admitted to prison. Almost two-thirds of respondents believed that these offenders joined gangs out of fear, while a lesser proportion believed that access to contraband, or to increase their sense of belonging were primary reasons for

joining a gang. This finding suggests that if gang recruitment in prison were eliminated, the gang problem might be decreased significantly.

- Virtually every prison system collects and examines different forms of individual and facility information to aid in STG investigations. However, only 10% of the prison systems used GIS to map gang members and their behavior. Virtually none of the respondents used or relied on commercial enterprises or vendors to assist in monitoring or tracking gang members. This, again, would appear to be closely associated with the observation that there is a lack of resources, skilled staff, and overcrowded prisons to be able to involve outside resources.
- Less than one-quarter of the respondents reported that formal evaluations of their gang management strategies had been conducted. Given the responses to the final question of the survey (the major problem confronting their system) it appears as though there are insufficient resources and perhaps political will to have such evaluations conducted.
- The biggest barrier to any constructive policy action(s) appears to be related to a continued reduction in (dedicated) resources to effectively manage, prevent recruitment, and investigate STG members. American prison systems are universally confronted with growing STG members, a growing complexity of undesirable and illegal STG behaviors and using interventions that have not been empirically examined – observations made earlier by Gaes et al. (2002) and more recently by Grekul and LeBoucane-Benson (2008).

Although the results of the study do not provide any clear direction for constructive policy action, they do provide insight into what actions might be taken to counter the problems reported in American prison systems. Future research should focus on pilot testing and evaluating one or more of the initiatives found to show promise. Any such interventions and research should be done with a clear understanding of the nature and type of prison gangs/STG which are being dealt with. For example, drawing on the evidence reported in the literature, no two gangs are the same and different types of STG/gangs will likely require slightly different strategies to manage them. To put this observation in a Canadian context, the strategies that may be effective in

increasing renunciation with an Aboriginal gang are unlikely to work with a long-established member of an outlaw motorcycle gang.

It is also recommended that a survey combined with interviews be conducted with prison wardens across Canada to see what gang management strategies they are using and the relative effectiveness of such strategies. For example, as noted by the recent comments of one warden, an institution's response was both reactive and adopting an approach that while perhaps able to contain the problems he was experiencing, may not be the most conducive to managing the prison. For example, he reported that "every minute of the day has to be arranged to keep gang members isolated, including separate meals, exercise and visitation" (CBC, 2007).

It might also be fruitful to conduct interviews with Canadian prison gang members (both current and former members) especially in terms of when they joined the gang, their reasons for becoming gang involved, and what factors led them to renounce the gang (for ex-members). While acknowledging that this group might not be very forthcoming with their responses, it is plausible that researchers external to the CSC might be more successful in gaining this information. Such information might enable the CSC to develop strategies that would prevent offenders from joining these groups, or renounce the gang.

Policy Recommendations

It is also recommended that CSC:

- Explore strategies to establish working relationships between law enforcement and correctional agencies (including officials from provincial and federal systems) to ensure the sharing of information on gang members either being transferred into prisons or transferred out of prisons and back into the community.
- Engage in a national analysis of correctional facilities to identify which areas might require support. It might be possible that the most successful gang prevention activities might occur in provincial and territorial youth and correctional centres – thus reducing their involvement in crime as well as the flow of gang members into the CSC.
- Since law enforcement agencies represent the front line of the criminal justice system response to gang problems, research should also examine their gang control strategies, bearing in mind that suppression efforts have generally been met with adaptive reactions

or behaviour. That is, gang members simply learn to change their *modus operandi* in order to continue to engage in their criminal lifestyle.

- While suppression in its various permutations is the traditional scope of responses to prison gang/STG challenges, consideration should also be given to learning about and understanding the motivation of prison gang/STG participation in the first place (e.g., protection or fear).

Finally, it must be recognized, as with any form of criminal activity or type of crime, that the root causes of STGs are often complex and that there are no simple solutions to the problem. However, which ever strategy, or strategies are used, it must be accompanied with the appropriate funding as well as trained and skilled staff to properly execute the objectives of the initiative. In addition, the appropriate resources must also be made available so that any initiatives are properly supported. For example, staff shortages, overcrowding, and cut-backs on resources – in other words, undermining the capacity – will reduce the success of any gang management strategy. In the end, as is the case with all presenting social issues, what is ultimately needed are collaborative and cooperative strategies to address the complex nature of prison gangs and their members within today's correctional environment.

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
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Appendix A



March 9, 2009

Gang/STG Coordinators,

This letter is to request your participation in a survey of all U.S. prison systems (federal, state, and corporate) in a study of gang/security threat groups (STG). This study examines the following issues:

STG membership and structure, investigations, prevention, and intervention strategies. Our hope is to identify promising interventions that we can use to reduce the influence of gangs within our prison system.

The survey consists of 25 questions that are divided into six sections. It should take you approximately 15-20 minutes to complete the survey. While we would appreciate responses to all the questions, please do not feel obligated to answer certain questions if you feel that it might pose a risk to your operations. All of the data reported will be combined, so that the results will not highlight or identify any one system or organization. All information will be dealt with in an anonymous manner.

To better understand how the data will be reported I would be happy to email you a PDF copy of a similar research study conducted by myself and colleagues that examined the gang problem in U.S. jails.

Should you be interested in the outcome of the study, there is a spot on the final page of the survey where you can provide contact information and we will be happy to send out an executive summary of the project by email.

Dr. John Winterdyk from the Criminal Justice Research Lab at Mount Royal College in Calgary, Alberta will be responsible for all of the data collection and analyses, and we are asking that you fax or email the completed survey to his attention (the fax number and email address is on the last page).

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me directly at (613) 947 8866 or email at: ruddellrk@csc-scc.gc.ca

Yours truly,

Rick Ruddell
Director, Operational Research
Correctional Service Canada

Section I – STG – GANG MEMBERSHIP

For the purposes of this survey – we use the term “gang” and “security threat group” (STG) interchangeably: A group of 3 or more members with recurring threatening or disruptive behavior.

Instructions: Answer all questions as accurately as you can. If unable, please skip and move to the next question.

1. On January 1, 2009, what was the percentage of your total institutional population who were thought to be STG members?

<input type="text" value="___"/> % of all Prisoners	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
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2. On January 1, 2009, what was the percentage of your total institutional population who were validated as STG members?

<input type="text" value="_____"/> % of all Prisoners	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
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3. On January 1, 2009, of the STG members in your prison system what is your best estimate of the percentage of members who had a leadership role in the gang? (e.g., Recognized by staff members and/or other prisoners as gang leaders).

<input type="text" value="_____"/> % of all STG members are leaders	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
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4. On January 1, 2009, of the gang members in your prison system, what is your best estimate of the percentage of members who were “hard core” (e.g., fully committed members who would fight for the gang – but who were not gang leaders and had a greater role in the group than “wannabes” or “affiliates”).

<input type="text" value="_____"/> % of all STG members are hard core members	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
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5. Has your prison system experienced any changes in the population of STG members over the past five years? Please check all that apply:

Changes in STG Members/Membership Over the Past Five Years	Yes	No	Don't Know – Not Applicable
The percentage of STG members in our system has increased	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
The percentage of STG members with a history of violent offenses in our system has increased	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
The percentage of female STG members in our system has increased	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
STG members belong to more sophisticated organizations today	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

6. Has your prison system experienced any changes in the institutional behaviors of gang members in the past five years? Please check all that apply:

Changes in Gang Member Behaviors Over the Past Five Years	Yes	No	Don't Know – Not Applicable
Increased disruptive conduct	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Increased acts of violence toward other inmates	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Increase in attempts to undermine rehabilitative programs	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Increased acts of violence toward staff	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Increased acts of threatening or intimidation of staff	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Increase in attempts to undermine staff authority	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Increased attempts to infiltrate prison system (e.g., employment, vendors)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Increased attempts to compromise staff members	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Increased use of prisoner litigation or grievances to counter gang management strategies	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

7. On January 1, 2009, did your prison system hold gang members who were involved with radical-extremist groups that held radical beliefs or had terrorist agendas? (e.g., Radicalized gang members)

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 7b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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7b. IF YES, Have any of the following strategies been effective in responding to the radicalization of prisoners? Please check all that apply, and whether they have been effective in reducing the influence of these groups.

Programs or Responses	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Increasing the number of Chaplains	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Increasing staff diversity	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Increasing staff training to recognize or respond to radicalization	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Intelligence gathering	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Monitoring inmate participation in religious groups	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Sharing intelligence with other corrections organizations (jails, prisons, probation or parole)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Sharing intelligence with other law enforcement organizations	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

Section II – STG MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

8. On January 1, 2009, did your prison system have sanctions that are imposed on all prisoners who were validated or identified as gang members?

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 8b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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8b. IF YES, Please check all that apply, and whether these approaches were effective in reducing the influence of these groups:

Programs or Responses	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Segregation/isolation	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Specialized housing units	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Restrictions on privileges:				
Visits	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Program participation	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Commissary/canteen	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Participation in employment	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Access to community	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Access to communication	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Loss of good time credits	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Delay parole eligibility	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Control release destination	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Automatic increase of security rating or classification score	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Gang free prisons	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

Section III – REDUCING STG RECRUITMENT

9. On January 1, 2009, did your prison system include, in the inmate’s orientation or at reception, some form of educational program or intervention to discourage them from joining gangs? (e.g., a video, formal orientation session or reading materials handed out to prisoners).

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 9b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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9b. IF YES, What strategies did your system use to discourage gang membership? Please check all that apply and whether they are effective at reducing recruitment.

Reducing STG Recruitment	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Orientation video/DVD	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Orientation class	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Handouts – reading materials	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Part of counselling, casework, or unit management activities	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

10. Does your system currently have any other strategies that seem to be effective in discouraging or deterring inmates from joining gangs? If you have an online site detailing the strategy, please provide.

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 10b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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10b. IF YES, Please describe:

11. Of the gang members in your prison system on January 1, 2009, what is your best estimate of the percentage who already belonged to a STG when they were admitted?

_____ % of all Prisoners were STG involved upon admission	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
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12. Of those persons who affiliated with a gang after their first admission to prison, what do you think were their primary reasons for joining?

Reasons for Joining a Gang	Primary Reason(s)	Secondary Reason(s)	Least Important Reason(s)	Not Applicable
Access to contraband	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Economic benefits	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Increase their status	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Sense of belonging, no other friends or relationships	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Fear of other inmates/gangs	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

Section IV – REDUCING STG INFLUENCE

13. On January 1, 2009, did your prison system specifically target STG leadership or leaders to disrupt the group's activities?

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 13b & 13c)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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13b. IF YES, Approximately how much of your investigative resources specifically target STG leaders?

_____ % of all Investigative resource	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't Know	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
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13c. IF YES, Please rate the effectiveness the following approaches in reducing the influence of gang leadership.

Targeting Gang Leadership	Very	Somewhat	Not	Not
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	Effective	Effective	Effective	Applicable
Isolate leaders (e.g., segregating them)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Target leaders for internal sanctions	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Direct higher levels of investigator's time toward gang leaders	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Criminal prosecution of gang leaders	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

14. Does your prison system currently have a different set of interventions for organized crime or highly durable gangs (e.g. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs) compared to less organized gangs? (e.g., A neighborhood street gang that has no affiliation to other groups).

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 14b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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14.b IF YES, Please describe:

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15. Does your system currently use any formal methods of ranking the threats that different STG pose? (e.g., a threat assessment tool that differentiates between a local street gang and a criminal organization such as an Outlaw Motorcycle Gang).

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 15b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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15b. IF YES, Would you be willing to fax or email a copy of your Threat Assessment tool to Dr. John Winterdyk (Fax number and email address is at the end of the survey)?

YES () NO ()

Section V – STG - GANG RENUNCIATION AND TREATMENT

16. On January 1, 2009, did your prison system have a formal gang renunciation program in place?

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 16b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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16b. IF YES, Have any of the following approaches been effective at increasing the number of members that have formally renounced their involvement in a STG? Please check all that apply:

Gang Renunciation Strategies	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Interventions using faith-based strategies	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Interventions using Chaplains or other religious leaders	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Interventions by counsellors, casework staff or unit managers	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Interventions based on racial, cultural or ethnic values	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Interventions based on a formal educational or treatment program	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

17. On January 1, 2009, did your prison system have a formal treatment intervention that specifically targeted STG members (e.g., to reduce involvement in incidents).

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 17b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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17b. IF YES, Please check all that apply and whether they have been effective in reducing STG misconduct.

Treatment Interventions	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Formal educational programs	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Formal treatment program (e.g., a group that meets)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Self-help interventions (e.g., prisoner led programs)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Case management activities of counsellors, casework specialists or unit managers	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

Section VI – STG – GANG INVESTIGATIONS

18. On January 1, 2009 did your prison system collect and examine different forms of individual and facility information to aid in STG investigations?

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 18b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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18b. IF YES, Please check all that apply, and whether these strategies have been effective in aiding your investigations of STG.

Data	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable

Analysis of financial records	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NA
Analysis of phone records	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NA
Monitor STG member's phone conversations	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NA
Search STG member's mail	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NA
Analysis of prisoner incidents and/or misconduct	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NA
Tracking the relationships of STG/criminal associates	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NA
Monitor STG affiliated persons in the community	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Program participation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

19. Are there any specific strategies that your prison system's investigators currently use to interpret the data that are collected? Please check all that apply, and whether these approaches have been effective at aiding investigations.

Data Interpretation Techniques	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Data mining	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Predictive models	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Cluster analyses	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Rule based systems	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Time series analyses	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Mapping	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Network analyses	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

20. With whom are the products of your investigations shared? Please check all that apply, and whether the sharing of intelligence has been effective.

Intelligence Sharing	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Within our prison system	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NA
With parole authorities	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NA
Prisons from other jurisdictions (state, federal, or corporate)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NA
County jails				
Law enforcement (local, state, and federal)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NA
Prosecutors	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NA

21. On January 1, 2009, did your prison system use any computerized programs to identify and display gang relationships? (e.g., programs that produce a chart showing gang relationships, their intensity, and structure – often called network analysis).

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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21b)		
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21b. IF YES, Please check all that apply and rank their effectiveness.

Network Analysis	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Within a single institution	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Between different prisons	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Prison inmate – community member relationships	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

22. On January 1, 2009, did your prison system use Geographical Information Systems (GIS) to map the location of gang members or their behavior (e.g., where and when incidents occurred)?

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 22b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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22b. IF YES, Please check all that apply and rank their effectiveness.

Programs or Responses	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Map the location of gang involved prisoners within an institution	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Map where gang related incidents occur within a facility	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Map when gang related incidents or events occur within a facility	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Locations where gang members are released (e.g., neighbourhoods)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

23. On January 1, 2009, did your prison system partner with commercial enterprises or vendors (such as J-Pay) to monitor or track gang member relationships?

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 23b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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23b. IF YES, Please check all that apply and list their effectiveness

Programs or Responses	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Effective	Not Applicable
Gang member inter-relationships (using financial records)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Gang member -community relationships (using phone records)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

Community-gang member relationships (using financial records – such as deposits into prisoner accounts)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA
Community-gang member relationships using email services (e.g., JPAY or ATG email systems)	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> NA

24. Has your jurisdiction ever conducted a formal evaluation of any of your gang management interventions?

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (go to 24b)	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Not applicable – Unable to answer
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24b. IF YES, What were the main findings?

25. In your opinion, what is the major problem confronting your jail/prison system today?

This completes the survey. We thank you for your participation! The survey can be faxed to Dr. John Winterdyk at **403-440-6201 or emailed to: JWinterdyk@mtroyal.ca**

PLEASE RETURN COMPLETED SURVEY AND ANY RELATED MATERIAL BEFORE MARCH 16/09

NOTE: *If you are interested in having a copy of the results – please provide an email address – Preliminary results will be distributed by the end of April 2009.*

E-mail (print clearly): _____