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This report is also available in French. Ce rapport est également disponible en français. Veuillez vous adresser à la direction de la recherche, Service Correctionnel du Canada, 340 avenue Laurier ouest, Ottawa (Ontario) K1A 0P9. Should additional copies be required they can be obtained from the Research Branch, Correctional Service of Canada, 340 Laurier Ave., West, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0P9.
Donna L. Mailloux
Ralph C. Serin
Research Branch
Correctional Service of Canada
August 2002
We would like to extend our appreciation to Julie Keravel and Joan Menard, with Security Information and Emergency Management, and Ben Vuong, with the Research Branch, for their assistance in obtaining a list of hostage-takers/forcible confiners. We also thank Diane Hedge with the Investigations Division of the Performance Assurance Sector for providing us with the investigation reports and Colette Cousineau with the Research Branch for coding the French reports.
Fortunately, hostage-takings and forcible confinements are rare phenomena within our institutions. However, when they do occur they cause enormous psychological and/or physical harm to the victims. Past research has attempted to describe the unique static and dynamic characteristics of this group of offenders. Furr (1994), in his review, suggested that an offender who had previously sexually assaulted women staff and/or is sexually sadistic, pervasively angry or psychopathic might be at an increased risk of sexually assaulting a hostage. This applied particularly to rapists. Willams (1995) found that these offenders tended to act alone, take a single victim, were an average age of 35 years. Further, they were described as being either violent or sex offenders, demanding treatment, and serving sentences longer than 6 years. Nouwens (1995) found that: (1) preindicators do not often exist, (2) the offender was appropriately placed, (3) monitoring of the offender was inadequate, and (4) the staff response was adequate.
The present investigation reviewed all 33 hostage-takings/forcible confinements that occurred over an 11-year period (December 1989-December 2000). Generally there was an equal distribution of incidents across 16 institutions with Port Cartier over-represented. The incidents occurred most often in Quebec, the Prairies and Ontario in either medium (13) or maximum (13) security settings.
The investigation team classified the incidents in the reports as follows: 20 hostage-takings (3 with sexual assault) and 13 forcible confinements (7 with sexual assault). Sexual assaults were always against women and 36.6% of the women were sexually assaulted. Notably, 22.5% of offenders sexually assaulted their hostages.
There are a number of static variables that describe offenders who take hostages or forcibly confine and sexually assault. First, this is a violent group of offenders with a prior history of sexual and non-sexual violence, in addition to escapes. Index offences were predominantly violent (non-sexual or sexual). Rapists were the most common types of sex offender, while robbery was most common type of violent non-sexual offence. Second, while a quarter of the offenders had a forcible confinement or hostage-taking in their current conviction, half had a prior history of such incidents. Third, sexual offenders were overwhelmingly implicated in incidents that resulted in a sexual assault against a staff. Fourth, the distribution for age and length of sentence illustrate that most offenders in this study were below the age of 30 and serving sentences less than 10 years.
There were several dynamic pre-indicators. Information from file and investigation reports described them as being demanding and confrontational, primarily towards staff. Some offenders were described as experiencing high levels of stress, although most of the time the source of stress was institutional (e. g. wanting a transfer to the Special Handling Unit (SHU). For others the stress was conflicts with other inmates, family loss, or conflicts with family and staff. Those who committed a sexual assault did not tend to demonstrate obvious or unique pre-indicators. In hindsight, a few were identified as either stalking the subject, writing letters, demonstrating infatuations and/or signs of dependence. These findings suggest training in boundary issues may be useful.
According to the information in the investigation reports, 8 offenders refused treatment, 2 were waiting for treatment and 3 were making specific demands for treatment prior to the incident occurring. The remainder had either completed treatment or was engaged in treatment at the time of the incident. However, many of those in treatment were described as being disruptive or unmotivated. Treatment participation did not differentiate type of incident (hostage-taking or forcible confinement).
Currency (using the hostage as a means to an end) was the primary motivation for three-quarters of the offenders, with sexual motivation for the remainder of the offenders. For those who were motivated by currency, most were demanding an institutional transfer to the SHU.
This research suggests that offenders involved in these types of incidents are not necessarily different from the general population of offenders, and sex offenders in particular. There are, however, some identifiers that may help alert employees to the risk an offender may pose for hostage taking. If the offender has a history of hostage-takings/forcible confinements and/or is presently refusing treatment, staff should be cautioned to the increased risk this offender may pose. Furthermore, demands for transfers and an angry disposition with staff may be pre-indicators of an imminent hostage taking. A hostage taking is more likely to become sexual if the offender is a known sexual offender, particularly a rapist, and if they have been displaying signs of sexual interest in staff.
This study was limited by the low base rate of incidents, in addition to the nature of information available on OMS and within the investigation reports. Moreover, the results of this study using a larger sample size did not completely replicate Williams' (1995) findings. These limitations are important to consider when attempting to develop screening protocols for hostage-takers, in particular those who commit sexual assaults. These data suggest the potential for incorrectly classifying an offender as high risk (false positive) is likely.
Hostage-takings and forcible confinements are rare phenomena within our institutions but when they do occur they cause enormous psychological and/or physical harm to the victims. Although we may be unable to predict the occurrence of these incidents with absolute certainty it may be possible to describe the characteristics of hostage-takers/forcible-confiners within certain limits.
Past research, although scarce, has attempted to describe the static and dynamic characteristics of this group of offenders. Furr (1994), a psychologist at Kingston Penitentiary, was the first to theorize about hostage-takings/forcible confinements, formulating several key hypotheses from the literature on sex offenders and his professional observations. He suggested that an offender who had previously sexually assaulted women staff and/or is sexually sadistic, pervasively angry or psychopathic might be at an increased risk of sexually assaulting a hostage. This applied particularly to rapists.
Shortly thereafter, Willams (1995) lead a focus group that reviewed 12 hostage-takings/forcible confinements occurring between 1993 and 1995. The average number of hostage-takings was reported to be 3.9 per year. This group of offenders tended to act alone, take a single victim, was 35 years old and was described as being either violent or sex offenders, demanding of treatment, and serving sentences longer than 6 years. Nouwens (1995) simultaneously found with the same sample that: (1) preindicators do not often exist, (2) the offender was appropriately placed, (3) monitoring of the offender was inadequate, and (4) the staff response was adequate.
The outcome of this early body of research was twofold. First, several screening protocols have been created to facilitate the identification of offenders at high risk to women staff. The Prairie region uses their assessment instrument to determine work placement, whereas the Ontario region used a different instrument to determine institutional risk. Second, policy has been drafted to facilitate the identification and management of offenders at risk to women staff. Both of these outcomes originated at Kingston Penitentiary and have been proposed as national policy.
The purpose of this research was to respond to the investigation report regarding the incidence of sexual assaults during hostage-taking incidents. In an effort to clarify this issue, the present research investigated hostage-takings/forcible confinements that occurred over an 11-year period (1989-2000). The intent was to validate previous findings with a large sample. Differences between those who do and do not sexually assault their hostages was investigated in addition to the identification of potential dynamic proximal cues. The results of this research are intended to inform policy development and operational practices for hostage-takings/forcible confinements.
A coding manual was created (see Appendix A) containing items similar to previous research in addition to an expanded list of dynamic cues. The Performance Assurance Sector Supplied 35 investigation reports of which 33 were coded for the purpose of this report. Some information was found by a review on the Offender Management System (OMS). The type of incident was coded according to the manner in which it was described within the investigation report. A hostage taking was defined by the use of the hostage as an instrument for negotiation, whereas the purpose of a forcible confinement was to obtain something directly from the hostage (e.g., money, drugs, or sex). For the purpose of this report the word "incidents" refers to a hostage-taking/forcible confinement with or without a sexual assault.
In the past 11 years (December 1989 to December 2000) 35 investigation reports were issued. Two of the investigations were omitted as one hostage incident turned out to be a hoax (Feb 4, 1997) and the other was a new sexual offence (without forcible confinement) committed on conditional release (Dec 8, 1997). The remaining 33 investigations are reviewed within this research report. Figure 1 displays the number of incidents per year (mean=3.0).
There were 40 offenders involved in the 33 incidents with an average of 3.6 offenders per year. Figure 2 displays a distribution which appears bimodal (one incident in 1995 involved 5 offenders).
Generally there was an equal distribution of incidents across 16 institutions with Port Cartier over-represented. As a maximum-security institution that houses protective custody inmates with long sentences (mean sentence of 9.4 years), this institution may be more susceptible to hostage-takings/forcible confinements. Edmonton (n=3), Warkworth (n=3), Drumheller (n=2) and KP (n=2) were the locations of the next most frequent incidents. All others experienced one incident (Saskatchewan Penn, RPC-SA, Dorchester, Mission, Grande Cache, P4W, Atlantic, Archambault, Drummond, Cowansville, La Macaza).
The incidents occurred equally in Quebec (n=11) and the Prairies (n=11) followed by Ontario (n=7), Pacific (n=2) and Atlantic (n=2). While none of the incidents occurred in a minimum-security setting, they were equally distributed across medium and maximum-security settings (Figure 3).
The investigation team classified the incidents in the reports as follows: 20 hostage-takings (3 with sexual assault) and 13 forcible confinements (7 with sexual assault). Overall, 22.5% of offenders sexually assaulted their victims (Figure 4). In almost all incidents there was some degree of planning (92%) and a weapon was used by 89% of offenders. Suicide was attempted in 15% and threatened in 24% of the incidents.
There were 46 victims in total of which 16 were men and 30 were women. Sexual assaults were always against women and 36.6% of women were sexually assaulted. In 65% of the incidents there was a single victim and in 20% two victims (the remainder had more than 2 victims). In 35 cases the victims reported no physical injury while in 8 cases the injury was reported to be minor (e.g., superficial cuts) and 19 cases major (e.g., sexual assault). The victims were mostly administrative staff (13), correctional officers (6) and parole officers (8). The remainders were inmates (3), nurses (3), teachers (3), psychologists (3), non-CSC employees (6) and a librarian. Figure 5 displays the victims' employment according to the type of incident.
The following section describes the offenders static and dynamic cues. The specific information sought was often not contained within either the investigation reports or OMS. Missing data limited the ability to generalize to all offenders but provides and understanding of some of the important variables to consider in this population. Furthermore, it should be stressed that the dynamic descriptors are not necessarily orthogonal as offenders present with a myriad of indicators simultaneously.
The offenders were mostly men (n=36; 4 were women) serving an average sentence of 14.5 years (SD=11.3). They were predominantly single (n=21; 8 were common-law, 4 married and 4 divorced) and approximately 30 years of age (SD=8.7). The distributions representing age and length of sentence were skewed to the right illustrating that most of the offenders were below the age of 30 and serving sentences less than 10 years. No differences existed in terms of age and length of sentence between those who did and did not sexually assault their victims. For 25 offenders the index offence was violent non-sexual and for 13 offenders it was sexual (2 offenders had index offences that were nonviolent). One quarter of the offenders had a forcible confinement or hostage-taking conviction in their index offence. Figure 6 illustrates that rapists were the most common types of sex offender, while robbery was most common type of violent non-sexual offence. Sexual offenders were overwhelmingly implicated in incidents that resulted in a sexual assault (90%). This is a violent group of offenders that have a prior history of sexual (38%) and non-sexual violence (82%) in addition to escapes (62%). Most interesting is that half of the offenders had been implicated in a prior incident either in the community or an institution.
The dynamic variables are more difficult to code as they relied on the questions asked during the investigation . Generally this group did not appear to be psychologically different from the general population of offenders. Most were identified as having antisocial personality disorder and problems with substance abuse while very few had a known mental disability (n=6), such as schizophrenia, depression, and organic brain injuries. They tended to be non-compliant and antiauthoritarian, with some displaying symptoms of depression (n=5), anxiety (n=5) and dysphoria (n=2). The overwhelming majority expressed their anger in the form of hostility, aggressiveness, and frustration. Information described them as being demanding and confrontational, primarily towards staff. Some offenders were described as experiencing high levels of stress, although most of the time the source of stress was institutional. This was described as wanting a transfer to the Special Handling Unit (SHU) but for others was conflicts with other inmates (n=12), family loss (n=2), or conflicts with family (n=2) or staff (n=2). Those who committed a sexual assault did not tend to demonstrate obvious or unique preindicators. In hindsight, a few were identified as either stalking the subject (n=1), writing letters (n=2), demonstrating infatuations (n=5), and/or displaying signs of dependence (n=2).
Information pertaining to treatment participation was available for 27 of the 40 offenders in this sample. While a few offenders indicated that they were waiting for treatment, only 3 were in fact making specific demands for treatment prior to the incident. While a number of offenders refused treatment (Figure 7), many of those in treatment were described as being disruptive or unmotivated. Treatment participation did not differentiate type of incident.
Currency (using the hostage as a means to an end) was the primary motivation for 72.5% of the offenders and sexual for 22.5% of the offenders (Figure 8). Others were for publicity (2.5%) and frustration (2.5%). For those motivated by currency, most were demanding an institutional transfer to the SHU (n=16). A further 3 wanted drugs, 4 wanted to contact family or friends, 4 wanted medical attention, 1 was angry and 1 wanted institutional change.
As of December 31, 1999 (CSC, 2000) there were 13,173 offenders incarcerated federally of which 98% are men. Most are in medium-security institutions (61.2%; 12.9% in maximum-security) serving average sentences of 3.9 years. With 68% serving sentences less than 10 years, their convictions are primarily violent (78%). Furthermore, 19% are sex offenders, 36% have a robbery conviction and 0.4% have escaped. Two-thirds of the population are single, 50% are below the age of 34, and 18% have been hospitalized at some point in a mental facility.
Comparing this sample to the general population of offenders, this sample is over-represented by offenders from maximum-security settings with longer average sentences. However, the distribution for sentence length indicates that, much like the general population, the majority was serving sentences less than 10 years. This sample is younger and consisted of proportionately more women. In general this sample was more violent, had more sexual and robbery convictions, and had more escapes. Among the sex offenders, rapists were also over-represented. These characteristics are indicative of offenders who tend to engage in externalizing patterns of behaviour.
These findings have several implications. First, identifying the offenders' motivations provides useful information in determining precursors to the incidents. Thus, it is recommended that in the absence of a psychologist, the director of psychological services and the national manager of sex offender programs should be involved in the development of the protocol for the investigation. For instance, we recognize that sexual gratification as a motive is an oversimplification. A sexual act may be driven by more specific motives such as desire, fantasy fulfillment, revenge, punishment and power to name a few. Failure to explore these and other motivational factors diminishes our ability to intervene in future incidents.
Second, the motivations of hostage-takers described in various documents applied to this sample in a very limited way For instance, the National Correctional Training Program defines five motivations of hostage-takers: escape, change, boredom/attention, psychiatric distress, and sexual assault. While the hostage-takersin this study could be described as motivated to create personal change, the other categories did not apply to the present findings (except sexual assault in those cases that resulted in a sexual assault). Similarly, the Hostage Negotiators Manual (Snider & Bally, undated) describes 4 other motivations: antisocial, inadequate, political terrorist, and mentally disturbed. This sample was no more antisocial, inadequate or mentally disturbed than the general population of offenders while political terrorists were nonexistent. The use of sex offender typology, however, appears to be somewhat effective at identifying hostage-takers that sexually assault. Among sex offenders, rapists were more likely than child molesters or incest offenders to sexually assault hostages. However, reliance on sex offender typology is an oversimplification that would result in the over-classification of sex offenders. Since the current typologies do not fit with the present findings, training programs for officers should be modified to reflect the most recent information on hostage taking typologies. In particular, the training programs should reflect research with offender populations, as this group may be unique in their motivations.
Third, the creation of screening instruments as a result of this and previous research should be done with extreme caution. Large sample sizes and replication is imperative to ensuring that screening instruments correctly identify the target population. Some of the findings in Williams (1995) were replicated in this investigation. For example, most offenders planned the incident to some degree, acted alone, used a weapon, and took a single victim. Further, it was rare that offenders were incarcerated for a non-violent offence and many had a past history of hostage-takings/forcible confinements. Rapists were most often implicated in sexual assaults although the present findings found an even greater proportion than Williams (1995). Unlike the results of Williams (1995), however, this sample was under 30, serving sentences less than 10 years, was primarily violent non-sexual offenders, and was infrequently demanding treatment. This suggests that screening instruments created from the results of Williams (1995) are likely over-classifying offenders as high-risk. This may result in an excessive number of offenders unjustifiably living under enhanced security conditions. Future use of these and other instruments for classifying potential hostage-takers should consider the findings of this investigation and exercise extreme caution in their use until future research replicates this and other findings.
Finally, policy and operational practices should reflect the need for intervention strategies that consider the probability of a sexual offence. Although Furr (1994) suggested that "not all sex offenders who take hostages do so for the purpose of committing a sexual assault.(and) not all hostage-takers who commit a sexual assault during a hostage-taking are sex offenders."(p. 6), these results suggest otherwise. Sex offenders, particularly rapists, often sexually assault their hostages. Thus, if a sexual offender has taken a hostage the assumption should be made that a sexual assault is imminent. In this case the current procedure for resolving a hostage taking (stall and negotiate) would inadvertently provide a greater opportunity for the hostage-taker to sexually assault the hostage. Policy must be created to facilitate the ability to act more rapidly when there is reasonable grounds to assume the hostage will be sexually assaulted.
In conclusion, this research suggests that offenders involved in these types of incidents are not necessarily different from the general population of offenders, and sex offenders in particular. There are, however, some identifiers that may help alert employees to the risk an offender may pose for hostage taking. If the offender has a history of hostage-takings/forcible confinements and/or is presently refusing treatment staff should be cautioned to the increased risk this offender may pose. Also, such an offender's movement and work placement within the institution should be monitored closely. Furthermore, demands for transfers in conjunction with an angry disposition with staff may be pre-indicators of an imminent hostage taking. A hostage taking is more likely to become sexual if the offender is a known sexual offender, particularly a rapist, and if they have been displaying signs of sexual interest in staff. In any situation it is advisable to first determine the offender's background so that the best course of action can be taken to resolve the incident appropriately.
Notwithstanding an effort to be comprehensive, this study was limited by the low base rate of incidents, in addition to the nature of information available on OMS and within the investigation reports. Moreover, the results of this study using a larger sample size did not completely replicate Williams' (1995) findings. These limitations are important to consider when attempting to develop screening protocols for hostage-takers, in particular those who commit sexual assaults. These data suggest the potential for incorrectly classifying an offender as high risk is likely. Using the indicators that identify those who sexually assault their victims is a reasonable start; however, it does not guarantee the accurate prediction of an incident. Future research should investigate further potential dynamic precursors. This information in particular may be useful in the prevention and early intervention process. Policies and operational practices that are created to address the issue of hostage taking should consider these cautions.
Correctional Service of Canada (2000, November). The safe return of offenders to the community: Statistical Overview November 2000. Ottawa, ON: Research Branch.
Correctional Service of Canada. (Undated). National Correctional Training Manual. Ottawa, ON: Author.
Furr, K. D. (1994). Hostage-taking and sexual assault. Correctional Service of Canada: Ottawa, ON.
Nouwens, T. (August, 1995). Hostage-takings: a.k.a. forcible confinements and sexual assaults, What the national investigations tell us. Correctional Service of Canada: Ottawa, ON.
Snider, B., & Bally, D. (undated). Hostage Negotiator Manual, Regional Correctional Staff College. Correctional Service of Canada: Ottawa, ON.
Williams, S. (1995). Review of sexual assaults and forcible confinements. Correctional Service of Canada: Ottawa, ON.
FPS:
OID:
Gender:
Male
Female
Date of birth: (month/day/year)<
Age:
Index offence:
Violent
Nonviolent
Sexual
Describe:
If sexual what type:
Rapist
Incest
Child molester
Other:<
Length of current sentence:
Marital status:
single
married
common-law
divorced
widow
Region:
Atlantic
Ontario
Prairies
Pacific
Quebec
Institution:
Security level:
Incident /investigation report number:
Incident type:
Hostage-taking
HT with SA
Forcible confinement
Forcible confinement with SA
Attempt to commit
Incident date: (month/day/year)
Number of offenders involved:
Number of victims:
Victim 1:
male
women
Victim status:
inmate
staff
visitor
If staff what position:
Physical injury:
None
minor
major
Describe:
Victim 2:
male
women
Victim status:
inmate
staff
visitor
If staff what position:
Physical injury:
None
minor
major
Describe:
Weapon used:
Yes
No
Describe:
Motivation:
Currency
Boredom
Escape
Publicity
Sexual
Frustration
Anger
Revenge
Self-harm
Other:
Planning:
planned
spontaneous
Unknown
Prior non sexual violent offender:
Yes
No
Prior sexual offender:
Yes
No
Ever taken hostages before:
Yes
No
Incident type:
Hostage-taking
HT with SA
Forcible confinement
>FC with SA
Attempt to commit
# of priors:
If Yes:
Community
Institution
# victims:
Institutional victim status:
Inmate
Staff
Visitor
Victim relationship:
Stranger
Acquaintance
Injury:
None
Minor
Major
History of escapes:
Yes
No
Mental illness:
Yes
No
If Yes what type:
Currently on medication:
Sexual indicators:
Stalking
Writing love letters
Infatuations
Dependence
Describe:
Social stressors:
Family - conflict
Family-loss
Offenders
Staff
Describe:
Other stressors:
Institutional
Sentence
Drugs
Alcohol
Describe:
Suicidal intent:
None
Attempted
Threatened
Previous suicide attempts:
Yes
No
Substance abuse issues:
Drugs: Yes No
Type:
Alcohol: Yes No
Mixed: Yes No
Unknown
Attitudes:
Non-compliant
Anti-authoritarian
Compliant
Other:
Overall attitude:
Difficulty
Some difficulty
No difficulty<
Mood:
Dysphoria
Anxiety
Depressed
Flat
Overall mood:
Difficulty
Some Difficulty
No Difficulty
Anger:
Hostile
Confrontational
Aggressive
Demanding
Frustrated
Other:
Anger directed towards:
Staff
Inmates
Risk assessment scores:
LSI:
VRAG:
PCL-R:
Other:
Current treatment status:
Refuser
Completed
In Progress
Waiting
Dropped Out
Kicked Out
Type of current treatment:
Treatment recommendations:
Previous treatment taken:
Yes
No
Type:
Demands for treatment made:
Yes
No
Date: (month/day/year)
Type of demands:
Motivation for treatment:
Refuser
Non-compliant
Enthusiastic
Compliant
Treatment participation:
Motivated
Participates
Disruptive
Incident Dates (Investigation Report Number):
December 19, 1989 (1410-2-147)
January 11, 1990 (1410-2-147
May 17, 1990 (1410-2-153)
February 10, 1991 (1410-2-182)
February 16, 1991 (1410-2-183
March 25, 1991 (1410-2-187)
July 4, 1991 (1410-2-182
March 16, 1992 (1410-2-210)
May 23, 1992 (1992101314)
May 28, 1992 (1410-2-220)
April 24, 1993 (1410-2-243)
May 7, 1993 (1410-2-245)
June 28, 1993 (1410-2-247)
July 11, 1993 (1410-2-250)
September 15, 1993 (1410-2-253)
January 5, 1994 (1410-2-261)
June 15, 1994 (1410-2-270)
October 12, 1994 (1994000137)
November 15, 1994 (1994000249)
September 25, 1995 (1410-2-304)
October 11, 1995 (1410-2-306)
November 3, 1995 (1410-2-308)
February 22, 1996 (1410-2-315)
May 29, 1997 (1410-2-347)
May 29, 1997 (1410-1-350)
June 5, 1997 (1410-2-351)
September 7, 1997 (1410-2-356)
June 18, 1998 (1410-2-371)
November 4, 1998 (1998000817)
May 17, 1999 (1410-2-397)
August 24, 1999 (1410-2-405)
December 13, 1999 (1999002300)
March 14, 2000 (1410-2-414)
July 25, 2000 (1410-2-422)